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ABSTRACT 
Lack of awareness of illness (insight) is a well recognised problem in clinical 
syndromes such as first episode psychosis and dementia. In healthy persons, ability to 
accurately rate our thoughts and behaviours is also often referred to as metacognition and 
there is also some debate as to whether the accuracy of our self-awareness diminishes 
during healthy ageing. Low mood is often noted to be associated with better insight in 
clinical groups, however it is not clear whether this also mediates awareness is healthy 
adults. Some aspects of insight are also mediated by cognitive abilities; more work is 
required in this area in healthy adults. 
Awareness and metacognition are often used interchangeably in the clinical 
literature, despite the methods differing drastically between healthy and clinical awareness 
studies. 
The aims of this thesis were: 
- to investigate the similarities and differences between insight and experimental 
measures of metacognitive efficiency across the adult life span and in patients 
experiencing their first episode of psychosis (FEP), early-stage dementia (ED) and 
depression.  
- to quantify the insight and metacognitive functional abilities and deficits in these 
groups.  
- to investigate the effect of mood and cognitive abilities on insight and metacognitive 
efficiency.  
- to run a pilot neuroimaging study aimed at investigating the structural neural 
correlates of both cognitive insight and metacognitive efficiency in ED patients.  
- 6 - 
Both clinical measures of insight and experimentally derived metacognitive tasks 
were used. 
Results indicate age, memory and mood mediate metacognitive efficiency in healthy 
adults, with small associations between metacognitive efficiency and some measures of 
insight when controlling for age.  
In patients, results suggest that mood is associated with cognitive insight in FEP, but 
not metacognitive efficiency in either early dementia or psychosis. Further, there was an 
association between cognition and metacognitive efficiency in FEP, but not ED. There was no 
association between insight and metacognitive efficiency in either patient group.  
Comparing groups, FEP patients have worse metacognitive efficiency that healthy 
younger adults but not insight, whereas there was no difference between ED and healthy 
older adults.  FEP patients appear to have better self-reflection on clinical scales than ED 
patients, whereas there was no difference between the two groups in metacognitive 
efficiency. 
The imaging study indicated that measures of cognitive insight and metacognitive 
efficiency have overlapping structural correlates in the cortical midline structures. 
Implications for these findings in both healthy adults and patients are discussed. 
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OVERVIEW 
OVERVIEW 
This thesis comprises a number of studies designed to explore the cognitive and 
neural systems underlying a number of self-awareness concepts: metacognitive efficiency 
(the efficiency with which one evaluates one’s cognitive performance) and clinical measures 
of insight (awareness that one is ill). The studies involved 20 patients with first episode 
psychosis (FEP) and 18 with early-stage dementia (ED), who often have problems with 
awareness of their illness, as well as 73 healthy adults and 15 patients with self-reported 
symptoms of depression and scores higher than 15 on Beck Depression Inventory. 
The aims included: clarifying the similarities and differences between the broader 
constructs of clinical insight and the more experimental measures of metacognitive 
efficiency, in all groups. Next, the aim was to quantify the extent of abilities and deficits in 
these functions in patient samples and their pattern in healthy adults across the life span. A 
further aim was to investigate how mood and cognition affect insight and metacognitive 
efficiency, and if this is uniform across the study groups. Finally, a pilot neuroimaging study 
aimed to investigate the structural correlates of both cognitive insight and metacognitive 
efficiency in ED patients.  
Measures of interest were 1) cognitive insight, which is a concept comprised of two 
sub-components; the ability to self-reflect and the degree of certainty of a person holds 
about their self-beliefs; 2) behavioural awareness using the Dysexecutive questionnaire 
(DEX); 3) clinical awareness (in patients only) using the Schedule for the Assessment of 
Insight; and 4) metacognitive efficiency relating to both memory and perceptual 
judgements. 
Results from healthy adults revealed a significant negative relationship between age 
and perceptual metacognitive efficiency, with memory metacognitive efficiency reaching 
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trend levels, and a negative relationship between depression and both measures of 
metacognitive efficiency. Memory metacognitive efficiency was also associated with 
memory ability, but no other measures of cognition, and when controlling for age 
metacognitive efficiency was associated with both cognitive insight self-reflection and self-
certainty. There was also an overall association between the two efficiency scores.  
A meta-analysis of published FEP data demonstrated an overall significant 
association between low mood and the cognitive insight measure of self-reflection. There 
was no significant relationship between either mood or measures of cognition with memory 
metacognitive efficiency in either clinical group. FEP patients demonstrated a strong 
association between memory metacognitive efficiency and cognition, where more efficient 
metacognitive judgements were associated with better memory and higher levels of 
executive function. ED patients demonstrated a significant positive relationship between 
memory metacognitive efficiency and independent-rater DEX scores; no relationship was 
found in the FEP group between memory metacognitive efficiency and any insight scales. 
Participants in both clinical groups had difficulty successfully completing the perceptual 
metacognitive task, likely due to its cognitive and executive demands, so successful 
completion rates were low; therefore results produced by both groups on this measure were 
less reliable. 
Comparing clinical and non-clinical groups (including those with low mood who 
scored above a cut-off on the Beck Depression Inventory) revealed significant differences in 
memory metacognitive efficiency; FEP patients had much poorer efficiency than their 
healthy and depressed peers. Though FEP patients scored lower than depressed individuals 
in measures of insight, there was little to no difference between scores of FEP and healthy 
adults on these scales. There was no difference between older healthy adults and ED 
patients in either their memory metacognitive efficiency or clinical measures of awareness, 
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despite significant differences in actual cognitive abilities. Direct comparisons of clinical 
groups (ED and FEP) indicated that FEP patients were significantly more aware on clinical 
insight scales, but there were no between-group differences on the objective memory 
metacognitive measure. As there is an age related decline in metacognitive efficiency, this 
lack of difference between the metacognitive efficiency of the clinical groups of interest 
implies that FEP patients’ efficiency may in fact be impaired, whereas it appears to be 
relatively intact in relation to age for ED patients, suggesting the two patient groups have 
distinct awareness profiles.  
A pilot analysis of structural MR images in a sub-group of patients with early-stage 
dementia indicated  overlapping structural correlates of cognitive insight and metacognitive 
efficiency overlap with the cortical midline structures (CMS). Anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) 
and right parietal lobe volumes were positively associated with memory metacognitive 
efficiency and the volume of both ACC and adjacent subcallosal gyrus were positively 
associated with self-certainty. Further, there was evidence of a neural dissociation between 
cognitive insight sub-scales, where prefrontal cortex (PFC) volume was positively associated 
with self-reflection and negatively with self-certainty. Only the association between self-
certainty and subcallosal gyrus volume survived correction for multiple comparisons across 
the brain volume, likely due to the heterogeneity and relatively small size of this sample. 
A clear relationship in healthy adults between increased age and metacognitive 
decline in both domains of efficiency calls into question the reliability of older adults’ self-
awareness of daily activity abilities. Evidence for a negative association between objective 
metacognition and low mood in healthy adults is at odds with the relationship previously 
observed in clinical samples between low mood and insight, indicating that an association 
between self-awareness and mood differs between the healthy and patient populations. A 
significant correlation between memory metacognitive efficiency and cognitive insight 
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scores, when controlling for age, indicates some association between the cognitive and 
clinical concepts of self-awareness.  
Patient behavioural data tells a different story, indicating measures of self-
awareness from different disciplines are not as strongly related in clinical groups. Measures 
of self-awareness across domains appear to have different cognitive correlates, and 
combined use may not be appropriate in a purely clinical setting. Results also suggest that 
disordered self-awareness has a different profile across distinct clinical groups. ED imaging 
data, however, implicates a neural substrate that is common across different domains of 
awareness in the cortical midline structures. 
This thesis provides a framework for understanding the relationship between clinical 
and cognitive domains of self-awareness on a behavioural and neural basis. The poor overall 
association between clinical awareness and more objective measures of metacognitive 
efficiency across groups indicates that the umbrella term “metacognition” refers to a 
number of loosely associated cognitive concepts that are most closely related at the neural 
level.  





The term “metacognition” was originally coined by Flavell (1979, p. 906) to describe 
“knowledge and cognition about cognitive phenomena”. He went on to describe 
metacognitive knowledge as “[consisting] primarily of knowledge or beliefs about what 
factors or variables act and interact in what ways to affect the course and outcome of 
cognitive enterprises” (Flavell, 1979; p907) and that “metacognitive experiences can be brief 
or lengthy in duration, simple or complex in content... These experiences can also occur at 
any time before, after, or during a cognitive enterprise.” – Flavell (1979, p908) 
Put more simply, metacognition can be referred to as, “thinking about thinking” 
(Metcalfe & Shimamura, 1994) and is said to involve a combination of knowledge about a 
process, monitoring of a process and control of a process. 
MEMORY METACOGNITION, also termed “metamemory”, refers to knowledge and 
understanding of memory in general, as well as one’s own memory in particular (Nelson, 
Narens and Dunlosky, 2004). This knowledge enables individuals to appraise memory 
demands and to assess available knowledge and strategies in memory.  
PERCEPTION METACOGNITION refers to knowledge and understanding about one’s 
perception, and thus the ability to discriminate between correct and incorrect perceptual 
decisions. 
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SOCIAL METACOGNITION refers to the ability to understand one’s own thoughts and 
emotions, as well as the thoughts and emotions of others (Van Donkersgoed et al., 2014). 
This is associated with “Theory of Mind”; the ability to attribute mental states, such as 
beliefs, feelings and intents, to other people. Poor theory of mind is associated with poor 
social function in patients with psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia (Mazza, De Risio, 
Surian, Roncone, & Casacchia, 2001). 
INSIGHT 
CLINICAL INSIGHT, at the most fundamental level, is a broad term used to describe 
the degree to which a patient with a mental illness understands their illness, with terms and 
concepts differing across literature and disease (Marková, 2005). In the context of this thesis 
lack of insight is considered to mean a “lack of awareness of the deficits, consequences of 
the disorder, and need for treatment” (Amador & Kronengold, 2004, pg5)  
Insight is a complex construct with several elements which, when combined, form a 
rounded self-appraisal regarding one’s mental illness. Specifically this refers to the 
individual’s status as a person with an illness, or as one suffering from a disorder that may 
benefit from a biomedical intervention or treatment. According to David (1990) it has 3 main 
components:  
 Awareness of illness- the general notion that one is suffering from a bio-
behavioural change  
 Relabeling- the ability to re-label unusual experiences and phenomena as 
pathological, such as hearing voices  
 Compliance- appreciating the need for treatment and agreeing to accept 
and comply with such treatment.  
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COGNITIVE INSIGHT is “the ability to self-reflect, to acknowledge the possibility of 
being mistaken, to be open to feedback, and to refrain from overconfidence” (Warman, 
Lysaker, & Martin, 2007, p325) and may be measured using the Beck Cognitive Insight Scale 
(BCIS; Beck, Baruch, Balter, Steer, & Warman, 2004). The BCIS is made up of two sub-scales: 
SELF-REFLECTION refers to how much a person is able to reflect on their thoughts. 
In the case of the BCIS, this term refers to a person’s ability to reflect on whether their 
thoughts and beliefs about him or herself are correct, or could be changed by someone 
else’s opinion (Beck et al., 2004). 
SELF-CERTAINTY refers to the degree of overconfidence people have in their 
interpretations of their experiences. 
ANOSOGNOSIA refers to a “lack of knowledge of disease”. The term was coined by 
Babinski (1914) when referring to patients with a lack of awareness of hemiplegia, however 
it is now used to refer to lack of awareness in other neurological conditions, such as 
dementia, when referring to lack of awareness of memory (Marková, 2005). The term is 
often used interchangeably in the dementia literature with insight, and so for the purposes 
of this thesis all discussion of awareness of psychiatric or neuropsychiatric disorders mental 
illness will be referred to using the term insight. 
SELF-AWARENESS 
Self-awareness may be defined as the “the capacity to perceive the ‘self’ in relatively 
objective terms while maintaining a sense of subjectivity” (Prigatano & Schacter), 1991, p. 
13). Moreover, it has been proposed that the capacity to be self-aware is essential to human 
life, as it facilitates the modification of one’s behaviour to achieve social goals (Stuss & 
Benson, 1986).  
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Within this thesis it is to be understood that insight and anosognosia are forms of 
self-awareness specific to patients’ understanding of mental illness. 
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CHAPTER 2 
2. METACOGNITION IN HEALTHY AND CLINICAL POPULATIONS: 
THEORY AND MEASUREMENT 
“At least I know that I don’t know” – Eminem – “Berzerk” 
This chapter will outline the basic understanding of metacognition, how it can be 
measured and how this knowledge can be applied to healthy adults and those with various 
psychiatric conditions.  
As stated in Chapter 1, metacognition can be referred to as, “thinking about 
thinking” (Flavell, 1979; Metcalfe & Shimamura, 1994). Metacognition is a fundamental 
aspect of higher cognition in humans (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009) that may support 
conscious awareness (Koriat, 2007) and social interaction (Frith, 2012). Apart from their 
subjective experience, a person is said to have good metacognition when their subjective 
judgements regarding behaviour are accurate. For example, a person with good 
metacognitive ability may perform poorly on a task but is aware of this low level of 
performance and rates it as such. Alternatively, a person with poor metacognitive ability 
would make subjective reports that are not related to their actual performance. This aspect 
of metacognition can be referred to as “strategic metacognition” (Saxe & Offen, 2010), and 
will be the focus of this chapter. The term metacognition can also be referred to as 
“attributive metacognition”, which is a form of self-knowledge where one can attribute 
beliefs and desires to the self, which is more akin to the concept of cognitive insight, which 
will be discussed in chapter 3.2. 
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2.1 METHODS OF MEASURING METACOGNITION 
Metacognitive ability (strategic metacognition) can be measured by calculating the 
accuracy of metacognitive judgements regarding one’s performance on a particular task. 
Accuracy measurements can be split into “absolute accuracy”, which refers to the precision 
of a confidence judgment compared to performance on a task, and “relative accuracy”, 
which refers to the relationship between confidence judgments and performance scores on 
a task (Maki, Shields, Wheeler, & Zacchilli, 2005). These measurements can be predictive, or 
made after a task has been completed, and can be obtained using a variety of tasks. 
Judgements of learning (JOL; Nelson & Narens, 1990) tasks require participants to 
make probabilistic judgements about the subsequent recollection of recently learned items. 
During such tasks, judgments are made regarding how likely the participants believe it is that 
they will remember the information learned on a later memory test. A typical test requires a 
learning phase, where participants learn a list of word pairs, and a memory test, in which 
one word from the pair (cue word) is presented and the second has to be recalled (target 
word). Participants make JOLs by predicting the likelihood that they will recall the target 
word during the memory test (Koriat, 1997).  
Feeling of Knowing (FOK; Hart, 1965) tasks require participants to make probabilistic 
judgements about the subsequent recognition of non-recalled information. A typical task 
asks participants to answer questions about a given topic or recall information recently 
learned. Questions answered or recalled correctly are set aside, whereas for those answered 
incorrectly or not at all participants are asked to rate how likely they are to choose the 
correct answer on a multiple-choice task (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009).  
A more objective, experimentally controlled measure of metacognitive ability is 
achieved by using psychophysical techniques that allow metacognitive judgements to be 
isolated independently from task performance, thus measuring the relationship between 
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self-appraisal and cognition directly (Fleming & Dolan, 2012; Galvin, Podd, Drga, & 
Whitmore, 2003; Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). This type of task has emerged much more 
recently; Fleming, Weil, Nagy, Dolan, & Rees (2010) investigated the metacognitive ability of 
31 healthy adults using a two-alternative forced choice (2-AFC) task, where participants 
were required to make a perceptual judgement about stimuli on the screen and then rate 
their confidence in their performance on a scale of 1-6 after each trial. This task was unique 
in that it allowed experimenters to control for participants performance using a staircase 
paradigm (Levitt, 1971), where the task became easier or harder depending on the 
participants’ abilities, resulting in each participant performing at approximately 70% correct.  
A similar paradigm was employed by McCurdy et al. (2013) regarding memory, in which 
participants learned words in the initial phase of assessment, and made a 2-AFC judgement 
about the word present on the screen during the test phase regarding which of the two 
words presented was recognised as being from the learned list. Again confidence 
judgements were made after each trial, however there was no staircase paradigm 
employed.  
2.2 METHODS OF CALCULATING METACOGNITION  
A number of methods have been proposed in the last 60 years to calculate 
metacognitive abilities, such as absolute and relative accuracy, bias, scatter and 
discrimination (Schraw, 2009; see table 2.2-1). Such methods can be used to calculate 
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Construct being 
measured 






Discrepancy between confidence judgement and 






Relationship between a set of confidence 
judgement and performance scores. Measures 





Bias index The degree of over- or under-confidence in 





Scatter index The degree to which an individual’s judgements 
for correct and incorrect responses differ in 
terms of variability.  
Measures differences in variability for 







Ability to discriminate between correct and 
incorrect outcomes. Measures discrimination 
between confidence for correct and incorrect 
items. 
 
Table 2.2-1. “Five types of metacognitive judgement outcome score” from Schraw (2009), p35. 
A problem with absolute measures of metacognition is that abilities can be 
dependent partly on participants’ task performance. For example, Maki et al. (2005) 
investigated absolute and relative metacognitive comprehension in a group of University 
students. Participants were required to predict their performance on verbal comprehension 
tasks, complete the task, and then make judgements about their task performance. Results 
indicated that metacognitive ability was partly affected by task ability: students with lower 
verbal abilities made overconfident judgements of future performance on harder tasks and 
students with better verbal abilities were under-confident in post-task performance 
judgements. In tasks where participants had revised beforehand all students were 
overconfident in their performance predictions. Therefore the results demonstrated that 
absolute accuracy of predictions and confidence judgments depended on students' abilities 
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and task difficulty. Conversely, relative metacognitive accuracy did not depend on verbal 
ability or on task difficulty.  
The most popular method of metacognition calculation in the metamemory 
literature is the Goodman and Kruskal (1954) gamma statistic (γ), which provides a measure 
of association, or correlation, between two ordered, symmetrical responses of two or more 
levels each. Usually used in FOK and JOL studies, participants’ performance is related to their 
pre- or post-task judgements of memory, and is measured at the ordinal level (see figure 
2.2-1 for a 2x2 data array).  
 
Type I 
Primary memory task 





Yes No Marginals 
Yes a b a+b 
No c d c+d 
Marginals a+b b+d a+b+c+d=N 
 Figure 2.2-1 2x2 illustration of potential judgements during an FOK or JOL task, where “a” and “d” are 
metacognitively ideal responses and “b” and “c” are metacognitively poor responses. 
In relation to JOLs such judgements are posed as, for example, “do you think you will 
remember this word in the recall phase?” whereas for FOK judgements this would be posed 
as “do you think you will recognise the items you have not recalled correctly?” γ is defined in 






The value of γ ranges from −1, which represents that there is 100% negative 
association between memory and FOK/JOL judgements, i.e. every time a participant gets an 
answer incorrect they rate a positive FOK/JOL and vice versa, to +1, which represents that 
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100% positive association between memory and FOK/JOL judgements, i.e. every time a 
participants gets an answer correct they rate a positive FOK/JOL and vice versa, therefore a 
value of zero indicates the absence of association between performance and FOK/JOL. 
Answers closer to +1 indicate good metacognitive abilities; the further individuals deviate 
from this score the worse their metacognitive abilities are.  
Unlike other correlation measures, e.g. Pearson’s r or Spearman’s rho, γ is 
unaffected by ties (as it discounts any data where this may occur), which are unavoidable in 
metamemory research and are otherwise problematic. In addition, no distributional 
assumptions need to be made for γ (Nelson & Narens, 1990). However, there are a number 
of limitations to gamma that make it an unreliable measure of metacognition (Schraw, 
1995). The most problematic of these limitations is that empty cells greatly distort the 
observed value of γ. For example, if a participant only makes “a” responses (where they 
make a correct judgement and accurate appraisal of it) during the task their gamma score 
will be “undefined” despite a perfect concordance rate between performance and ratings. 
Further, γ =1 whenever b or c=0 (i.e. mainly “a” and “d” responses are made) and γ = -1 
whenever either a or d = 0 (i.e. when no “a” or “d” responses are made).  
Gamma systematically varies with response bias (e.g. when a participant chooses 
“Yes” more often than “No” when unsure of the answer, resulting in skewed responses), so 
that effect artefacts arising from response bias, and not from genuine differences in 
accuracy, may appear if γ is used as a measure of accuracy (Masson & Rotello, 2009). In 
other words, if a participant is biased on either a type I or type II response, this can affect γ 
and thus give an unrepresentative accuracy value. In addition, γ is an asymmetrical test of 
independence whereby large values of γ suggest that recognition performance on FOK/JOL 
judgements are related to memory performance. However, when γ = 0 it does not suggest 
judgements are totally independent of recognition performance (unless using the 2 x 2 
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judgement method, as shown in Figure 2.2-1). Finally γ values are very sensitive to the 
distribution of scores along the ad and bc diagonals; if a and d are equal the value of γ 
increases, whereas if they are uneven γ can decrease in value. 
Signal detection theory (SDT) allows assessment of discrimination accuracy 
independent of performance or judgment bias, but its application crucially depends on 
distributional assumptions. To calculate metacognition using signal detection theory one 
requires participants to make 1) type I judgements, which are the basic judgement made 
regarding the primary task (e.g. which stimulus on the screen is brighter, right or left), and 2) 
type II judgement, which are the basic confidence judgements made (do you think your 
answer for this trial was: correct or incorrect). Type I sensitivity measures the incorrect 
rejections, i.e. making a correct answer but saying it is incorrect, or making an incorrect 
answer and saying it is correct. More correct rejection or correct acceptance during the task 
results in a better metacognitive score (see figure 2.2-2). However basic signal detection 
theory still holds a risk of response bias, for example when a participant is unsure of an 






Self-rated confidence in performance 
 
Confident Correct Not Confident 
Correct 
Correct Answer / x 
Incorrect Answer x / 
Figure 2.2-2 Illustration of judgements required for metacognitive ability to be calculated using signal 
ndicates the metacognitively 
poor response 
Most recently Maniscalco and Lau (2012) developed a method of calculating 
metacognitive efficiency (type II efficiency): “the efficacy with which observers’ confidence 
ratings discriminate between their own correct and incorrect stimulus classifications” (p. 
422), using a computational model grounded in signal detection theory, which removes 
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confounds such as response bias and type 1 sensitivity found in standard signal detection 
calculations.  Their calculations use d-prime (d’), which relates to primary performance on a 
given task, and meta d’ which refers to type 2 sensitivity (confidence in performance). Meta 
d’ represents the level of d’ that would have been expected to have generated the observed 
confidence in performance. For example, if one was confident in their performance on 100% 
of the trials the expected d’ would be 100% correct. This reflects that their measure is one of 
type 2 sensitivity (meta d’) expressed at the level of type 1 signal detection theory (d’). Meta 
d’ can be considered to be a measure of the signal that is available for the subject to 
perform the type 2 task (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). Under the ideal observer model we would 
expect someone with good metacognitive ability to have a meta d’ score that = d’, i.e their 
task performance matched the expected result. However, if this is not the case, and meta 
d’≠ d’, participants’ type II sensitivity has either out performed or underperformed the 
expected value. Where meta d’ is smaller than d’, we can assume that the participant has 
poor metacognitive abilities.  





which controls for the influence of basic task performance on metacognitive judgements 
(also referred to as meta d’/d’). This estimates the amount of signal strength that is available 
for metacognition, expressed as a fraction of the amount of signal strength that is available 
for the primary task. When a participant has ‘ideal’ metacognitive efficiency they will obtain 
a ratio score of 1, whereas a participant who has very poor efficiency will obtain a ratio score 
of 0. Maniscalco and Lau’s method isolates subjects’ metacognitive efficiency by dissociating 
a subject- and task-specific metacognitive score (meta d’/d’) from both objective task 
performance and the absolute level of subjective confidence, which both vary on a trial-by-
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trial basis. In other words, meta d’/d’ objectively calculates the efficiency with which a 
participant is aware of their task performance. Though meta d’/d’ relies on assumptions, 
unlike γ, this measure of metacognition produces an efficiency value which provides the 
most objective result. 
2.3 HEALTHY ADULTS 
Fleming et al. (2010) found large inter-individual variability in metacognitive abilities 
of healthy young adults, where metacognitive ability varied from 0.55-0.75 (out of a possible 
1) despite task performance remaining ~70% correct across participants. In addition, Song et 
al. (2011) found that participants’ metacognitive ability measured in one type of visual 
discrimination task could predict their metacognitive ability in a second, different visual task, 
and this effect was independent of the variability in their objective performance on 
perceptual judgements. Further, to this McCurdy et al. (2013) found that there was a 
significant relationship between metacognitive abilities as measured on a visual perception 
task and a memory task, however this was not found by Baird, Smallwood, Gorgolewski, and 
Margulies (2013). Together these findings suggest that metacognitive ability uses a cognitive 
process independent of both task used, and, possibly, task domain. 
2.3.1 AGEING 
Given that there are clear inter-individual differences in metacognitive ability in the 
healthy younger population, there is some debate as to whether metacognitive ability 
changes as we age. Some may suggest greater life experience results in better self-
understanding and therefore better metacognitive judgements, and there is some evidence 
to support this. Pliske and Mutter (1996) investigated the awareness of older and younger 
adults in their general knowledge ability; results showed that older participants were better 
at predicting whether their answers would be correct or not on a general knowledge test 
(Dodson, Bawa, & Krueger, 2007; Pliske & Mutter, 1996). Similarly, Vukman (2005) found 
that accuracy in metacognitive statements regarding problem solving was significantly 
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better in the mature adult group compared to younger adults, with a minor decline in the 
oldest adult group. Lachman, Lachman, and Thronesbery (1979) found all age groups 
demonstrated accurate and efficient metamemory, however this may have been related to 
the finding that there were also no age effects on memory retrieval.  
Some research has found there to be no age effect, positive or negative, on 
metacognitive judgements. This has been found using FOK methodology for face recognition 
(Eakin, Hertzog, and Harris, 2014) and semantic memory when accounting for subjective 
accounts of memory awareness (Souchay, Moulin, Clarys, Taconnat, and Isingrini, 2007). 
Further, Connor, Dunlosky, and Hertzog (1997) also suggest that differences in absolute 
accuracy are influenced by factors other than on-line monitoring of memory, and 
demonstrated that, though there were age related differences regarding absolute 
metamemory accuracy, older adults showed a robust delayed metamemory accuracy that 
was not significantly different from younger adults. In addition Halamish, McGillivary and 
Castel (2011) found that, whilst older adults exhibited worse memory performance, they 
made accurate JOLs where they accurately estimated that they had forgotten more 
information than their younger counterparts. It was found that both age groups were 
accurate in predicting their ‘forgetting’, indicating that aging does not impair the ability to 
monitor forgetting. It has been suggested that studies demonstrating age related decline in 
JOL’s reflect recall deficits as opposed to a true age related decline in metacognition 
(Daniels, Toth, and Hertzog, 2009). 
Conversely, there is a substantial body of evidence to support the notion that, as 
with memory (Stuart-Hamilton, 2012), our ability to accurately judge our performance on 
various tasks also declines with age. This has been demonstrated in a number of study 
designs, such as forced recall and confidence ratings of words (Kelley & Sahakyan, 2003; 
Weil et al, 2013) and pictures, despite controlling for memory ability (Pansky, Goldsmith, 
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Koriat, and Pearlman-Avnion, 2009). Work by Huff, Meade, and Hutchison (2011) has also 
demonstrated that older adults recalled intrusions with greater confidence than young 
adults, indicating that the older adults had less awareness that their recall was incorrect. 
There is evidence of an age related decline in FOK accuracy (Cosentino, Metcalfe, Holmes, 
Steffener, and Stern, 2011), however it has been suggested this age effect is only the case in 
episodic, and not semantic, memory (Souchay et al., 2007). Regarding JOLs, Tauber and 
Dunlosky (2012) studied effects of age on emotional word learning and found that, though 
younger adults were more sensitive to learning ability of positive words versus neutral 
words, older adults were not, and both were sensitive to learning negative words. Toth, 
Daniels, and Solinger (2011) found that only younger adults benefited from prior knowledge 
on the recognition tests, whereas this appeared to interfere with the familiarity of pictures 
shown to older adults and reduced accuracy of the memory predictions. Age-related 
reductions in metamemory accuracy may also be affected by deficient recall and monitoring 
of stimuli details such as colour and font size (Wong, Cramer, & Gallo, 2012), where older 
adults were found to be better at picture recall than colour recall, and font size also had an 
impact. Soderstrom, McCabe, and Rhodes (2012) found that, using both Judgements of 
Remembering and Knowing (JORKs)– where participants predicted whether learned word 
pairs would be remembered (i.e. recalled) known (i.e., be familiar but not recalled), or 
forgotten – older adults demonstrated poor accuracy compared to actual memory ability, 
where they were overconfident in their prediction of remembering.  
Some evidence suggests older adults require extra time to reach similar 
performance levels as their younger counterparts (Thomas, Bonura, Taylor, and Brunyé, 
2012) however when given the opportunity to allocate time between tasks of varying 
difficulty, unlike younger participants, older adults allocated even amounts of time 
regardless of task difficulty (Froger, Sacher, Gaudouen, Isingrini, and Taconnat, 2011), 
indicating a reduced awareness of the need for extra time. Bender and Raz (2012) found that 
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older adults consistently used ineffective encoding strategies, further indicating older adults 
have poor awareness of their memory abilities.  
Despite different study designs there is a clear, large body of evidence support the 
idea of an age related decline in metacognition regarding task performance, as opposed to 
research demonstrating no such trend. However evidence suggests there may be variations 
in the age effect, where awareness of general knowledge and problem solving ability may 
improve with age, and other cognitive domains such as awareness of task performance and 
daily functioning may decline over time. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that awareness 
of deficits in both questionnaire assessments of daily life and laboratory based task 
performance are related, and decline as we age (Harty, O’Connell, Hester, & Robertson, 
2013). These findings are more consistent with real-world reports that lack of awareness of 
cognitive, physical and perceptual abilities in healthy older adults can be problematic, with 
aberrant confidence leading to dangerous or even life threatening behaviours. Hultsch, 
MacDonald, Hunter, Levy-Bencheton, and Strauss (2000) demonstrated that there are 
notable changes in self-appraisal as we age, and these tend to centre on inaccuracies 
regarding beliefs about cognitive ability and control over cognition. Older adults tend to 
demonstrate increased over-confidence compared to actual performance when compared 
to younger adults (Dodson et al., 2007; Light, Singh, & Capps, 1986), which has been 
supported by research regarding  “real-world” examples of age-related decline in awareness 
of driving ability (Ross, Dodson, Edwards, Ackerman, & Ball, 2012). Older adults between the 
ages of 65–87 years old were asked about their driving abilities, and it was found that, 
regardless of previous accident history, 85% of the drivers in this age range rated themselves 
as “good” or “excellent” drivers. In addition, there was no change in rating with age despite 
finding a correlation between increased number of accidents and older age. 
- 42 - 
Metacognition can operate across numerous domains of cognition, such as 
perception and memory. In addition, metacognitive judgments can be prospective (such as a 
prediction of success) or retrospective (such as confidence in past choices). Research has 
emphasized conceptual similarities between some characteristics of memory metacognition 
and executive functions (Shimamura, 1995; Fernandez-Duque et al., 2000; Souchay, Isingrini, 
& Espagnet, 2000; Pannu and Kaszniak, 2005). However, the domain-specific characteristics 
of metacognition are not well explored. McCurdy et al. (2013) showed that metacognitive 
ability in perceptual and mnemonic domains were moderately but significantly related in a 
sample of young adults. Whether aging affects metacognition in a domain-general or 
domain-specific fashion is not clear from the previously reported literature. A study by 
Perrotin, Belleville, and Isingrini (2007) compared patients with mild cognitive impairment 
(MCI) to healthy age matched controls in their FOK abilities looked at the effects of tests of 
executive function. Results indicated that there were between-group differences; 
highlighting that FOK accuracy was primarily related to memory abilities in people with MCI, 
as opposed to control participants, in whom it was related to executive functioning.   
However, it has been difficult to separate metacognitive ability from age-related 
changes in performance. As mentioned in section 2.1.1, the sensitivity of metacognitive 
measures used in the previously reviewed literature is often inherently affected by task 
performance itself, which can also be affected by age (Stuart-Hamilton, 2012). If we are able 
to remove the effect of performance on metacognition we may see a difference in 
metacognitive efficiency across the lifespan and cognitive domains (see 2.3.2).  
2.3.2 RELATIONSHIP TO BRAIN STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION 
Research has revealed a specific neural basis for strategic metacognitive ability in 
human prefrontal and parietal cortices (Saxe & Offen, 2010). The study by Fleming et al. 
(2010) referred to in section 2.3 demonstrated that the inter-individual differences noted in 
metacognitive ability were also significantly associated with gray matter volume in- and 
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white matter microstructure connected with - the anterior prefrontal cortex (aPFC) volume, 
where greater volume was associated with better metacognitive ability. Fleming, Huijgen, 
and Dolan (2012) investigated metacognitive aspects of decision-making and found that 
during an fMRI task the right rostrolateral prefrontal cortex (rlPFC) showed greater activity 
during confidence reporting compared to a matched control condition. Greater activity in 
this area was also significantly associated with reported confidence in task performance 
where the strength of the relationship between activity and confidence predicted 
metacognitive ability across individuals. In addition, functional connectivity between right 
rlPFC and both contralateral PFC and visual cortex increased during metacognitive reports.  
McCurdy et al. (2013) found a similar association to previous work between the volume of 
the aPFC and visual discrimination metacognitive abilities, with an additional weak 
correlation with precuneus volume. Memory metacognitive abilities, however, were only 
correlated with precuneus volume. It is suggested that the joint association of metacognitive 
abilities in different domains and the precuneus explain the behavioural correlation between 
metacognitive tasks of memory and perception.  Further, a recent study by Baird, Cieslak, 
Smallwood, Grafton, & Schooler (2014) investigated the association between white matter 
connections and metacognitive accuracy. Results demonstrated that accuracy on perceptual 
metacognitive tasks were associated with white matter connections to the ACC, whereas 
accuracy for memory metacognitive judgements were associated with white matter 
extending into the inferior parietal lobule, indicating that there are distinct neural correlates 
across metacognitive domains. Yokoyama et al. (2010) also investigated the functional 
neural correlates of metacognitive abilities in a memory task using fMRI; they found 
increased activity in the posterior-dorsal right frontopolar cortex when confidence ratings 
about task performance were better correlated with actual memory performance, i.e. when 
better metacognitive judgments were made.  
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Further to this, Baird et al. (2013) used resting-state functional connectivity (rs-
fcMRI) to relate intra-individual variability in metacognitive judgements noted in previous 
studies to the connectivity of the medial and lateral regions of aPFC, to identify if specific 
anatomical parts of the aPFC are specialized for domain specific metacognitive processes. 
Akin to previous research they report a behavioural dissociation in perceptual and memorial 
metacognitive judgments. Functional connectivity analyses indicated that distinct patterns 
of connectivity were associated with individual differences in both perception and memory 
metacognitive abilities.  As with previous studies, greater connectivity was observed during 
perceptual metacognitive judgments between the lateral aPFC and the right dorsal anterior 
cingulate cortex (dACC), bilateral putamen, right caudate, and thalamus. Similarly to 
previous work they identified that memory metacognitive ability was associated with 
greater connectivity between medial aPFC and the right central precuneus and intraparietal 
sulcus/inferior parietal lobule. In addition to metacognitive judgements about ‘basic’ 
cognitive processes such as perception and memory, De Martino, Fleming, Garrett, & Dolan 
(2013) asked participants to make choices between two snack items, where they were 
required to choose the most expensive item, and then rate their confidence in this value-
based choice. Results indicated that accuracy of confidence judgements are positively 
associated with functional connectivity in the ventro medial PFC (vmPFC), suggesting that 
the frontal lobes mediate metacognitive judgements across a number of domains. 
These results are supported by brain stimulation studies. Rounis, Maniscalco, 
Rothwell, Passingham, and Lau (2010) used transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to 
bilaterally reduce activity in the DLPFC whilst participants carried out a visual discrimination 
task. Reduced activity in the targeted area of the PFC was associated with reduced 
metacognitive judgements with signal detection theory analysis confirming this was due to a 
reduction in metacognitive ability, not response bias. Further to this point, Harty et al. 
(2014) tested the awareness of older adults to correctly detect performance errors; after 
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anodal transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) was performed over the right DLPFC 
they reported that participants displayed a significant increase in error detection, but not 
performance accuracy, indicating that performance and metacognition can be dissociated. 
This sample consisted of older adults (65-86 years old) and thus further implicates the 
frontal lobes in the executive-ageing theory of metacognitive decline as we age (2.3.1). 
There is also evidence from lesion studies. Hoerold, Pender, and Robertson (2013) 
demonstrated that patients with lesions to the left and right frontal lobe had impaired 
metacognitive awareness. Further, a recent study by Fleming, Ryu, Golfinos, and Blackmon 
(2014) compared metacognitive efficiency in patients with lesions in the aPFC and found 
that, compared to healthy adults and control patients with temporal lesions, aPFC lesions 
lead to a selective deficit in perceptual metacognitive efficiency (meta d’/d’). As these 
regions are susceptible to aging-related atrophy (Fjell et al., 2009) it is plausible that there 
are age-related changes in metacognitive ability. However it is unknown how aging affects 
metacognitive ability when dissociated from the confounding influence of task performance.  
Studies have also looked into self-reflection, an introspective aspect of 
metacognition, in healthy adults. Activation in a distinct area in the frontal lobe, the medial 
PFC (MPFC), was found to be associated with participants’ subjective judgements of their 
personality traits, current mental state, and physical attributes (Jenkins & Mitchell, 2011). 
Authors suggested that, though each type of self-reflection was also associated with unique 
areas of activation, self-referential thought clearly utilises a cognitive processes that is 
related with the MPFC. This area is also associated with implicit self-referential thinking; 
Rameson, Satpute, & Lieberman (2010) studied a group of participants who associated 
themselves as “scientific” or “athletic” (referred to as their schema) and asked them to rate 
a number of words on how representative they were of the respective categories. Though 
the task was not explicitly self-reflective in nature, participants had faster response times for 
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words matching their personal schema (i.e. participants who saw themselves as scientific 
responded faster to scientific words). During an fMRI task, the explicit referential task 
required participants to rate whether a schematic word described them by rating it “me” or 
“not me”. The implicit task required participants to rate whether scientific or athletic photos 
had people in them. Again, though this task was not self-referential, areas of the precuneus 
PCC, vMPFC, MPFC, ventral striatum, and subACC showed significant activation, which were 
also active in the explicit task. These results demonstrate that activation of frontal structures 
occurs when observing words or pictures one views as self-referential, even if this is not the 
primary task being undertaken. 
There is therefore a great deal of behavioural and brain imaging evidence, in a 
number of domains, to indicate that there is an age related decline in metacognitive abilities 
from early to older adulthood. Indeed, there is also a large body of evidence that 
demonstrates an age-related decline in frontal lobe volume, where both the gray matter and 
white matter connections are affected (Cabeza & Dennis, 2013). Specifically, cross-sectional 
studies have indicated that pre-frontal cortex atrophy is affected to a greater degree as we 
age, compared to other cortical regions, with the gray matter in the lateral PFC regions 
demonstrating the sharpest decline (Raz, 2000, 2004). Longitudinal studies have further 
supported this notion (Resnick, Pham, Kraut, Zonderman, & Davatzikos, 2003) and indicated 
that the PFC shows a steeper decline as we enter older age. Further, studies across a 
number of domains have implicated that the neural basis of metacogntion is located in the 
frontal lobes and CMS (Fleming & Dolan, 2012). 
2.3.3 EMOTION 
Recent evidence also suggests that emotion can affect metacognitive abilities. Massoni 
(2014) used a similar computerised paradigm to other recent studies mentioned in section 
2.3 to investigate the effect of worry on metacognitive efficiency. Participants had to 
complete a 2-AFC task that required a perceptual judgement about which of two circles 
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contained more than 50 dots. There was a betting phase prior to the perceptual task that 
required participants to bet money (€20 or €200) on the likelihood of their success over the 
next 2,3 or 4 trials, with the higher stake bet designed to induce anxiety, and betting on 
more trials would also induce higher anxiety. Before the perceptual trial participants rated 
their level of anxiety on a scale of 0-9, participants then completed a perceptual trial and 
immediately after rated their confidence in their performance. Maniscalco and Lau’s (2012) 
Meta-d’ was used to calculate metacognitive efficiency, and results demonstrated that 
higher anxiety led to improved metacognitive judgements on this task, implicating emotion 
in the accuracy of metacognitive judgements. 
2.3.4 HEALTHY ADULTS – CONCLUSIONS 
There is a great deal of behavioural evidence to suggest that there are inter-
individual differences in the metacognitive abilities of healthy adults, and that abilities also 
reduce as we age. Imaging studies have indicated that this variance is associated with gray 
matter volume in the frontal lobes and the CMS. Support for the association between age 
and metacognitive decline comes from imaging studies which indicate atrophy of the frontal 
lobes is significantly associated with age, especially when entering older age. Evidence also 
suggests that there is an association between metacognitive abilities in different cognitive 
domains. Further, the current literature can be combined to suggest that there is a neural 
basis of metacognitive function focused in the frontal lobes.  
2.4 METACOGNITION IN PSYCHIATRIC POPULATIONS 
As covered in Section 2.1, metacognition in healthy adults may be mediated by 
frontal lobe function. It has therefore been suggested that metacognition may be impaired 
in neuropsychiatric disorders in which frontal lobe function is thought to be compromised 
and in which structural imaging has suggested reductions in frontal lobe volume (David, 
Bedford, Wiffen, & Gilleen, 2012), or damaged (Fleming et al., 2014; see Chapter 2.3.2). 
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Mainly using FOK and JOL methodology, metacognitive abilities have been measured 
in both dementia (chapter 2.4.1) and psychosis (chapter 2.4.3). 
2.4.1 DEMENTIA 
Dementia (including Alzheimer’s disease [AD] and other disorders) is a neurological 
syndrome primarily characterised as affecting memory with other cognitive functions also 
involved, resulting in a steady decline in functioning profiles as the disorder progresses. Mild 
cognitive impairment (MCI), where cognitive impairment exists but not to the extent of 
causing significant functional impairment, often precedes overt dementia. However there is 
a large amount of heterogeneity regarding areas of cognition affected under the umbrella 
term of dementia. As will be further outlined in Chapter 3, anywhere from 20-80% of 
patients with MCI and dementia have reduced awareness of their cognitive impairments 
(Derouesne et al., 1999; Reed, Jagust, & Coulter, 1993), which can negatively impact on 
treatment adherence, and the life satisfaction of both patient and caregiver (Rymer et al., 
2002). However, like functioning profiles, there is also a large amount of heterogeneity 
regarding patients’ awareness of their cognitive deficits (Cosentino & Stern, 2005). Variance 
in results on metacognitive abilities in patients with dementia may come from the measures 
used to assess patient awareness; much of the literature in this field has relied on clinician 
ratings and clinician- or caregiver-patient discrepancy ratings (global measures) for 
assessments of patient awareness of functioning, which are often questionnaire-based and 
can be subjective in nature. Though these scales are often related to actual functioning (local 
functioning, e.g. performance on a memory task) more recently research has focussed on 
developing measures of self-awareness that are more objective, such as FOK and JOL (as 
described in 2.1), which have been shown to have different correlates to global measures of 
awareness.  
Another explanation for the heterogeneity across tasks comes from a review of 
metamemory in patients with dementia by Souchay (2007), who concluded that there was a 
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fractionation of memory metacognition in this patient group, whereby some abilities, such 
as short-term self-knowledge updating and cue recognition, are preserved, and others 
degrade faster than the normal rate of ageing, such as long-term self-knowledge and 
episodic memory updating. This is also called “mnemonic anosognosia”; at the beginning of 
a memory metacognition test the patients have “forgotten that they forget”, and make 
predications and judgements on their memory performance based on this erroneous self-
knowledge. However, after completing a few blocks of trials, patients’ self-knowledge is 
updated to integrate information about their poor memory performance and they are more 
accurate at rating their performance. Agnew & Morris (1998) proposed, using their Cognitive 
Awareness Model (CAM), that initial judgements may improve over a short period of time in 
patients with dementia on JOL tasks, as self-knowledge is updated to match experience and 
performance, therefore resulting in more accurate self-judgements over a short period of 
time. Moulin, Perfect, and Jones (2000) demonstrated that patients with dementia have 
intact short-term memory monitoring, and that they show similar responses to healthy older 
adults in relation to stimulus parameters that increase or decrease the ability to recall 
information in such tasks, such as recall tasks compared to recognition, item difficulty and 
distinctiveness. Results therefore suggest that their lack of awareness of memory and 
cognitive deficits is not related to “primary anosognosia”, however, due to their mnemonic 
anosognosia, there is no consolidation of this information, leading to patients forgetting and 
poor self-judgments resuming after a time. Indeed, Ansell and Bucks (2006) demonstrated 
that, despite short-term improvement in JOLs over three trials, patients’ JOL accuracy 
reverted back to baseline after a break of only 20 minutes. Thus, this phenomenon has been 
termed the “petrified-self”, wherein the patient’s long-term self-knowledge is unchanged 
from a time before they were experiencing these memory problems, and judgments on 
anticipated task performance are made using this out-dated information. Further, Gilleen, 
Greenwood, Archer, Lovestone, & David (2011) investigated the relationship between 
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clinical awareness and discrepancy scores using the Memory Awareness Rating Scale (MARS; 
Clare, Wilson, Carter, Roth, & Hodges, 2002) and Rivermead Behaviour Memory Test (RMBT; 
Wilson, Cockburn, & Baddeley, 1985). Patients with low RMBT scores rated their memory as 
better than patients who scored higher; those with higher scores were more accurate at 
rating their memory abilities, however they still underestimated their deficits. In addition, 
Souchay, Isingrini and Gil (2002) found that FOK judgements were more strongly related to 
memory than to executive function in AD patients, but to executive function in healthy, age 
matched controls. These findings may help develop our understanding of metamemory, as it 
is this process that is crucial for accurate introspective judgements.  
It has been suggested that more objective, experimentally controlled measures of 
metacognition should be used in research, which in turn will help us understand the specific 
nature and mechanisms underlying such processes and why they sometimes go wrong. A 
review by Cosentino (2014) found that over time there has been an increase in the number 
of studies using objective task paradigms in the field of dementia research, however to date 
these tend to use biased statistical methods, such as the gamma statistic (described in 
section 2.2; Cosentino, Metcalfe, Butterfield, & Stern, 2007).  
2.4.1.1 RELATIONSHIP WITH MOOD 
Though most work in relation to memory awareness in dementia and mood has 
been carried out using clinical scales (see chapter 3.1.3.1), there is some evidence to suggest 
that more objective measures of memory metacognitive function are associated with mood. 
Nakaaki et al. (2008) investigated the relationship between depression and the 
number of words AD patients predicted they would recall, where they found that patients 
with depression were significantly more accurate in the number of words they would recall 
compared to patients who were not depressed, independent of actual memory ability. 
Similarly Gilleen, Greenwood, Loveston and David (2011) found that a MARS measure of pre-
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diction memory accuracy, but not post-diction, was associated with depression scores, 
where lower mood was associated with better prediction. There was no significant 
association with post-task memory judgements and mood, which may be due to the 
observation that immediate JOLs made by patients with dementia are generally more 
accurate than predictions (discussed in section 2.4.1), where most patients make more 
accurate short-term ratings. It may be that mood is associated with long-term memory 
ability but does not affect short-term post-diction judgements when memory has been 
updated temporarily (according to the CAM model).  
2.4.1.2 RELATIONSHIP TO BRAIN STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION 
There is a substantial body of evidence to suggest that the observed lack of accurate 
memory metacognition in dementia is related to reduced volume and function in the frontal 
lobes.  For example, Souchay, Isingrini, Pillon, & Gil (2003) found that patients with 
frontotemporal lobe dementia (FTD) were worse at self-ratings on memory test compared to 
patients with AD, which the authors suggest is related to the increased frontal deficits 
observed in patients with FTD. 
A meta-analysis of neural correlates of self-referential processing in healthy subjects 
has demonstrated that there may be three clusters within the CMS that are specialized in 
different self-referential processes (Northoff et al., 2006). The ventral region (medial 
orbitofrontal cortex, ventromedial PFC, and subgenual and pregenual ACC) was identified as 
labelling stimuli as self-referential; the dorsal region (dorsomedial PFC and supragenual ACC) 
was identified as evaluating self-related stimuli; and the posterior region (posterior cingulate 
cortex [PCC], retrosplenial cortex, and medial parietal cortex) was identified as helping to 
place “self-related” stimuli in temporal cortex and linking them with previously self-related 
stimuli. Additionally, this relationship was found regardless of stimuli type, such as 
emotional or memory. 
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2.4.2 SCHIZOPHRENIA 
The notion of metacognition has also been investigated in patients with 
schizophrenia, however this has primarily been studied regarding “social” aspects of 
metacognition using questionnaires, interview methods and analysis of “self” narratives 
(Lysaker et al., 2005).  Results from this field of research have indicated that there is a 
relationship between “social metacognition” and improved insight, better executive function 
and social function. However, less work has been carried out to investigate the more 
objective, experimentally controlled aspects of metacognition in patients with 
schizophrenia.   
Using FOK methodologies has produced mixed results. Bacon, Danion, Kauffmann-
Muller, and Bruant (2001) asked schizophrenia patients and age matched controls to 
perform a recall task, where they were asked to rate their confidence after each recall, and 
make FOK ratings for words they had not successfully recalled. Results demonstrated that, 
despite patients having worse recall compared to healthy controls, their confidence ratings 
for recall and accuracy of confidence ratings and FOK judgements did not differ from those 
of the control group, however FOK ratings themselves were significantly reduced for 
patients with schizophrenia. Additionally, discordant FOK judgements were also made more 
frequently in the patient group. However Souchay, Bacon, and Danion (2006) found no 
difference between patient and control FOK judgements, bias or discrimination, as 
calculated using the gamma statistic. 
2.4.2.1 RELATIONSHIP WITH NEUROCOGNITION, MOOD AND INSIGHT 
Research by Lysaker et al. (2005) has indicated that there is a relationship between 
self-report and narrative measures of metacognition and executive function in patients with 
schizophrenia. It is suggested that a deficit in neurocognition is associated with poor 
metacognitive function as the reduced set shifting ability can lead to poor self-monitoring, or 
indeed poor memory can lead to inability to up-date self-knowledge (Dimaggio & Lysaker, 
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2010). However, recent research has indicated that this relationship is moderated by 
disorganized symptoms, where increasing disorganization results in a stronger association 
between executive function and neurocognition (Minor & Lysaker, 2014). 
An association has also identified between understanding ones’ own mind and 
depressed mood (Lysaker et al., 2005), where presence of depressive symptoms were 
related to better self-understanding. Further, there was also an association with 
metacognition and insight into illness, however this research was conducted using self-
report assessments of metacognition as opposed to the more objective measures described 
in section 2.1. Conversely, a study by Morgan & David (2010) indicated that, although some 
patients displayed poor metacognitive processing of their unusual cognitive experiences (as 
assessed by qualitative analysis of a clinical insight schedule), this was not directly associated 
with a failure to acknowledge or recognise, even superficially, that they were experiencing 
psychological change or suffering from a mental illness.  
A more objective measure of metacognitive function was developed for use in 
groups of patients with schizophrenia (Koren et al., 2004), comprising a metacognitive 
version of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST). Patients were asked to give a “forced” 
response, i.e. perform the WCST as normal, and additionally they gave a “free” response, 
where they had to rate their confidence in their performance (where 0= just guessing, and 
100= completely confident) in each trial, and choose if they wanted that trial to “count” 
towards their final score and overall performance, in which case they received a 10 cent 
bonus for each correct trial, and a 10 cent penalty if incorrect. Results demonstrated that 
the metacognitive ratings (confidence and whether trials counted towards the final score) 
were associated with insight into illness more so that original WCST scores, therefore 
indicating that though insight is associated with executive function, it is more strongly 
associated with self-awareness of thought processes.  
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It is clear that more experimentally controlled research into metacognitive function 
is required in this patient group to confirm whether it is associated with executive function 
and insight into illness, as is suggested by the qualitative evaluations of self-narratives. 
2.4.2.2 RELATIONSHIP TO BRAIN STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION 
Most neuroimaging research regarding self-awareness in schizophrenia patients has 
been related to clinical measures (Chapter 3.2.3) and has found significant associations with 
the functional activation in Cortical Midline Structures (CMS; Murphy et al., 2010; van der 
Meer, Costafreda, Aleman, & David, 2010) and volume of the frontal lobes (David et al., 
2012; see Chapter 2.3.). 
 Bedford, Surguladze, Giampietro, Brammer, & David (2012) carried out a study into 
the functional correlates of self-evaluation in relation to positive, negative and illness related 
words in patients with schizophrenia and healthy adults. Results indicated that patients 
demonstrated a hypo-activation in both the medial superior frontal gyrus (DLFPC) and 
posterior cingulate, compared to controls, across the evaluation of all traits. Further, inverse 
correlations with insight were noted in the ACC as well as frontal and parietal regions. 
Murphy et al. (2010) investigated the functional correlates of self- versus other- (in this case 
a close other) evaluations using positive and negative emotionally valenced words. There 
was significant activation observed in the medial prefrontal and posterior cingulate cortices 
during self-evaluation trials for both patients and healthy controls, however there were no 
between-group differences identified, possibly due to lack of power as the result of a small 
sample size (11 patients and 10 controls). In addition, there was significantly reduced 
activation observed in patients compared to healthy controls in the right middle frontal 
gyrus when considering other-evaluations. Finally, similar relationships have also been seen 
in non-clinical populations (Modinos, Renken, Ormel, & Aleman, 2011). Across a group of 
students with a varying degree of schizotypal traits (a measure of psychosis-proneness), 
fMRI indicated that making self-referential judgements (vs. other or semantic judgements) 
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induced activation of the CMS. When comparing participants with high psychosis-proneness 
to those with lower scores, there was a significantly increased degree of activation in the 
CMS and frontal lobes for self-judgements of positive and negative personality traits in 
higher scoring participants, indicating that atypical activation in these regions may be risk 
factors for psychotic illnesses. 
2.4.2.3 TRAINING 
Metacognitive training is already being trialled in psychosis patients (Aghotor, 
Pfueller, Moritz, Weisbrod, & Roesch-Ely, 2010; Favrod, Maire, Bardy, Pernier, & Bonsack, 
2011; Pijnenborg, Van der Gaag, Bockting, Van der Meer, & Aleman, 2011) and has been 
shown to produce improvements in the domain of clinical insight (Pijnenborg et al., 2014). 
Metacognitive training developed by Aghotor et al. (2010) involves highlighting common 
“cognitive distortions” (atypical attribution styles, jumping to conclusions, lack of mental 
flexibility, need for closure, overconfidence in errors and negative cognitive schema), making 
patients aware of them and then asking them to reflect and critical evaluate them, with the 
view to changing them, thus changing their method of problem solving.  Another form of 
metacognitive therapy has been developed by Van Donkersgoed et al. (2014), 
“Metacognitive reflection and insight therapy” (MERIT), which is manual-based and 
personalised to each individual patient. This treatment is target driven as opposed to 
following a set course of therapy sessions and aims to stimulate Lysaker’s (2005) four 
elements of metacognition (self-reflectivity, understating the others’ mind, decentration and 
mastery). Patients are encouraged to produce a personal narrative so therapists can identify 
errors in their metacognitive thinking and help patients reflect on themselves and others in 
more complex ways. No data have been published on the outcomes of this therapy to date.  
2.4.3 CLINICAL POPULATIONS - CONCLUSIONS 
There has been a reasonable amount of research into the metacognitive abilities of 
clinical groups in comparison to healthy controls, particularly in dementia but also in 
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schizophrenia patients, and this tends to be in the memory domain as opposed to other 
aspects of cognition. That said there is evidence from behavioural and imaging studies that 
patients with dementia and FEP display a reduced ability to monitor their memory abilities 
accurately, and this tends to be related to the frontal lobes. Further evidence has 
demonstrated that there are also deficiencies in patient populations regarding self-
reflection. Neural correlates of self-reflection in patients samples are similar to those 
identified in in healthy adults, and may be implicated in clinical awareness (see chapter 3).  
Evidence from schizophrenia patients has shown that it is possible to improve metacognitive 
accuracy with training in the form of group cognitive remediation therapy. 
2.5 CONCLUSIONS 
It is clear that there is a growing body of evidence that suggests there is a reduction 
in metacognitive ability, both in health ageing and in clinical syndromes such as dementia 
and schizophrenia, all of which have been investigated using similar experimentally 
controlled methodologies. Deficits and individual variation in metacognitive abilities have 
been linked to reduced volume, connectivity and functioning in the frontal lobes in healthy 
controls and patients. There has also been recent evidence from schizophrenia research to 
suggest metacognitive function can be improved using a form of cognitive remediation 
therapy that addresses cognitive biases. Whether this is also the case for dementia patients 
is yet to be investigated.  
It has been suggested that “lab based” research cannot apply to the “real world” 
deficits that patients experience, and this may be why we find contradictory or non-
significant results when comparing the two (Lysaker, 2010). This may especially be the case 
in patients with schizophrenia, wherein their primary deficit is not one of memory, but 
cognition in general. Metacognition research in healthy adults appears to have broadened 
from basic cognition and psychophysics and is working towards more socially oriented 
concepts. On the other hand, clinical research has focussed on complex social concepts of 
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metacognition from the beginning, where deficits are commonly uncovered, but work using 
more fundamental psychophysical measures is lacking. An attempt to address this will be 
made in this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 3 
3. INSIGHT AND LACK OF AWARENESS IN CLINICAL DISORDERS: 
PSYCHOSIS AND DEMENTIA 
“Insight is not a word of plain and single meaning.” - Aubrey Lewis, 1934 p.332 
“I’m not crazy! My mother had me tested!” Sheldon Cooper – “The Big Bang Theory” 
3.1 CLINICAL INSIGHT 
As stated in chapter 1, at the most fundamental level clinical insight refers to an 
aspect of self-awareness related to illness and symptoms. In the context of this thesis it 
refers to a patient’s level of awareness, or un-awareness, of their mental illness. It is often 
described as an illness-specific domain of metacognitive function, where metacognitive 
deficits are associated with a number of neuropsychiatric disorders (David et al., 2012), 
including first episode psychosis (FEP), schizophrenia and dementia. The term “lack of 
awareness” is often used interchangeably with “anosognosia” in neurology and in dementia 
and Alzheimer’s disease (AD) research, where anosognosia refers to a “lack of awareness of 
deficits” such as reduction in memory and cognitive abilities, as opposed to the unawareness 
that experiences such as hallucinations are in a sense ‘not real’ and symptoms of a disorder.  
In this thesis “lack of insight” will refer to the multi-dimensional framework of unawareness 
of illness in clinical populations (see section 3.1.1 for further details).  
3.1.1 CONCEPTUALISATION 
Historically, insight was considered to be an all or nothing phenomenon (Lewis, 
1934), where a patient either possessed awareness of their illness, or they did not. Now it is 
considered to be a multi–dimensional construct, where patients can demonstrate various 
levels of awareness of their illness, which may change over time. Insight is normally 
conceptualised and measured in terms of awareness of the clinical aspects of the disease – 
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such as awareness of having schizophrenia or dementia, of symptoms and the need for 
treatment. These dimensions show some differentiation and have been shown to be 
somewhat independent of one another in both disorders (David, 1990; Starkstein, Sabe, 
Chemerinski, Jason, & Leiguarda, 1996). Gilleen, Greenwood & David (2011) found that 
insight into symptoms, behaviour and cognition were to some extent isolated, and each was 
predicted by different factors, highlighting that it is a complex and possibly modular concept. 
Indeed, it is possible for patients to be aware of some deficits but not others (Clare et al., 
2011). 
The nature and degree of awareness that psychiatric patients have about their 
illness has important implications as poor insight can result in later detection of illness, 
poorer treatment adherence and poorer outcomes (Amador & David, 2004; Cosentino & 
Stern, 2005; Kemp & David, 1996; Lincoln, Lullmann, & Rief, 2007) and may impact 
negatively on the life satisfaction of both patient and caregiver (Rymer et al., 2002).  It has 
been reported that around 50% of patients with schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders 
have poor insight (Arango & Amador, 2011), where the awareness that different symptoms 
are pathological can vary from 30% (hallucinations and thought disorder) to 50% (delusions). 
Further, Lambert et al., (2010) report that during an initial 18-month treatment period of 
FEP patients, only 34% patients were fully adherent to treatment, 47% had at least one 
phase of noncompliance, and 19% persistently refused treatment. In patients with dementia 
it has been reported that between 20% and 80% of patients are not aware of their cognitive 
and behavioural symptoms, depending on severity and measures used (Reed et al., 1993). 
It appears that in both disorders there are specific errors in “self” awareness and 
monitoring, as opposed to “other”, which again implies the two types of awareness are 
modular and potentially separable constructs. For example, Zamboni et al. (2013) asked 
patients with AD and mild cognitive impairment (MCI), as well as controls, questions about 
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themselves and a significant other, and created discrepancy scores using the significant 
others’ response. Results showed that that AD patients were less accurate than those with 
MCI and controls relating to “self” but not “other” questions, as demonstrated by much 
larger discrepancy scores.  
3.1.2 CLINICAL INSIGHT IN SCHIZOPHRENIA 
3.1.2.1 RELATIONSHIP WITH PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 
Lack of insight has been reported to be a characteristic feature of psychotic 
disorders (Amador et al., 1994). The degree of insight into illness is also associated with the 
severity of other prominent symptoms. A meta-analysis by Mintz, Dobson, and Romney 
(2003) analysed the relationship between insight and the 4 main symptom domains of 
schizophrenia; global, positive, negative and depressive. 
An analysis of 19 studies found that as global symptoms increased, degree of insight 
into illness reduced. Further, it was calculated that variance in global symptoms explained 
7.2% of the variance insight. This significant relationship was also found to hold across all 
conceptual domains of insight: awareness of mental disorder, awareness of social 
consequences, awareness of need for treatment, awareness of symptoms and attribution of 
symptoms. 
An analysis of 22 studies found that positive symptoms, such as hallucinations and 
delusions, were also a significant predictor of insight. Here an increase in positive symptom 
severity was associated with worse insight, whereby 6.3% of the variance in insight can be 
explained by variance in positive symptoms. This relationship held across all domains of 
insight. An analysis of 20 studies found that, as severity of negative symptoms, such as flat 
affect and lack of motivation, increased so degree of insight into illness reduced. 
Approximately 5.2% of variance in insight can be explained by variance in negative 
symptoms. This effect held across all insight domains except for awareness of symptoms. 
- 61 - 
Finally, evidence suggests that low mood is a predictor of good clinical insight (Mintz 
et al., 2003; see Amador and David, 2004 for review) and higher levels of depression at first 
admission predict higher levels of insight at 3 year follow up (Saeedi, Addington, & 
Addington, 2007). Analysis of 15 studies revealed a slightly smaller but highly significant 
relationship between low mood and improved illness awareness was evident, where 3.2% of 
insight variance is explained by variance in depression. This effect also held across all 
domains of insight. Equally, abnormally elevated mood alongside psychosis has been 
associated with poor illness awareness (Sanz, Constable, Lopez-Ibor, Kemp, & David, 1998). 
Further, it has been demonstrated that patients diagnosed with their first episode of 
psychosis who score highly on ratings of mania had significantly less awareness of a need for 
treatment than those with low mania scores (Morgan & David, 2010). Additionally, patients 
with bipolar disorder experiencing a period of mania were found to have an increased 
likelihood of poor illness awareness (Amador et al., 1994). The concept of “depressive 
realism” has been used to explain to this mood-insight relationship, whereby low mood 
results in a person holding a more accurate view of themselves and the world (Ackermann & 
DeRubeis, 1991; Haaga & Beck, 1995) or reduced self-serving bias, where a person blames 
external factors for their misfortune, which in turn leads to improved awareness of illness. 
Cavelti, Beck, Kvrgic, Kossowsky, & Vauth (2012) carried out a cross-sectional analysis of the 
relationship between insight and psychopathological symptoms, with results demonstrating 
the common observation that higher reported levels of insight were associated with 
increased levels of depression. The analysis went on to demonstrate that that the 
relationship between depression and insight was positively mediated by patients 
understanding of their illness as being disabling to social function and chronic, and was 
reduced by an expectation that symptoms could be improved by treatment. The association 
between insight and depressive symptoms was also further reduced in patients who held a 
positive attitude to recovery. 
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However it should be noted that, combined, the relationship between these four 
main areas of psychopathology and insight into illness only explain 21.9% of the variance, 
thus indicating that there are other factors that influence the degree of insight patients 
possess about their illness. 
Insight can also predict clinical outcomes. A longitudinal analysis by Mohamed et al., 
(2009) indicated that baseline clinical insight was significantly associated with levels of 
schizophrenia symptoms at 18-month follow-up, where better insight resulted in lower 
symptom severity, and Capdevielle et al., (2013) reported a small but significant positive 
association with insight and remission of other clinical symptoms. Further, Austin et al. 
(2014) demonstrated that self-reflective or ‘metacognitive beliefs’ about illness are better 
predictors of illness course than depression or anxiety.  
3.1.2.2 RELATIONSHIP WITH NEURO-COGNITION 
An area that may also explain variance in patients’ insight variance is neuro-
cognition. A meta-analysis by Aleman, Agrawal, Morgan, and David (2006) recently 
replicated by Nair, Palmer, Aleman, and David (2014), demonstrated that, generally, reduced 
executive function was correlated with lack of insight (i.e. worse executive function is 
related to worse insight). More specifically, scores on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task 
(WCST) were also positively correlated with insight (i.e. more errors are related to worse 
insight), however this correlation was much smaller in the updated analysis by Nair (r=0.14) 
compared to the previous analysis by Aleman (r=0.23), which may be explained by a larger 
sample size in the most recent analysis. Nevertheless, the presence of a significant 
relationship between poor insight and mental flexibility (as measured by set shifting ability) 
provides support for the neuropsychological theory of insight in psychosis (Cooke et al., 
2005; David, 1990) that proposes poor insight is, in part, the product of deﬁcits in 
neurocognition.   
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3.1.2.3 RELATIONSHIP WITH BRAIN STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION 
In addition to cognitive and psychopathological correlates, recent research has 
focused on potential neural correlates of insight. Early studies suggested a relationship 
between poor illness awareness and increased ventricular volume (Takai, Uematsu, Ueki, & 
Sone, 1992), and reduced brain and intracranial volume (Flashman, McAllister, Andreasen, & 
Saykin, 2000). A theory gaining more support is that of the relationship between poor insight 
and reduced frontal lobe structure (Larøi et al., 2000; Morgan et al., 2010; Sapara et al., 
2007; Shad, Muddasani, Prasad, Sweeney, & Keshavan, 2004; Spalletta, Piras, Piras, 
Caltagirone, & Orfei, 2014). However some studies identified no brain regions to be 
associated with insight (Bassitt, Neto, de Castro, & Busatto, 2007; David et al., 1995; Rossell, 
Coakes, Shapleske, Woodruff, & David, 2003). This may be due to the different methods 
employed to measure insight and analyse brain images. Nonetheless, the frontal lobe theory 
of reduced insight appears to have the greatest amount of support versus theories 
highlighting other brain areas.  
A recent review by (David et al., 2012) demonstrated that areas of the Cortical 
Midline System (CMS) have consistently been associated, in structural and functional 
imaging studies, with insight. Further, Ouzir & Azorin (2014) identified a number of studies 
reporting that poor insight is related to hemispheric asymmetry, whereby the majority of 
related brain abnormalities are associated with the right hemisphere. In addition, it has been 
suggested that it is possible to link each insight dimension to certain brain structures (Shad, 
Muddasani, & Keshavan, 2006) where deficits in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) 
may result in illness unawareness by interfering with self-monitoring, while occipital frontal 
cortex (OFC) abnormalities may be related or mediate symptom misattribution. Further, 
reduced fractional anisotropy (FA; white matter connections) in the left middle and right 
superior frontal gyri, as well as the right and left cingulate gyri, was significantly associated 
with poor insight into illness (Antonius et al., 2011). Indirect support for this has also come 
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from an open label transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) study, where patients with 
schizophrenia experiencing persistent auditory hallucinations received anodal stimulation of 
left DLPFC and cathodal stimulation over left temporo-parietal junction. Following tDCS, 
there was a significant improvement in illness awareness, as well as a significant reduction in 
auditory hallucination severity (Bose et al., 2014). 
The general notion of impaired self-awareness has also been extensively researched 
in psychiatric populations. A review and meta-analysis by van der Meer et al. (2010) 
investigating the neural correlates of self-reflection in schizophrenia demonstrated that they 
are also related to the Cortical Midline Structures (CMS) as measured using PET and fMRI. 
Patients with damage to the CMS are often impaired in evaluating problems they face and 
often overestimate their capacities and performance. After close reading of the literature it 
appeared that, within the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), activation of the ventral MPFC 
(vMPFC) was related to processing of self-relevant information, whereas the activity within 
dorsal MPFC (dMPFC) was related to evaluation and decision-making processes regarding 
both self- and other-referential processing. It was theorized that, as good insight into illness 
requires intact self-referential processing, CMS integrity might also be related to illness 
awareness in patients with psychosis and schizophrenia. This relationship has since been 
supported using fMRI by Raij, Riekki, and Hari (2012), who measured activation in various 
brain regions whilst patients rated statements that were based on well-established insight 
assessments, such as “If someone said I have a mental illness they would be right.” It was 
found that patients’ insight was strongly correlated with increased activation in the CMS, 
where more activation was associated with better insight.  
These findings indicate that similar areas of the medial frontal lobes are associated 
with both insight into illness and healthy adult introspection, suggesting that these neural 
regions make up the neural basis of metacognitive processes (Fleming & Dolan, 2012).   
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3.1.2.4 TRAINING 
It has been suggested that cognitive and behavioural training could help improve 
insight into illness in patients. A meta-analysis by Pijnenborg, van Donkersgoed, David, and 
Aleman (2013) assessed the effect various forms of intervention can have on insight. Overall, 
analysis of 19 randomised control trial (RCTs) studies found that there was a significant 
moderate overall effect of treatments that measured the change in insight in psychotic 
disorders. However most studies measured insight as a secondary outcome, and thus more 
studies need to be carried out investigating the effect of an intervention specifically 
targeting insight.  A sub-analysis of different intervention types was also carried out on CBT, 
psycho-education and adherence therapy studies; while no effect sizes reached significance 
(possibly due to lack of power) the effect size for CBT increased when CBT vs. treatment as 
usual studies were included. 
Another recent review by McCormack, Tierney, Brennan, Lawlor, & Clarke, (2014) 
found results regarding the effectiveness of CBT on insight were conflicting. The authors 
suggest that this may be the result of differering theories of insight influencing the various 
treatments and the psychoeducational channels through which they are disemminated. 
Further limitations were identifed such as the variety of assessments employed across the 
studies reviewed which possibly correlated differently with individual aspects and outcomes 
of the CBT interventions.  
Recently results of an RCT designed to improve insight (REFLEX; Pijnenborg et al., 
2014) have indicated that a metacognitive training program improved clinical insight after a 
course of therapy. Further, evidence suggests that by using targeted psychotherapy, self-
awareness of mental illness can be improved. Briki et al. (2014) have developed 
“Metacognitive training” (MCT), an 8-week group intervention therapy designed to improve 
self-reflection on cognitive biases and problem solving in patients with schizophrenia. 
Results indicated that there was only a trend improvement in insight scores, which they 
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attribute to relatively high insight scores at baseline. A pilot investigation carried out 3 years 
earlier indicated that there was significant improvement on awareness scores in a group of 
patients who had lower baseline insight (Favrod et al., 2011).  
One concern which has been raised when considering interventions aimed at 
improving insight is the effect they may have on mood (Cavelti et al, 2012), as there is a 
small but robust relationship associated with improved insight and depression severity 
(Mintz et al., 2003). Whilst the meta-analysis by Pijnenborg et al. (2013) states there were 
few reported effects on mood in association with improved insight, they note that this effect 
(following intervention) was rarely measured.   
3.1.3 CLINICAL INSIGHT IN DEMENTIA 
3.1.3.1 RELATIONSHIP WITH PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 
A review by Aalten, Van Valen, Clare, Kenny, and Verhey (2005) found an association 
between insight and a number of clinical symptoms. The largest body of evidence suggests 
that insight in dementia is related to reported levels of depression, where better illness 
awareness is associated with lower mood (Mograbi & Morris, 2014; Marková, 2005). 
However some studies have indicated that only mild depression and dysthymia, as opposed 
to major depression, are related to level of insight (Migliorelli et al., 1995; Starkstein et al., 
1997), and thus it may be that mild depression is manifested as depressive realism, whereas 
major depression results in less accurate appraisals due to more severe mood changes and 
increased feelings of hopelessness leading to negative self-appraisal. Further, some work has 
indicated that mania and pathological laughing are associated with worse awareness 
(Migliorelli et al., 1995). This lack of consistent evidence on this link between awareness and 
mood may be due to methodological limitations around measurement across studies, which 
may affect the apparent strength and degree of the relationship with each other (Aalten et 
al., 2005). It may also be the case that only specific dimensions of depression are associated 
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with aspects of illness awareness (Mograbi & Morris, 2014), and thus studies that use more 
global assessments will miss these associations. 
 There is also some evidence to suggest that insight becomes worse as dementia 
progresses (Onor, Trevisiol, Negro, & Aguglia, 2006) and depression rates fall (Feher, 
Mahurin, Inbody, Crook, & Pirozzolo, 1991; Starkstein et al., 1997). There is therefore a 
suggestion that the presence of mild depression or dysthymia is a ‘healthy’ psychological 
reaction to perceived loss of abilities, such as memory or other cognitive faculties (Starkstein 
et al., 1997). Additional evidence suggests that as dementia severity progresses, awareness 
is reduced and mood improves (Wragg & Jeste, 1989). However, it has been found that, 
when awareness is split into domains, there is a correlation between only low mood and 
awareness of memory deficits, and not awareness of behavioural deficits (Chen et al., 2014). 
Hence, depression may occur early on in the condition when there is relatively good 
awareness but that as the disease progresses patients may even lose awareness of their 
affective symptoms; note that Verhülsdonk, Quack, Höft, Lange-Asschenfeldt, and Supprian 
(2013) identified large discrepancies between patient and caregiver ratings of patient 
depressive symptoms. 
There is a small amount of evidence to suggest that apathy is also related to poor 
awareness of illness in dementia patients (Aalten et al., 2005; Mograbi & Morris, 2014) with 
SPECT imaging indicating that both apathy and lack of awareness of illness are both related 
to dysfunction in the right hemisphere (Ott, Noto, & Fogel, 1995). Anxiety has also been 
linked to higher levels of awareness (Aalten et al., 2005). In addition, delusional psychotic 
symptoms are have also been associated with poor awareness, however both lack of 
awareness and psychotic symptoms in dementia are related to dysfunction in the right 
frontal lobe, and as such this relationship may be related to a common neurological change 
as opposed to a direct correlation (Aalten et al., 2005). 
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There is also evidence for a link between age of onset and insight, where late onset- 
dementia patients are twice as likely to have poor insight compared to early onset patients 
(van Vliet et al., 2013). It is suggested that the higher number of functional demands on 
younger onset patients may expose them to more of their deficits, and thus make them 
aware. It may also be associated with underlying neuropathology, as younger onset patients 
show increased atrophy in posterior brain regions (van der Flier, Pijnenburg, Fox, & 
Scheltens, 2011), as opposed to areas in the medial temporal lobe that are known to be 
associated with awareness (see section 3.1.3.3). 
3.1.3.2 RELATIONSHIP WITH NEURO-COGNITION 
In addition to psychopathology, neurocognitive functioning is suggested to be a 
correlate of awareness of illness in dementia. Chen et al. (2014) found that lower scores on 
the Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE) were significantly associated with unawareness 
of both memory and behavioural deficits, and a number of studies have found an association 
between improved awareness and better executive function (Lopez, Becker, Somsak, Dew, 
and DeKosky, 1994; Michon, Deweer, Pillon, Agid, and Dubois, 1994).  Zanetti et al. (1999) 
describe a “tri-linear” model of insight and cognitive ability as measured by the MMSE, 
whereby insight was consistently high for those with scores greater than 24 (MCI), and 
showed a steady decrease between scores of 23 and 13, and awareness was lowest for 
patients with an MMSE score lower than 12. One study has found that the relationship 
between poor insight and impaired cognitive function (mental control, visual perception and 
verbal memory) was only present when controlling for depressive symptoms (Smith, 
Henderson, McCleary, Murdock, & Buckwalter, 2000). 
 There is some evidence to suggest that people with MCI- which is frequently the 
prodromal phase of dementia- are actually more likely to overestimate their cognitive 
impairments, such as memory, when relating it to every day functioning, as opposed to 
patients with more severe impairments such as AD underestimating their deficits (Roberts, 
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Clare, & Woods, 2009). Orfei et al. (2010) found that poor verbal memory performance was 
related to poor awareness in MCI patients. However there was no relationship between the 
two in AD patients, suggesting factors other than memory ability are related to awareness as 
dementia progresses.  
 A multi-dimensional analysis of 101 patients with dementia (Clare et al., 2011) 
found that reduced explicit awareness was related to age, lower MMSE scores and poorer 
memory function. It has also been reported that better awareness is related to better 
outcomes of cognitive training (Clare, Wilson, Carter, Roth, & Hodges, 2004). 
There has also been research into experimentally controlled measures of awareness 
of memory and cognitive abilities found in the metacognition literature relating to MCI and 
AD patients, which was discussed in Chapter 2.  
3.1.3.3 RELATIONSHIP WITH BRAIN STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION 
Lack of awareness in dementia has often been associated with lesions in the right 
parietal lobe and bilateral frontal lobes (Stuss & Benson, 1986), and a review by (Zamboni & 
Wilcock, 2011) identified that, though there was a large range of areas identified within the 
18 studies analysed, findings were mainly located in the frontal and temporo-parietal 
regions.   
Regarding functional correlates, Vogel, Hasselbalch, Gade, Ziebell, and Waldemar 
(2005) found that there was a relationship between discrepancy scores on a clinical memory 
questionnaire and activation in the right inferior frontal gyrus in a group of MCI and AD 
patients (as measured using regional cerebral blood flow). This relationship was also specific 
to self-awareness, as demonstrated by Zamboni et al. (2013), who found differences in brain 
activation in medial prefrontal and anterior temporal regions during self- and other-ratings 
in AD patients. Additionally, Sultzer et al. (2013) carried out a PET study and found low 
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cortical metabolic activity in bilateral medial frontal cortex to be associated with poor 
insight. 
A recent review by (Cosentino, 2014) also suggests that a specific reduction in the 
functional connectivity between cortical midline structures (CMS) affects awareness of 
cognitive deficits in dementia; namely the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC; Ries et al., 2012) as measured on a memory rating discrepancy scale. 
Performance on a self-appraisal task (rating trait adjectives as self-relevant or not) has also 
been associated with activation in the MPFC and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC; Ries et al., 
2007). Both structures appear to be functionally associated with accurate self-appraisal in 
healthy adults, and the ACC is involved in detection and response to errors, as well as 
monitoring conflict.  
Recent evidence has also suggested that brain structure may be predictive of future 
conversion from MCI to AD. Spalletta et al. (2014) followed up patients with a first diagnosis 
of MCI for 5 years. They found that self-awareness and baseline structural MRI differed 
between those who were identified as converters at 5 year follow-up (converted from MCI 
to AD) compared to non-converters (did not convert to AD). Converter patients 
demonstrated worse awareness at baseline and their memory deficit awareness was 
associated with reduced gray matter volume in the ACC and the right inferior frontal cortex, 
and total awareness was associated with the cerebellar vermis. Non-converter patients, 
however, had better awareness at baseline and this was associated with reduced gray 
matter volume in the left superior and middle temporal areas, indicating that MCI and AD 
deficits are mediated by different mechanisms. 
As stated in section 3.1.2.3, the same areas in the frontal lobes and CMS are 
associated with healthy adult introspection, adding further support to the suggestion that 
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these neural regions make up the neural basis of metacognitive processes (Fleming & Dolan, 
2012).  
3.1.3 CLINICAL INSIGHT ACROSS DIAGNOSES 
The literature regarding awareness of illness tends to be split by diagnosis, however 
Gilleen, Greenwood & David (2009) compared awareness of patients with schizophrenia, 
dementia and traumatic brain injury (TBI), as measured using the standardised measures of 
awareness (Patient Competency Rating Scale [PCRS], the Scale to Assess Unawareness of 
Mental Disorder [SUMD], Dysexecutive Questionnaire [DEX] and Schedule for the 
Assessment of Insight [SAI]), in order to search for similarities and differences between the 
three clinical groups, and identify common mechanisms that mediate awareness. Though 
there are clear limitations regarding large age differences between the groups, all were 
comparable on premorbid IQ score. Results suggested that patients with dementia and TBI 
were much less accurate in appraisal of behavioural symptoms than those with 
schizophrenia. Additionally, the behavioural insight scores were not correlated with clinical 
insight scores (SAI and SUMD) in schizophrenia patients, as compared to a significant 
correlation in the whole group analysis. It was therefore suggested that behavioural 
awareness remains intact for schizophrenia, as opposed to organic disorders such as 
dementia and TBI, and this may be because the different domains of awareness are partially 
regulated by different processes. Further work by Gilleen, Greenwood & David (2014) has 
demonstrated that there was a greater association between memory awareness and 
memory function itself than between memory and awareness of illness in patients with 
dementia.  
3.1.5 CLINICAL INSIGHT CONCLUSIONS 
There are clear and similar disturbances in illness self-awareness in patients with 
FEP, schizophrenia and dementia, where both severity of symptoms and cognitive function 
are significantly related to insight. There is also structural and functional neuroimaging 
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evidence for a neurological component of insight, mainly located, but not limited to, the 
medial frontal lobes. These neurological bases of “self-concept” also appear to be modular, 
with specific areas related to specific processes such as understanding, awareness or 
processing information about the self. Further, recent evidence suggests that there may be 
some difference between the profiles of self-awareness for behavioural function across 
diagnosis (Gilleen, Greenwood & David, 2009).  
3.2 COGNITIVE INSIGHT  
A complementary addition to the concept of clinical insight was introduced by Beck 
et al. (2004), named “cognitive insight”, which focuses on the “thinking style” biases 
associated with unawareness of illness, rather than those due to information processing 
efficiency, that are often present in patients with psychosis.  More specifically, cognitive 
insight can be defined as a patient’s ability to self-reflect and also the level of self-certainty 
they feel in the interpretation they give to their unusual (illness-related) experiences. 
Though an idea conceived in the clinical field of self-awareness research, cognitive insight is 
similar concept to “attributive metacognition” (David et al., 2012), which was initially 
investigated in the psychological literature (Saxe & Offen, 2010).  
Cognitive insight addresses four key impairments characterised by patients with a 
lack of illness awareness: impairment in the ability to be objective when considering 
delusional experiences and cognitive distortions, a reduced capability to put such 
experiences into perspective, unresponsiveness to corrective information from others and 
an overconfidence in conclusions regarding delusional judgments. Therefore, whilst clinical 
insight assesses patients’ understanding that symptoms are a manifestation of mental illness 
and require treatment, cognitive insight seeks to understand the metacognitive processes 
involved in how those judgements are made and maintained. 
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3.2.1 MEASURING COGNITIVE INSIGHT 
Beck at al. (2004) developed the Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (BCIS) to measure 
patients’ ability to distance themselves from and re-evaluate unusual beliefs and 
misinterpretations of situations and perceptions. The BCIS is a 15 item self-rated 
questionnaire, where each item requires a response on a 4 level scale; 1. Do not agree at all, 
2.  Agree slightly, 3. Agree a lot, 4. Agree completely. The items can be separated into 2 sub-
scales, 9-item self-reflection (SR: “ability to reflect on whether their thoughts and beliefs 
about him or herself are correct, or could be changed by someone else’s opinion”) and 6-
item self-certainty (SC: “degree of overconfidence people have in their interpretations of 
their experiences”). A composite index can be calculated by subtracting SC from SR (see 
chapter 5.4.4 for a more detailed description of the scale). 
A recent review of the literature and the scale itself (Riggs, Grant, Perivoliotis, & 
Beck, 2012) states that seven studies have confirmed the 2-factor structure of the BCIS 
suggested by Beck et al. (2004) for inpatients, and this structure has been replicated in 
outpatients, first-episode psychosis patients, as well as healthy controls using numerous 
factor analysis methods. Riggs et al. also report that the internal consistency of the scale is 
sound, with all but one study demonstrating the SR subscale produced a Chronbach’s alpha 
score of greater than or equal to .7, and all but 2 studies showed internal consistency for the 
SC subscale to be greater than or equal to .7. Additionally three studies demonstrated that 
the scale has good test-retest reliability in both patients and healthy controls. One recent 
study of 120 patients (Merlin et al., 2012) identified a 4-factor structure, self-certainty, self-
reflectiveness, openness to external feedback and infallibility of self-reflection, and asks 
whether a 4-factor structure may help identify the further intricacies of cognitive insight.  
Though this study used the Tamil version of the BCIS (BCIS-T), the researchers used back 
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translation, and thus this measure is considered to be comparable to the original BCIS. That 
said, subtle cultural differences in the meaning of the questions in the additional two factors 
might explain the differences in factor structure. 
As noted, the BCIS has shown good test-retest reliability (Uchida et al., 2009), 
however there are few data on whether cognitive insight can improve over time. A recent 
metacognitive training intervention RCT aimed at improving insight in psychosis patients, the 
REFLEX study (Pijnenborg et al., 2014), found that whilst clinical insight improved after an 8 
week course of a behavioural intervention, cognitive insight remained unchanged. This lack 
of change in cognitive insight could be explained as follows; as patients began to understand 
more about their illness throughout the course of therapy, statements from the BCIS which 
are thought to indicate an overconfident bias in the way patients think (e.g. “My 
interpretations of my experiences are definitely right”, and “I know better than anyone else 
what my problems are”) take on a different meaning and actually reflect better self-
understanding after the course of therapy. The difficulties in interpreting certain BCIS items 
below will be covered further below. 
The BCIS has been shown by most studies to distinguish between psychotic and 
nonpsychotic patient groups using the CI sub-scale, where patients experiencing psychosis 
score significantly lower than non-psychotic patients (Bora, Erkan, Kayahan, & Veznedaroglu, 
2007). However there is still some debate as to whether this is the case with bipolar patients 
(Colis, Steer, & Beck, 2006) and depressed patients given the work of (Mass, Wolf, & Lincoln, 
2012), who found equal BCIS scores in schizophrenia and mixed (mostly unipolar depressed) 
patients. 
In addition to the original aims of developing the BCIS regarding illness awareness, 
the scale has also been demonstrated as suitable for use in community and healthy 
population samples (Buchy, Brodeur & Lepage, 2012), which have produced the same 2 
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factor structure of the BCIS as patient populations in a factor analysis. This has also been 
demonstrated in other, selected, non-clinical populations (Uchida et al., 2009). However this 
calls in to question what happens when healthy adults do not have, or are unable to relate 
to the term, “unusual experiences”, akin to those noted in clinical populations. Further, it 
has been said that one needs to have ‘something to have insight about’ before it can be 
measured (Marková, 2005). In the case of the BCIS, the nature of most questions deem it 
suitable for use in the healthy population, but what is being assessed in healthy adults is not 
the same ‘something’ as in patients. While high self-certainty and low self-reflection may 
result in distorted self-belief and poor correction of this in patients, it could reflect a realistic 
grasp of facts and events in healthy adults.  
  All in all, the results suggest that the BCIS is a valid instrument to assess cognitive 
insight in the general population, but it should be noted that what is being measured may be 
subtly different in patients and healthy volunteers.  
With this is mind, it is also important to note that BCIS subscales have shown a 
variable ability to distinguish between patients with psychosis and healthy controls. A 
number of studies have demonstrated that patients could be identified as having a 
significantly lower CI score (Beck et al., 2004; Colis et al., 2006; Martin, Warman, & Lysaker, 
2010), however there is no absolute cut off score to discriminate between healthy 
individuals and patients. Additionally, while patients have been identified as scoring 
significantly higher on SC sub-scale (Martin et al., 2010), there is still some debate as to 
whether controls and non-psychotic patients score significantly higher on the SR subscale 
compared to psychotic individuals. One large scale study reported a significant difference 
between groups where controls score significantly higher on the SR subscale (Bora et al., 
2007; n=93 FEP, 43= non FEP), while there are two studies reporting no significant difference 
between psychotic and non-psychotic psychiatric patients (Colis et al., 2006 [major 
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depressive disorder n=56; paranoid schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder n=42; bipolar 
i disorder n=52; bipolar I with manic episode n=18; bipolar I with mixed or depressive 
episode n=34]) as well as psychiatric patients and controls (Engh et al., 2007 [schizophrenia 
n=143; bipolar disorder n=92; controls n=64]). Thus the BCIS may be a useful tool to 
measure the difference in self-awareness of healthy controls and patients, as well as 
between patient groups, but results should be interpreted with caution.  
3.2.2 RELATIONSHIP WITH PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 
A positive relationship has been consistently reported between delusion severity 
and SC (Engh et al., 2010; Ouzir, Azorin, Adida, Boussaoud, & Battas, 2012; Warman et al., 
2007). The BCIS is also sensitive to delusion proneness in otherwise healthy individuals 
(Warman & Martin, 2006) with delusion-prone individuals scoring higher on the SC items 
than non-delusion prone participants. Interestingly, non-delusion prone patients also 
showed higher SR scores, and were more likely to acknowledge their other biases such as 
jumping to conclusions. The authors go on to suggest that it is a lack of self-reflection that 
may cause some, but not all delusion-prone individuals, to later make the transition into a 
psychotic disorder. Further, recent evidence has demonstrated that patients in an “at risk 
mental state” (ARMS: associated with a higher risk of transition into a psychotic episode) 
demonstrated a positive correlation between delusional thinking and SC scores, indicating 
that those with near psychotic-threshold delusional thinking had higher SC and thus more 
impaired cognitive insight (Uchida et al., 2014). This study also reported that ARMS patients 
scored significantly higher than healthy controls on the SC sub-scale. It could therefore be 
suggested that delusional thinking is related to cognitive insight because low SR and high SC, 
which produces a low BCIS-CI (composite index) score, result in a reasoning style that can 
maintain delusional beliefs. In essence, high self-certainty is associated with poor cognition 
and cognitive rigidity (Nair et al., 2014), and poor cognition is associated with poor decision-
making and the avoidance of rational thinking (Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff, 2007; 
- 77 - 
Stanovich & West, 2008). It is suggested that one requires greater cognitive capacity to think 
about and reflect on potentially erroneous beliefs, whilst it requires less capacity to make a 
quick decision and stand by it (such as jumping to conclusion bias; Garety et al., 2013). 
Similarly, patients who demonstrate increased SR and reduced SC are less cognitively rigid, 
are more open to alternative explanations for their experiences, and are predicted to be less 
delusion-prone.  
In relation to positive symptoms, the majority of studies have reported a 
relationship between Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale scores (PANSS; Kay, Flszbein, & 
Opfer, 1987) and BCIS (Riggs et al., 2012), with a significant positive correlation between 
PANSS positive symptom score and SC, and a negative relationship with SR and CI (probably 
driven by the SR score; Mass et al., 2012; Mohanty & Kumar, 2012). In addition to 
differentiating between patients with delusions and healthy controls, both chronic and FEP 
patients with delusions have been reported to score lower on SR, with SC producing a non-
significant trend towards higher scores and worse delusions.  
The research into cognitive insight and negative symptoms has produced mixed 
results. Although it has been suggested that there is a logical link between negative 
symptoms (such as withdrawal or lack of function and flat affect) and cognitive insight (Riggs 
et al., 2012) there is scant evidence to suggest that reduced SR and increased SC are 
correlates of negative symptoms as measured on the PANSS, with an equal number of 
studies supporting and refuting the claim. 
As noted in the previous section, low mood is significantly related to better clinical 
insight in a number of patient groups (Mintz, 2003); it has therefore been suggested that 
cognitive insight may also be linked to mood. Granholm et al. (2005) reasoned that patients 
who are able to understand and reflect on their unusual cognitive experiences, and 
subsequently gain both cognitive and clinical insight, might also become more depressed as 
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they lose confidence in their previous incorrect beliefs and understand their experiences 
were symptoms of their illnesses. Hence, if an increased ability to self-reflect about one’s 
experiences and problems leads to depression, one might expect a close relationship 
between SR and mood. Alternatively, if low mood leads to depressive realism (Ackermann & 
DeRubeis, 1991; Haaga & Beck, 1995) or less self-serving bias (blaming external factors for 
one’s misfortune), this may mean that there is less need for self-reflection to correct such a 
bias. In this way, one could speculate that strong links between self-reflection and mood 
would better support the notion that changes in awareness follow changes in mood. 
The supporting evidence for the association with mood, for whatever reason, 
appears mixed. The initial paper presenting the BCIS by Beck, Baruch, Balter, Steer, and 
Warman (2004) demonstrated that there was no correlation in psychosis patients’ 
depression scores and any BCIS sub scale, however they did report a significant correlation 
between patients with Major Depressive Disorder and SR. The lack of association between 
mood and BCIS in psychosis was replicated by Pedrelli et al., (2004), whose sample consisted 
of adult men over the age of 40 and used a different measure of depression. However, since 
these initial studies Beck and colleagues have found results in the opposite direction (Riggs 
et al., 2012), with SR showing a trend in the literature towards a significant relationship with 
mood. A total of 15 studies have reported correlations between BCIS scores and depression; 
11 have reported a positive relationship between SR and worse mood (Beck et al., 2004; 
Colis, Steer, & Beck, 2006; Ekinci, Ugurlu, Albayrak, Arslan, & Caykoylu, 2012; Greenberger & 
Serper, 2010; Kao, Wang, Lu, & Liu, 2011; Mass, Wolf, & Lincoln, 2012; Misdrahi, Denard, 
Swendsen, Jaussent, & Courtet, 2014; Raffard et al., 2013; Tastet, Verdoux, Bergua, 
Destaillats, & Prouteau, 2012; Warman, Lysaker, & Martin, 2007; Wiffen, 2011) 1 with no 
discernible effect (Gilleen, Greenwood, & David, 2011) and 2 small negative, non-significant 
correlations (Granholm et al., 2005; Pedrelli et al., 2004).  
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A similar relationship has also been reported between anxiety and SR scores, with 
most studies reporting positive relationships between worse anxiety symptoms and both SR 
and CI, with one study reporting no effect (Riggs et al., 2012). Again, this relationship may be 
related to the rumination symptoms present in anxiety, which may be seen as a form of 
continued self-reflection. Therefore the evidence that mood and BCIS are related through a 
self-reflection pathway is compelling (see chapter 6 for meta-analysis of BCIS and mood), 
however the basis for the association and direction of causality has not yet been established. 
A recent study by Giusti et al. (2014) investigated the relationship between cognitive 
insight and perceived recovery (using the Recovery Assessment Scale [RAS; Corrigan et al., 
1999, 2004]), reporting a negative association between scores on the RAS and BCIS-SR, 
however RAS scores were positively associated with severity of psychopathology. A multiple 
regression model demonstrated that lower clinical insight, higher neurocognitive abilities 
and lower social functioning were the significant predictors of personal recovery. Results 
therefore demonstrate that better perception of recovery by the patient was actually 
correlated to a lower ability of patients to self-reflect. The authors describe recovery as a 
subjective experience as well as an objective remission of symptoms, and thus indicate that, 
whilst cognitive insight is associated with symptoms, it is not associated with personal 
interpretation of illness and recovery in patients with schizophrenia.  
A longitudinal study has also indicated that cognitive insight scores are good 
predictors of social functioning at 1 year follow up (O'Connor et al., 2013) as measured by 
the Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF). This has not been reported often in other 
studies, and the authors suggest that this is because GAF scores are more general than 
measures such as the PANSS which measures specific symptoms separately, and thus the 
relationship between cognitive insight and depression or delusions may have been the 
driving force behind this significant association.  
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3.2.3 RELATIONSHIP WITH CLINICAL INSIGHT 
Riggs et al. (2012) report that convergent validity of the ‘cognitive insight’ construct 
has been determined by looking at the association between the BCIS and 5 different 
measures of clinical insight. Beck, along with two other research groups, has demonstrated 
that cognitive insight is a significant predictor of illness awareness as measured on the Scale 
to Assess Unawareness of Mental Disorder (SUMD; Amador et al., 1993) with moderate-to-
large correlations between cognitive insight and the awareness of a mental illness item 
(Lepage et al., 2008) and the total score (Bora et al., 2007).  
The relationship between BCIS score and other measures of clinical insight, such as 
PANSS, Birchwood Insight Scale (BIS) and Schedule for the Assessment of Insight (SAI) is 
weaker, with mild to moderate correlations reported for each (Riggs et al., 2012). This may 
be because cognitive and clinical insight measures are looking at subtly different 
psychological constructs. Again, looking at the REFLEX trial, a significant improvement in 
clinical, but not cognitive, insight was found after a course of metacognitive remediation 
therapy (Pijnenborg et al., 2014) emphasizing the difference between the two measures. 
Further evidence for a conceptual difference between the two forms of insight is the finding 
reported previously that cognitive insight, not clinical insight, is a good baseline predictor of 
social function at 1-year follow-up (O'Connor et al., 2013).  
3.2.4 RELATIONSHIP WITH GENDER 
There has been little research into the effect of gender on cognitive insight (Martin 
et al., 2010), partly because there are often significantly more men in clinical psychosis 
samples, and women in control samples. The original paper by Beck et al., (2004), reports no 
gender effect. Though Warman et al., (2007) reported a gender effect when comparing 
scores of patients and healthy adults, it was suggested that this was due to the majority of 
women being in the healthy control group and was thus an artefact. This may explain the 
lack of gender effects in the previous literature. 
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Kao et al. (2013) investigated the potential effect of gender on cognitive insight, in 
relation to executive function. Their results demonstrated, using logistic regression, that 
poor cognitive insight was significantly related to impaired executive function and was 
mediated by gender, wherein poor executive function was significantly correlated with 
impaired cognitive insight for males with schizophrenia, but not for females, based on the SR 
sub-scale. 
3.2.5 RELATIONSHIP WITH NEURO-COGNITION 
Given that clinical insight is partly associated to neurocognitive functioning, it 
follows that cognitive insight should also demonstrate links, given it is related to cognitive 
processing of illness related information. Findings in this area, however, have been mixed. A 
recent preliminary meta-analysis by Nair et al. (2014) investigated the relationship between 
cognitive insight and total cognition, memory, executive function. This analysis revealed that 
BCIS sub-scales differ in terms of their relationship to neurocognitive functions. More 
specifically, the composite index was significantly associated with “total cognition” and 
memory, driven by the SC scale, whereas SR was not significantly correlated with any 
measure of neurocognition. 
3.2.6 RELATIONSHIP WITH BRAIN STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION 
A great deal of research into self-reflection as a more general concept has been 
reported in the healthy metacognitive (chapter 2.3.2) and clinical (chapter 2.4.1.2 and 
3.1.3.3) literature. Therefore, this section will focus on the neural correlates specific to the 
BCIS sub-scales.  
A recent MRI study by Orfei, Piras, Macci, Caltagirone, and Spalletta (2013) found 
that, in 45 outpatients with schizophrenia and 45 age- and gender-matched healthy controls, 
there was a positive correlation between SR and gray matter volume in the right ventro-
lateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC), an area that is thought to be crucial for working memory 
when creating and maintaining different hypotheses about the self. There were no 
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significant neural correlates of SC. Additionally, there was no correlation between BCIS 
scores and white matter connectivity, as identified by diffusion tensor imaging (DTI). 
Another recent study by Pu et al. (2013) investigated pre-frontal function in 
cognitive insight and during a cognitive task using near-infrared spectroscopy (NIRS) 
procedure (a functional neuroimaging technique). They studied 30 patients with clinically 
stable schizophrenia and 30 age- and gender-matched healthy controls. Their results 
implicated reduced functioning in the prefrontal and temporal regions of the brain in 
patients, as characterised by reduced hemodynamic changes during multi-channel NIRS. 
There was a significant positive relationship between SR and the right ventrolateral 
prefrontal and right temporal functions during a verbal fluency task (measure of executive 
function). Results suggest that activity in the right VLPFC and temporal cortical regions was 
associated with cognitive insight in patients with schizophrenia. 
Similarly, Buchy et al. (2014) investigated the relationship between external source 
memory, as measured using a virtual reality landscape during fMRI, and activation of the 
frontal cortex including VLPFC, temporal and occipital cortices. A significant relationship was 
identified between VLPFC activity and higher SR scores, with significant associations 
between the midbrain and lower SC scores during source memory attributions. However no 
significant relationship was found between either measure of cognitive insight and source 
memory accuracy. 
Evidence from brain imaging studies confirms that there are similar brain regions 
associated with both BCIS SR and attributive metacognition, the temporal parietal junction 
and the MPFC (Saxe & Offen, 2010), further supporting the notion that the two concepts are 
related on a neural basis. 
 
- 83 - 
3.2.7 COGNITIVE INSIGHT - CONCLUSIONS 
Overall it appears that there is some measurable relationship between cognitive 
insight and psychopathology; a stronger relationship with positive symptoms and worse 
cognitive insight, driven by the SC subscale has been reported and there is evidence for a 
similar yet weaker relationship between SC and negative symptoms. There is also a growing 
body of evidence to suggest a link between low mood and better cognitive insight, driven by 
the SR subscale. There is also evidence to confirm a moderate but significant relationship 
between clinical and cognitive insight, implying that they are separable but associated 
concepts. There is equal support for a small but significant relationship between 
neurocognitive functioning and cognitive insight, specifically SC and both total cognition and 
memory. As in clinical insight, initial investigations into the structural and functional 
correlates of cognitive insight have implicated areas in the frontal lobe relating to SR, and 
midbrain structures relating to SC.  Further, these associations indicate a similar neural basis 
for SR and attributive metacognition. 
The BCIS may be suitable for use with healthy adults, and therefore also for 
comparisons between healthy and clinical populations. As there are few clinically relevant 
assessments designed for use with clinical groups that are also suitable for use in the healthy 
population, this measure may be important for teasing out deficits of self-appraisal in a 
variety of neuropsychiatric patients. All in all, this growing body of work suggests that the 
concept of cognitive insight has some utility in the field of insight research, with the 
potential for clinical applications. 
3.3 MEASURES OF CLINICAL INSIGHT 
There are a number of methods used to assess self-awareness and clinical insight in 
psychiatric conditions, usually developed for a specific disorder. Such methods can be 1) 
self-rated by patients, 2) utilise ratings from a significant other or clinician, or 3) use 
discrepancy measures where rating 1) is subtracted from rating 2). 
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3.3.1 DEVELOPED FOR SCHIZOPHRENIA 


























Scale A  0.239 0.44* 0.466** 0.544** 0.545** 
Scale B 0.229  0.336 0.410* 0.423* 0.411* 
 SAI 0.400* 0.336  0.977*** 0.823*** 0.823*** 
SAI-E 0.466** 0.401* 0.977***  0.895*** 0.845*** 
PANSS 0.544** 0.423* 0.884*** 0.895***  0.904*** 
 (ITAQ) 0.545** 0.411 0.845*** 0.845*** 0.904***  
Table 3.3-1 Shows correlation coefficients (Pearson’s r) between insight scales developed for use with patients 
diagnosed with schizophrenia, adapted from (Sanz, Constable, Lopez-Ibor, Kemp, & David, 1998); * p<.05; 
**p<.01; ***p<.001. 
3.3.1.1 SELF-REPORT 
A commonly used self-report insight scale is the Birchwood Insight Scale (BIS; 
Birchwood et al., 1994). Based on the three-dimensional insight model (David, 1990) it has 
11 items to assess patients’ awareness in each domain. The scale has demonstrated good 
test-retest reliability, and is also correlated with a clinician rated insight scale (Young, 
Campbell, Zakzanis, & Weinstein, 2003), the Scale to Assess Unawareness of Mental 
Disorder (SUMD; Amador et al., 1993). However, Young et al. also found that patients scored 
significantly lower on the BIS than the SUMD regardless of which assessment was 
administered first.  
Marková and Berrios (1992) devised a scale based on the premise that ”individuals 
hold views not only about the disorder affecting them but also about how the disorder 
affects their interaction with the world”. It is made up of 32 “yes/no” questions, which relate 
to self-perception of illness related statements. The items are split into two sub-scales, 
where a positive answer indicates greater insight (Scale A), and items where a positive 
response indicates less insight (Scale B). This scale can either be completed by the subject or 
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by a clinician. Scale A appears to be more frequently, highly, positively correlated with other 
measures of insight, and not correlated with Scale B (see table 3.3-1). 
3.3.1.2 CLINICIAN RATED 
The most basic clinical measure of insight used with schizophrenia patients is the 
PANSS insight item (Kay, et al., 1987). This is part of a 30-item psychopathology scale that is 
rated using a semi-structured interview, and to use it, raters should have standardised 
training. The insight item asks the clinician to rate a patients’ “Lack of judgment and insight” 
on a scale of 1-7, where a score of 1 relates to “no impairment” (i.e. patient doesn’t show a 
lack of insight) and 7 relates to “severe” (i.e. patients shows a severe lack of insight). Despite 
being a single item, this scale shows a moderate to high, significant, positive correlation with 
other standard measures of insight (see table 3.3-1). 
 A more commonly used scale is the Insight and Treatment Attitudes 
Questionnaire (ITAQ; McEvoy et al., 1989). This scale uses a semi-structured interview, 
including items that measure recognition of mental disorder (5 items) and attitudes to 
medication, hospitalization and follow-up evaluation (6 items). Items are scored from 0 (no 
insight) to 2 (good insight). This scale shows moderate to high, significant, positive 
correlations with other commonly used insight scales (see table 3.3-1). 
Another commonly used scale is the SUMD (Amador et al., 1993), which is based on 
a structured interview.  Though this scale can be used for assessment of a number of 
disorders, it is primarily used in schizophrenia research. This scale is made up of general 
measures (6 items), which measure global awareness of mental disorder, awareness of the 
effects of medication and awareness of social consequences of having a mental disorder. 
There are an additional 4 sub scales (17 items each), which measure current awareness of 
symptoms, retrospective awareness, current attribution of symptoms, and retrospective 
attribution of symptoms. Each item is given a score between 1 (good awareness) and 5 (poor 
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awareness). The different sections can be used independently of one another if necessary. In 
an initial assessment (Amador et al., 1993), it was reported that scores on the first 3 general 
items of the SUMD correlated positively with insight ratings on the Mental Status 
Examination and the insight rating on the Hamilton Depression scale. There was also a 
correlation between the SUMD total awareness scores and Mental Status Examination 
scores.  
Another commonly used scale to assess insight is the Schedule for the Assessment of 
Insight (SAI; David, 1990) and the SAI-Extended (SAI-E; Kemp and David, 1997). This scale 
uses a semi-structured interview to rate awareness of illness, need for treatment and 
awareness of symptoms (9 items) as well as treatment compliance (3 items). Scores for the 
first 6 items (insight into illness and need for treatment) are between 0 (no insight) and 2 
(good insight), 3 items regarding symptoms and reappraisal are scored from 0 (no 
awareness/bizarre explanation) to 4 (good insight/understanding). 3 items regarding 
medication compliance are rated using clinical notes or patients’ primary carer in a separate 
scale (A-C). Both the SAI and the SAI-E scores are highly, positively correlated with ITAQ, 
PANSS and Scale A, whilst SAI-E is also highly correlated with Scale B (see table 3.3-1). The 
SAI-E total is also highly correlated with the SUMD total (r=.84, p<.01) and sub-scales 
(mental awareness, r=-.82, p<.01; medication, r=-.81, p<.01; awareness, r=-.62, p<.01; 
attribution, r=-.86, p<.01; Gilleen et al., 2010).  
3.3.2 DEVELOPED FOR DEMENTIA 
A review by Clare, Marková, Verhey, and Kenny (2005) reports on and critically 
appraises the main approaches to assessing awareness in patients with dementia. The main 
methods identified were 1) clinician ratings of awareness, 2) calculation of discrepancies 
between carers’ ratings and patients’ self-ratings 3) calculation of an awareness score based 
on the discrepancy between patients’ self- ratings and their performance on specific tasks 
(similar to those described in Chapter 2) and 4) a combination of the above methods. 
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3.3.2.1 CLINICIAN/INFORMANT RATINGS 
As in schizophrenia research, a popular method of assessing awareness of patients 
with dementia is using clinical or researcher ratings, taken from semi-structured interviews 
or clinical notes. The most basic form of this assessment is the insight item of the Clinical 
Dementia Rating scale (CDR; Hughes, Berg, Danziger, Coben, & Martin, 1982), a scale 
designed to assess patients’ awareness of memory impairment, where the final item allows 
the clinician or researcher to make a judgement regarding patients’ “assessment of disability 
and station in life and understanding of why he/she is present at the examination”. Scores 
range from 0 (little insight) to 2 (full insight). 
The SUMD (section 3.6.1.2) was designed for use with a number of neurological 
disorders and is therefore also suitable for use in the dementia population.  
3.3.2.2 DISCREPANCY SCORES 
Discrepancy scores are often used to assess a patients’ awareness of their memory 
and behavioural deficits. To calculate, patient ratings of their abilities are subtracted from 
the informant ratings; positive scores indicate patients are underestimating their disability 
and negative scores indicate patients are over-estimating their disabilities. These measures 
often deem the patients’ caregiver or informant to be an objective gold standard, which is 
not necessarily the case as they may be biased towards a higher or lower impairment rating 
depending on their mood or perceived quality of life (Clare, 2004a; 2004b). However, 
despite the potential risk of bias, they have consistently shown patients tend to 
underestimate their cognitive and behavioural deficits compared to the assessments of 
caregivers (David et al., 2012).  
One commonly used assessment is the Dysexecutive questionnaire (DEX; Burgess, 
Alderman, Evans, Emslie, & Wilson, 1998), a sub-test of the Behavioural Assessment of the 
Dysexecutive Syndrome (BADS), which assesses patients’ awareness of their behavioural and 
executive function. Patients and their caregivers complete a 20-item questionnaire that asks 
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them to rate the frequency with which the patient displays certain behaviours in everyday 
life (see Chapter 5 section 5.4.3 for full description). A discrepancy score is calculated by 
subtracting patients’ ratings from their care-givers’ ratings. This scale is suitable for use 
within the general population as it is asking users to rate their executive and behavioural 
abilities rather than disorder-specific symptoms.  
3.3.2.3 TASK PERFORMANCE DISCREPANCY SCORES 
Task-performance discrepancy scores often come from tasks such as FOK and JOL, 
which have already been described in Chapter 2. These scores are more specific to types of 
memory function than clinical and practical outcomes. 
3.3.2.4 COMBINATION METHODS 
It is believed that there may be some bias from carers and clinicians in typical 
discrepancy and clinician rated assessments, where carers may over- or under-evaluate a 
patients’ behaviour and deficits, and similarly clinicians have limited exposure to the patient 
outside of clinical settings and therefore may not make accurate judgements. Ratings can 
also be subjective and vary according to the schedule used to obtain them. To address this 
issue, Clare et al. (2002) developed the Memory Awareness Rating Scale (MARS). The 
questions that form the items of the MARS are based on the Rivermead Behavioural 
Memory Test (RBMT; Wilson et al., 1985). The MARS allows clinicians and researchers to 
compare patients’ memory ratings, task performance ratings and actual performance scores, 
as well as ratings of everyday situations. For some memory and behavioural scales, patients 
are required to rate how well they will do (prediction) and then how well they did 
(performance) on the task and how well other people of the same age would perform; 
ratings are made on a five-point scale ranging from better than average (0) to a lot worse 
than average (4), where a low score is related to good perceived performance.  For other 
aspects of the scale carers are asked to rate how well a patient does everyday tasks. 
Discrepancy scores are calculated by subtracting patient response from carer or 
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performance scores. As the tasks are related to everyday memory and behavioural 
experiences, as opposed to standard lab-based experiments, the MARS is therefore 
considered to be more ecologically valid that other discrepancy assessments.   
The clinical methods described above can be referred to as “global” measures of 
awareness, and are related to general functioning in activities of everyday living, and can be 
useful when making clinical and practical decisions. Task specific discrepancy scores, as 
described in Chapter 2, are related to specific cognitive processes and allow a more detailed 
look into the specific processes that are disturbed in patients’ awareness (Cosentino, 2014). 
It is therefore useful for researchers to use a combination of both when investigating the 
nature and effects of lack of insight in clinical patients so that a fuller picture can be gained 
from the information gathered.  
3.3.2.5 MEASURES OF CLINICAL INSIGHT - CONCLUSIONS 
Insight in neuropsychiatric disorders such as dementia and schizophrenia can be 
assessed using a number of measures, which are either rated by clinicians, carers or the 
patients themselves. Though many awareness scales used within these patient groups are 
correlated, there are a number of criticisms that can be made of each type of method, as 
discussed above. Plus the fact that there is evidence to suggest that patients demonstrate 
varied awareness depending on the situation they are in (Weinstein, Friedland, & Wagner, 
1994) which could affect both clinician and carer ratings of patient awareness. Nevertheless, 
considerable progress has been made in developing practical, quantitative and reasonably 
reliable measures to assess awareness in clinical and experimental contexts. 
3.3.3 IMPLICIT AWARENESS 
Finally it is worth noting that (Mograbi & Morris, 2013) detail evidence that, though 
outwardly appearing to have poor awareness of their functional problems, some patients 
with dementia and hemiplegia show an “implicit” awareness. Evidence to support this in 
patients with dementia comes from Martyr et al. (2011), who found that patients with 
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dementia still showed an emotional Stroop effect for memory failure words, and Mograbi, 
Brown, Salas, and Morris (2012) who found that patients with dementia showed a normal 
emotional reaction in response to failure on tasks, indicating an unconscious awareness of 
their failure.  
Though developed in the dementia literature, this has also been investigated in the 
psychosis literature. When carrying out a similar task to dementia patients, psychosis 
patients did not show any interference with psychosis-related words (e.g. crazy, 
schizophrenic) over and above words associated with physical disease (e.g. cancer; Wiffen et 
al., 2013). Further, there was a correlation between and explicit measure of illness 
awareness and interference on illness-related words, indicating that these words were less 
emotionally salient and appear to be less associated with the self in patients with poor 
insight. Together, these findings indicate that patients with psychosis have a genuine 
reduced awareness of their illness, as opposed to utilising a motivated denial mechanism 
where on some level they are aware that their experiences are illness related. 
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CHAPTER 4 
4. AIMS AND HYPOTHESES 
This project aimed to investigate the neurocognitive basis of metacognition and 
insight, including experiments with healthy volunteers and patients with psychosis and those 
with early stage dementia (ED). The four main aims were: 
A. To investigate the effect of normal ageing on metacognitive tasks of perception and 
memory  
B. To investigate the cognitive systems and mechanisms underlying metacognitive 
efficiency and patients’ insight into illness, and discover whether the two are 
separate. 
C. To investigate how current mood and presence of depression affects insight and 
metacognitive efficiency, and if this link is more evident in clinical populations 
compared to healthy controls.  
D. To investigate whether deficits in metacognition and insight are caused by similar 
cognitive and neural systems across different diagnoses. 
The following hypotheses were tested: 
4.1 METACOGNITION IN THE HEALTHY POPULATION AND PATIENTS 
H4.1-1. There will be a negative association between metacognitive efficiency and age 
in both perceptual and memory domains. It is predicted that metacognitive efficiency (meta 
d’/d’) will decline as participant age increases to a greater degree than would be predicted 
by age-related declines in performance alone, because under the ideal observer model meta 
d’ is expected to be equal to d’, therefore the decrease in meta d’/d’ shows an impairment 
in metacognitive function above and beyond what is expected based on task performance. 
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H4.1-2.There will be a positive correlation between the two domains of metacognitive 
efficiency. It is assumed that, despite differences in primary task performance according to 
type of task, ability to judge one’s own performance on each task, and efficiency with which 
this judgement is performed, should be in part related to a common cognitive process. 
H4.1-3 There will be a positive correlation between executive function and 
metacognitive efficiency, in both domains. As metacognitive function in healthy adults has 
previously been associated with structure and function of the frontal lobe and executive 
function, it is predicted that better efficiency in our experimental measures of 
metacognition will be related to more optimal scores on standard tests of executive function 
(over and above IQ). 
4.2 METACOGNITION AND MOOD 
H4.2.There will be a positive association between metacognitive efficiency and low 
mood as measured on the Beck Depression Inventory II (BDI), in both the perceptual and 
memory domain, akin to findings from qualitative measures of metacognitive function.  
4.3 METACOGNITION AND AWARENESS 
H4.3 There will be a significant relationship between metacognitive efficiency and 
measures of awareness (Beck Cognitive Insight Scale, DEX and SAI-E) in both healthy controls 
and patients. It is assumed that, as more objective metacognitive judgements regarding task 
performance and awareness measures both rely on self-reflective processes, there will be a 
positive relationship between the two types of measure, where better awareness is 
associated with better metacognition. 
4.4 METACOGNITION IN PSYCHIATRIC POPULATIONS 
H4.4. Patients experiencing their first episode of psychosis (FEP) or early-stage 
dementia (ED) will have lower metacognitive scores than healthy controls. As some patients 
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with these disorders have poor awareness of illness it is also assumed that their general self-
referential processing is also poor compared to healthy adults. 
4.5 INSIGHT IN PSYCHIATRIC POPULATIONS 
H4.5-1 A meta-analysis investigating the relationship between mood and cognitive 
insight will demonstrate an overall positive association between self-reflection and 
depression, following qualitative evidence reported in a recent review. 
H4.5-2 There will be a significant correlation between measures of insight in 
psychiatric populations. There is robust evidence from previous research to suggest that 
there is an association between measures of awareness. 
4.6 NEUROIMAGING 
H4.6-1 There will be a significant relationship between the volume of areas of the 
frontal lobe, such as the BA10, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and medial prefrontal cortex 
(MPFC), and metacognitive efficiency scores in patients with ED. Previous research in 
healthy adults has demonstrated there is a link between individual differences in 
metacognitive ability and the prefrontal cortex structure, and self-reflective processes in 
patients have been associated with structural imaging measures of the MPFC and the ACC.
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              CHAPTER 5  
5. METHODS: PARTICIPANTS, BEHAVIOURAL ASSESSMENTS AND 
PROTOCOLS 
5.1 RECRUITMENT 
5.1.1 HEALTHY PARTICIPANTS 
Three methods were employed to recruit healthy participants, so that a 
representative sample of the general population could be obtained. This aimed to ensure 
that results could be generalised to the wider healthy adult population as far as possible. 
1. Some healthy control participants were recruited by approaching participants who 
had completed participation in an existing study at the Institute of Psychiatry; 
European Union Gene Environment Interaction (EU-GEI; PI Dr C Morgan). The study 
recruited a large sample of healthy participants from South London, in the boroughs 
of Lambeth and Southwark. Participants who had agreed to be re-contacted for 
further studies were approached by a phone call from the student in the first 
instance, explaining the study and asking if they were interested in taking part. 
Participants responding to the EU-GEI study invitation letter but who were 
unsuitable for the initial study due to quota sampling were also passed on to this 
study. 
2. A copy of the Royal Mail Postal Address File (PAF), containing all residential 
addresses in the boroughs of Lambeth and Southwark, was obtained from the Royal 
Mail. This is available to all members of the public for a small fee. Approach letters 
for participation in this study were sent out to a random selection of 355 addresses, 
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addressed to the occupier, stating the study information and exclusion criteria. 
Willing parties were asked to contact the study team to register interest. 
Addresses were selected at random by assigning each of the 252,927 addresses a 
number, and then randomly generating 1,000 numbers, from 1 to 252,927. The first 
355 addresses were selected from the pool of 1,000 and were sent letters in batches 
of approximately 30, starting with the first 30 random addresses selected.  
From previous experience this method yields a 10% “interested” response rate 
(Hubbard et al., 2012). 
3. A database available to all researchers at the Institute of Psychiatry, MindSearch, 
which holds details of willing volunteers for human participation studies, was also 
used. Inclusion and exclusion criteria for healthy participants (as stated below) were 
sent to the MindSearch organisers. This returned a file containing 585 participants. 
These participants were all sent an email explaining the study, and willing parties 
were asked to contact the study team to register interest. 
Inclusion criteria for healthy control participants were: 
 Over the age of 18 
 First language English/very good English speaking ability 
Exclusion criteria for healthy control participants were: 
 Below the age of 18 
 Have suffered from a psychotic episode, or suffer from mild cognitive 
impairment, Alzheimer’s disease or depression.  
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5.1.2 PATIENTS WITH FEP 
First episode psychosis patients were recruited by approaching patients who had 
completed participation in a study at the Institute of Psychiatry, the European Union – Gene 
Environment Interaction study, (PI Dr C Morgan). As patients were recruited during their first 
episode of psychosis, no formal, fixed diagnosis had been made at the time of participation 
in this study, however all patients met the inclusion listed below.  
Part of the study required participants to complete 2 booklets of questionnaires and 
assessments over 2 or 3 appointments and involvement in the EU-GEI study had ceased 
following completion of the booklets. The EU-GEI study team asked patients who had 
completed the two booklets on their final appointment if they would like to take part in 
another study. If the patient consented to the passing on of his/her details they were 
approached with a phone call or letter, explaining this study and asking for their 
participation. If the patient expressed an interest in taking part an appointment was set up 
to explain the study again and ask for the patient’s consent. Once consent was gained the 
patient was asked to complete the study, as detailed below. Inclusion criteria for psychosis 
patients were:  
 Age 18 to 64 
 Presence of an untreated first episode of psychosis (even if long‐standing) (ICD‐10: 
F20‐29; F30‐33 [DSM equivalents: 295.xx to 298.xx]) during the study period (1st 
January 2010 to 31st May 2013) [n.b. this does not mean that cases have to be 
untreated at the point at which they are seen, only that treatment (as defined 
below) was not begun prior to 1st January 2010] 
Exclusion criteria for first episode psychosis patients in this study were: 
 Age under 18 or over 64  
 Treatment for an episode of psychosis outside of the study period  
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 Evidence of psychotic symptoms precipitated by an organic cause  
 Transient psychotic symptoms resulting from acute intoxication as defined by ICD‐10  
 Have been detained in prison - the study from which these patients were recruited 
chose to include patients who were in prison at the time of contact and assessment, 
whereas this study chose not to include any patients who were detained; however 
any patient who had previously been detained was eligible. 
5.1.3 PATIENTS WITH ED 
Early stage dementia patients were recruited through the “Plasma Based Biomarkers 
for Alzheimer’s Disease” study (PI Prof S Lovestone). Patients included in this study were 
originally recruited from South London and Maudsley (SLaM) memory services and SLaM GP 
surgeries by Dr Costafreda (second supervisor and Clinical Lecturer in the Department of Old 
Age Psychiatry), who is part of the clinical care team for this cohort. Once recruited into the 
study, the research team contacted any participant who met this study’s requirements of 
MCI/mild AD, as long as they could be seen within four months of having an MRI scan. 
Participants were assessed using a general cognitive test – Mini Mental State Exam (MMSE) - 
and the tests included in the “Consortium to establish a registry for Alzheimer's disease” 
CERAD). Patients categorised as ED had scored 1.5 SD (MCI) or 2 SD (early AD) below the 
normative age adjusted scores in at least one of the following: verbal fluency, Boston 
naming test, word list memory, constructional praxis, word list recall, word list recognition, 
word list delayed recall, recall of constructional praxis. The team asked if the patients’ 
details could be passed on to the PhD student. If patients consented to the passing on of 
their details they were approached with a phone call or letter, explaining this study and 
asking for their participation. If the patient was interested an appointment was set up to 
explain the study again and ask for the patients consent. Once consent was gained the 
patient was asked to complete the study, as detailed below. It is worth pointing out that, 
while MCI constitutes as a high-risk state for dementia, up to 50% of MCI patients may never 
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progress to overt dementia. That said, as this study is a cross-sectional design it is interested 
in associations between current functional profile and metacognition rather than 
longitudinal effects.  
The inclusion criteria for patients recruited from the Biomarkers study are stated 
below: 
 MMSE score >=20 and with a clinical diagnosis based on ICD-10 criteria of dementia 
in AD or MCD (Mild cognitive disorder, the ICD terminology for mild cognitive 
impairment). This cut off score was decided upon to limit the chance of contacting 
patients who did not have the capacity to consent. The cut off score is consistent 
with mild stages of dementia and MCI. 
 Patients must have had an MRI in the last 5 months. Due to the degenerative nature 
of MCI or Dementia, assessing patients who received an MRI over 5 months prior to 
participation in this study may have resulted in the MRI data being un-
representative of the patients’ brain structure at the time of assessment. 
Exclusion criteria for dementia patients were:  
 Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE) score <20. 
 Evidently not possessing the capacity to consent. Assessment for capacity to consent 
was carried out by a research nurse from the Biomarker study team who specialised 
in old age psychiatry and had specific experience in consenting older adults for 
research. This was conducted prior to patients’ signing the consent form. 
Patients were recruited according to the inclusion and exclusion criteria stated 
above. This particular threshold of MMSE score (>20) included patients with diagnoses of 
either MCI or mild AD, and thus the group is referred to as “early stage dementia”, so as to 
be inclusive of both diagnoses. 
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5.1.4 DEPRESSED PATIENTS 
First attempts were made to advertise the study in GP Surgeries in Lambeth, using 
posters or information sheets. However, after 6 months of contacting suitable surgeries, 
none agreed to advertise the study. The study description was therefore added to the King’s 
College, London Research Studies page 
(https://internal.kcl.ac.uk/innovation/studies/index.aspx), which advertised the study for 2 
months, featuring in two of the advertising circular emails, sent to staff and subscribers. 
Potential participants registered interest via email or phone. 
Inclusion criteria for depressed patients were: 
 Over the age of 18.  
 Score >=14 on the Beck Depression Inventory at the time of registering interest. 
 Have a formal diagnosis of Depression (by a GP/Psychiatrist/IAPT practitioner; 
diagnosis from the patients’ own report; no access to medical records was required). 
Exclusion criteria for depressed patients were: 
 Under the age of 18. 
 Have a history of psychotic disorders, mild cognitive impairment or Alzheimer’s 
disease. 
 Score of <14 on the Beck Depression Inventory at the time of registering interest. 
This patient group was required only for the between-group comparisons, reported in 
chapter 10. 
5.2 PARTICIPANT NUMBERS 
All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. There were 73 healthy 
adults included (31 men, 42 women); 20 patients with first episode of psychosis (12 men, 8 
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women); 18 patients with ED (11 men, 7 women); and 15 patients with Depression (5 men, 
10 women). 
 
5.3 ETHICAL APPROVAL 
Ethical approval for healthy participant participation was granted by the Psychiatry, 
Nursing and Midwifery research sub-committee of King’s College, London Research Ethics 
Committee (REC ref: PNM/11/12-94). Ethical approval for patient participation was granted 
by the NHS National Research Ethics Service Committee London – Fulham (REC ref: 
13/LO/0661). 
5.4 BEHAVIOURAL MEASURES 
5.4.1 METACOGNITION MEASURES 
Perceptual metacognitive efficiency  
Perceptual metacognitive efficiency was investigated using a computerised visual 
perceptual metacognition task, similar to that used in the study by Fleming et al. (2010). 
Each trial required participants to perform a perceptual task. The stimuli used were Gabor 
patches: circular patches of alternating light and dark vertical bars (2.8 visual degrees in 
diameter, spatial frequency of 2.2 cycles per visual degree). The contrast between the 
vertical lines in each standard Gabor patch was 20%, where 0% indicates no difference 
between the light and dark bars and 100%, the maximum difference (black to white). Six 
such Gabor patches were arranged in a circle (eccentricity of 6.9 visual degrees) around a 
central fixation point (see figure 5.4-1a). One of the six Gabor patches could be made to 
pop-out from the others by increasing the contrast in that patch compared with the 
standard 20% contrast of the others. The contrast of the pop-out Gabor patches varied from 
23% (little effect of pop-out) to 80% (pop-out very clear). The task required participants to 
view two stimulus arrays, each presented for 200 ms, separated by an interval of 300 ms. 
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Each array contained the six Gabor patches around a central fixation point, set against a 
uniform gray background. The interval between stimuli comprised a uniform gray screen 
without the Gabor patches. A single Gabor patch in one of the two intervals was designated 
as a pop-out. Which of the six Gabor patches popped-out varied randomly between trials.  
Participants were prompted by a computer display to respond “1” or “2” (presented 
centrally) as to whether they thought the pop-out Gabor patch appeared during the first or 
second presentation. Participants responded by pressing the numerical keys on the top left-
hand side of the laptop keyboard with their left hand, with a red box surrounding their 
response. Participants had 2 s in which to make their decision; if an answer was not given in 
this time the phrase “Too Slow” appeared on the screen. No feedback was given as to 
whether responses were right or wrong.  
Participants then indicated confidence in their decision on a scale of 1–6 (1: 
relatively low confidence; 6: relatively high confidence; see Fig. 5.4-1a). The display screen 
consisted of the numbers 1–6 presented centrally. Participants were encouraged to use the 
full range of the scale, thinking carefully about how confident they were after each decision. 
Participants responded by pressing numerically marked keys on the top left-hand side of the 
laptop keyboard with their left hand, with a red box again surrounding this selection. 
Participants had 3.5 s to complete this metacognitive judgement. Performance on the task 
was maintained at around 70% using a 2-down, 1-up staircase procedure (Levitt, 1971). Two 
consecutive correct visual judgments led to a one step (3%) decrease in contrast of the pop-
out Gabor patch in the next trial, whereas one incorrect visual judgment led to a one step 
increase in contrast of the pop-out patch. This procedure ensures all participants perform 
with approximately the same accuracy on the primary perceptual task, allowing us to 
measure metacognitive efficiency independent of task performance. This was especially 
useful in the present study, as the range of participant ages may otherwise have led to 
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performance bias. Older participants who struggled to make manual responses in the time 
permitted gave verbal answers to the researcher who made manual responses. The task 
comprised 5 blocks of 8 minutes with short breaks between each block, taking 
approximately 50 minutes to complete.  
A standard task instruction sheet explaining the task was read through by 
participants on their own, they were then given the opportunity to ask the task 
administrator questions. Participants were seated in a darkened room approximately 60 cm 
from a laptop computer screen (Sony Vaio, PCG-71614M laptop; 17 in display; 1280 x 800 
pixels). Stimulus display and responses for the tasks were programmed in MATLAB 7.8 
(Mathworks Inc., Natick, MA, USA; using the COGENT 2000 toolbox 
(http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php). A practice session of two blocks of eight trials was 
given at the start to familiarise participants with the task. Participants were tested 
individually in a quiet room. All 54 participants completed the perceptual metacognition task 
as used in the study by Fleming et al. (2010). As this task requires more sustained attention 
from participants it was decided to complete this first to avoid fatigue effects confounding 
the data, especially in older participants. Participants are asked to sit in front of a laptop 
computer screen, which was no further than 20cm from the edge of the surface on which it 
is placed. The experimental task had 5 blocks of 8 minutes, with short breaks in between 
each block, therefore taking approximately 50 minutes to complete.  
Participants were firstly presented with a practice session. The trials in this session 
were easier, and the contrast between pop-out and non-pop-out patches was much more 
obvious than in the experimental trials. The time they were given to make their responses 
was also longer than in experimental trials.  
Participants over 60 years old were asked to complete a slightly easier version of the 
experimental task, where the staring contrast of the Gabor patches was higher and 
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therefore easier to see, with additional response and stimuli presentation times. These 
modifications were in place to compensate for general age related decline in response times 
and visual perception ability. 
 
Figure 5.4-1. a) Visual Perception Metacognitive task; 1 trial (adapted from Fleming et al, 2010). b) Memory 
Metacognition task, 1 trial (adapted from McCurdy et al, 2013) 
Memory metacognitive efficiency  
Memory metacognitive efficiency was investigated using the 2-AFC memory 
confidence task devised by McCurdy et al. (2013; see figure 5.4-1b). At the beginning of each 
block 50 English words (Calibri font, size 24; appendix 5.1) were presented simultaneously 
on the screen for 0.5, 1, or 1.5 min to create three levels of difficulty to ensure that, overall, 
participants performed at neither chance nor ceiling; analysis did not involve comparing the 
different levels of difficulty. English words were generated using the Medical Research 
Council Psycholinguistic Database (Wilson, 1988). These standard nouns were four to eight 
letters long, had one to three syllables, and had a familiarity, concreteness, and imagability 
rating of 400–700 each. Participants were instructed to memorize as many words on the list 
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as possible during the study period. A small notice appeared at the bottom of the screen to 
inform them when there was 10s left to study the list. After the study period, a series of 
trials probing memory for the word list was presented. In each trial, two words were 
presented to the left and right of fixation. One of these words had been presented on the 
study list (“old”), and the other word had not been presented previously (“new”). First, 
participants had 250ms to provide a 2-AFC judgment with regard to which word was “old”, 
where pressing “1” referred to the left hand word and “2” referred to the right hand word. 
Participants had 250ms seconds to press one of four keys (“7,” “8,” “9,” or “0”) using their 
right hand to indicate their confidence in being correct about their memory judgment 
(signifying “not at all confident” to “very confident” respectively). Older participants who 
struggled to make manual responses in the time provided gave verbal answers to a 
researcher who made manual responses. The task comprised 3 blocks of approximately 5 
minutes each with short breaks in between each block. 34 participants completed the 
memory metacognition task. 
5.4.2 CALCULATING METACOGNITIVE EFFICIENCY 
Metacognitive efficiency was quantified using the meta d’/d’ measure developed by 
Maniscalco & Lau (2012). It is known that other measures of metacognitive ability are 
affected by primary task performance (Galvin et al., 2003; Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). For 
example, if two individuals A and B have identical metacognitive ability, but A performs 
better than B on the primary task, A’s metacognition score will appear higher than B’s due to 
this performance confound. Calculating meta d’ circumvents this issue. As meta d’ is 
expressed in the same units as task performance (d’), we can construct a relative measure of 
metacognitive efficiency (meta d’/d’) to isolate metacognition from variations in task 
performance. Importantly, meta d’/d’ is a relative measure: given a certain level of 
processing capacity (d’), meta d’/d’ quantifies the extent to which a metacognitively optimal 
observer is aware of their performance (discussed previously in chapter 2.2) 
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5.4.3 MOOD RATINGS 
A simple and frequently used method of self-rating a characteristic or attitude, in 
both clinical and research settings, is a visual analogue scale (VAS; Wewers and Lowe, 1990). 
This type of scale was used in the present study to measure participants’ current subjective 
mood. The scale asks participants to rate how happy they are, ranging from 1=very unhappy 
to 10=very happy (see appendix 5.1). There were no other marks on the scale; this was so 
participants were encouraged to use the entire width of the line and avoid responses 
clustering around specific points, such as the mid-point.  This took no longer than one 
minute to explain and carry out.  
The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck & Steer, 1984; see appendix 5.2) is a 
common measure of depression, and is widely used in both the clinical and non-clinical 
populations (Lasa et al., 2000). The BDI is a 21-item self-report questionnaire designed to 
assess the presence and severity of symptoms of depression over the previous 2 weeks. 
Each of the 21 items corresponds to a symptom of depression, and scores are totalled to 
give a single overall score. There is a four-point scale for each item ranging from 0 to 3. The 
pilot study confirmed our assumption that most participant scores would fall within the 
“normal” or “minimal” range with scores of 0-13; scores of 14-19 are classed as mild, 20-28 
as moderate, and 29-63 as severe.  
5.4.4 MEASURES OF INSIGHT 
Cognitive insight ratings were measured in all participants using the Beck Cognitive 
Insight Scale (BCIS; Beck et al, 2004; appendix 5.3). The BCIS is a 15-item self-report 
questionnaire that assesses participants’ self-reflectiveness and overconfidence in their 
interpretations of their experiences. There is a four-point scale for each item ranging from 1 
to 4. The questionnaire can be split into two subscales; self-reflectiveness (SR; 9 items) and 
self-certainty (SC; 6 items). This scale was designed with the aim of identifying possible 
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thinking biases, rather than skill deficits. Recent research (Kao et al, 2011; Martin et al, 2010) 
has shown that the scale is reliable and suitable for use in the general population as well as 
with psychiatric patients. The scale was selected to allow for direct comparisons to be made 
between the general population and patients in this study (see chapter 6 for factor analysis 
and meta-analysis).  
Insight into executive deficits and behaviour was measured in all participants using 
the Dysexecutive Questionnaire (DEX; appendix 5.4). The DEX is a 20-item measure of 
participants’ opinions about their executive and cognitive functions, and how these impact 
on their daily life, e.g. “I lose my temper at the slightest thing” and “I will say one thing, but 
do something different”. An Independent rater (IR) is required to complete a separate 
version of this questionnaire, where they answer questions about the participant (these 
questions are identical to those the participant has answered about themselves). Ideally the 
IR will be a spouse or person living with the participant, as an accurate and objective 
measurement of the participants’ dysexecutive abilities is required, as well as the subjective 
report of the participant. Discrepancy scores between the participants’ own ratings and the 
IR’s ratings about the participant are calculated by subtracting participant scores from the IR 
scores. A greater difference in scores leads to a larger discrepancy, where a negative value 
indicates that participants are unaware and underestimating their cognitive dysfunction, and 
a positive number indicates participants are overestimating their level of cognitive 
dysfunction. A larger discrepancy score therefore indicates that participants have less insight 
into their illness, as they have overestimated or underestimated their functioning compared 
to the objective, more accurate view. Research (Chan, 2001) has shown that this scale is 
reliable and suitable for use in the general population as well as with psychiatric patients. 
This took no longer than 5 minutes to complete. 
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Clinical insight scores, from patients (Psychosis, Dementia and Depression) only, 
were measured using the Schedule for the Assessment of Insight - Expanded (SAI-E), (Kemp 
and David, 1997). This is a simple semi-structured clinician-administered series of questions 
on the three dimensions of insight (ability to recognise illness, ability to relate their unusual 
mental events as pathological, and compliance with medication; David, 1990), which are 
rated on three levels, and measures patients’ awareness of change, and its effects on their 
functioning. 
5.4.5  NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL MEASURES 
The Wechsler Memory Scale (WMS; appendix 5.6) logical memory task (Wechsler, 
1997a) is designed to detect attention and memory deficits, and is suitable for use in 
participants from 16-90 years of age. The “logical memory” task asks participants to listen to 
and remember a spoken story. Stories were recorded in a quiet room on iPhone 4S Voice 
Memo application. They were presented to each participant using iPhone 4S speakers to 
ensure all participants heard the same story presented in exactly the same way. After 
hearing each story participants were then asked to recount the story to the researcher, and 
obtained scores for remembering key facts and aspects of the story. The more aspects of the 
story remembered, the higher the participants’ score. Story A is played once to the 
participant who then recalls any information they can remember. Story B is played twice (B-I 
and B-II), with the participant recalling information after each reading. After 30 minutes 
from when the stories are initially played to the participants they are asked again recount 
the stories to the researcher (A2, B2; total recall after 30 minutes). A recognition task is then 
carried out, where participants are asked 15 questions about each of the stories and 
required to give “Yes” or “No” answers.  
Scores are derived from the learning slope (difference between number of items 
recalled on Story B-I and Story B-II), total immediate recall (story A score + story B-II score), 
total recall after 30 minutes (story A2 score + story B2 score), recognition score (recall score 
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on A + recall score on B) and total percentage information retained ([immediate recall/30 
min recall] *100).  The scores reported in this thesis are the raw memory scores, not age 
adjusted. Age adjusted scores give a score of an individuals’ memory ability compared to 
their age-group norms. The use of raw scores in this study therefore gives us an individuals’ 
absolute memory scores rather than a view of their memory ability compared to age-related 
norms. Given there is a small but significant age-related decline in memory ability, and the 
participants included in this sample have a wide age range, the use of raw scores may 
appear to inflate the difference between memory abilities between and within groups across 
the age range, thus affecting the interpretation of results. 
The abbreviated Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS; Wechsler, 1997b; 
appendix 5.7) measures IQ. This takes the digit symbol coding, arithmetic, block design and 
information sections from the full WAIS-III battery of assessments that creates a scaled IQ 
score. This shortened version of the WAIS-III was selected because it only takes 
approximately 20 minutes with healthy controls, and 30 minutes with patients, whilst still 
providing a reliable measure of their IQ. This was required since an aim of this study is to 
establish whether overall intellectual ability correlates with metacognitive efficiency.  
The Trail Making Test is designed to measure the cognitive domains of processing 
speed, sequencing, mental flexibility and visual–motor skills (Bowie and Harvey, 2006; 
appendix 5.8). The test comprises of two parts; A and B.  Part A requires the participants to 
connect a series of 25 numbers outlined with a circle in ascending numerical order. This part 
of the task is designed to be a simple test of visual search and motor speed skills. Part B of 
the task requires the same connecting of circles but instead participants have to ascend in 
number and letter order (1-A-2-B-3-C—etc.). This part of the task is designed to also be a 
test of higher-level cognitive skills, particularly task switching, aspects of executive control 
(Bowie and Harvey, 2006).  
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In each task the numbers (and letters) are placed in a semi-random fixed order to 
avoid overlapping connector lines. The score of interest is the completion time, especially 
that of B. A score of basic task speed and attention is obtained using A; we can then remove 
the effect of general speed from task B by subtracting time A from time B (Trails B-A score). 
If executive function is intact a faster B-A value is anticipated. 
The Brixton Test is a sub-test developed within the Hayling and Brixton tests of 
executive functioning (Burgess and Shallice, 1997; appendix 5.9). The test presents 
participants with a 56-page stimulus booklet. Each page contains 2 rows of 5 circles, where 
each circle is numbered from 1 to 10. On each page one of these circles is blue. The position 
of the blue circle can change on each page. Changes depend on a set of rules, which can 
change without warning to the participant. Participants are required to point out where they 
think the next blue circle will appear, with the intention being for participants to work out 
and use the rules using previous pages.  Responses are considered correct if participants 
follow the current rule. Where a rule has changed, they answer correctly if they continue to 
use the rule from the previous page. Scores are obtained by noting the number of errors, 
where the maximum number of errors that can be made is 55. A higher score reflects poorer 
performance and therefore poorer executive function. 
Verbal Fluency task (FAS; Spreen & Benton, 1977; appendix 5.10) asks participants to 
list words, either beginning with a specific letter (phonological fluency; F A and S) or those 
belonging to specific categories (Fruit, Parts of the Body and Animals) within a 1-minute 
limit. The number of correct and incorrect words (non-word, not belonging to that 
category/letter group, name, place or number) and repeated words are tallied for both the 
first 30 seconds and the total 60 seconds. This is regarded as an executive function test since 
it requires word generation, maintenance of set and the monitoring of previous responses to 
prevent repetitions and out of category items.  
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5.5 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
All analyses were performed using SPSS v.22 (SPSS Inc., 2013). As data were 
continuous and normally distributed, parametric tests were used.  
5.5.1 WITHIN-GROUP ANALYSES 
Pearson’s Correlation analyses were carried out to compare variables within each 
individual group. Specifically, the following associations were investigated: 
 The relationship between both domains of metacognitive efficiency (perception 
and memory) and age, measures of mood (VAS and BDI) and neurocognition. 
 The relationship between measures of insight (BCIS sub-scales, DEX sub-
subscales and the SAI [for patients only]) and mood. 
 The relationship measures of insight and both domains of metacognitive 
efficiency scores. 
5.5.2 BETWEEN-GROUP ANALYSES 
ANOVAs were carried out to compare variables across the younger participant 
groups: 1) Healthy adults less than 60 years of age, 2) FEP patients, and 3) depressed 
patients. Scheffé’s post-hoc tests were performed to identify the difference between 
individual groups, as opposed to the less conservative least significant difference (LSD) post-
hoc test. Specifically, the following comparisons were carried out: 
 The difference in scores of cognitive insight (BCIS sub-scales) and awareness of 
executive and behavioural deficits (the DEX-sr).  
 The difference in scores of metacognitive efficiency. Due to the small number of 
FEP patients who successfully completed the perceptual metacognitive task, 
these data were not included in the between-group comparison. 
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T-test analyses were carried out to compare variables across both the older 
participant groups: 1) Healthy adults of 60 years and over, 2) ED patients, and across the two 
patient groups. Specifically, the following comparisons were completed: 
 The difference in scores of cognitive insight (BCIS sub-scales) and awareness of 
executive and behavioural deficits (the DEX-sr).  
 The difference in scores of memory metacognitive efficiency. Due to the small 
number of patients in both groups who successfully completed the perceptual 
metacognitive task, these data were not included in the between-group 
comparison. 
5.6 PROTOCOL 
Where possible the following order of task presentation was carried out. If 
participants reported being fatigued, or requested shorter sessions, the protocol was split 
into two parts of approximately 1 hour each. 
1. The experiment was first described briefly to participants and any questions 
they had were answered, without disclosing the nature of the computerised assessments. 
Consent was then obtained. 
2. Basic information was then collected regarding age, ethnicity, education, 
employment and relationship status. This task took no longer than one minute to explain 
and carry out. 
3. Participants were then asked to rate their current mood on a Visual 
analogue scale (VAS). This task took no longer than one minute to explain and carry out. 
5. Participants were then asked to complete the perception metacognitive 
task. This task took no longer than 50 minutes to complete. 
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6. Participants were then asked for a second time to rate their mood on the 
VAS.  
7. Participants were then asked to complete the BDI. This task took no longer 
than 5 minutes to complete. 
8. Participants were then asked to complete the BCIS. This task took no longer 
than 5 minutes to complete. 
9. Participants were then asked to complete the DEX. This task took no longer 
than 5 minutes to complete. 
10.  Patients only were then asked to complete the SAI-E. This task took no longer 
than 10 minutes to complete. 
11. Participants were then asked to complete the first part of the WMS. This 
task took no longer than 10 minutes. 
12. Where necessary the WAIS was administered. (Some participants had 
already completed this battery of assessments for a previous study and hence did not need 
to complete it, instead obtaining scores from the previous study.) 
13. The Trail Making Task was then administered. This task took no longer than 
5 minutes to complete. 
14. The Brixton Spatial Anticipation Test (Brixton test) was then administered. 
This task took no longer than 5 minutes to complete. 
15. The verbal fluency task was then administered. This task took no longer than 
10 minutes to complete. 
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16.  The second half of the WMS was then carried out. This task took no longer 
than 10 minutes to complete. 
17. The memory metacognition task was then administered. This task took no 
longer than 15 minutes to complete. 
18. Participants were then debriefed and any questions answered. Payment of 
£10 was then given. 
Mood induction 
An initial aim of the study was to investigate the effect of mood induction on healthy 
participants’ metacognitive abilities using Velten statements (Velten, 1968). However, the 
induction procedures did not have any significant effect on participants’ mood, and hence 
this portion of the study was set aside.  
5.7     ADDITIONAL MEASURES – ED 
ED patients were recruited from a larger study at the Institute of Psychiatry and 
therefore had already completed some relevant assessments, the results of which were 
made available along with the data collected by this study.  
The MMSE (Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975) is the most commonly used test for 
complaints of memory problems, and is commonly used to help diagnose MCI and dementia, 
and follow progression of memory complaints over time. It is a 30-point assessment that 
measures:  Orientation to time (what time and date is it), Orientation to place (where are 
you now, nearby street etc.), Registration (repeating named words), Attention and 
calculation (Count back from 100 in sevens/ spell “world” backwards). Recall of registration 
words, Language (name a pencil and a watch), Repetition (speaking back a phrase) Complex 
commands (draw picture or complete a set of written commands). Regarding scores, 27-30 
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represents “normal cognition”, below this score represents mild (19-26), moderate (10-18) 
or severe (0-9) impairment. That said, a score of 27-30 does not rule out the presence of 
MCI. The assessment can take between 10 and 15 minute to complete. 
For the current study an MMSE score of less than 30 and failure on one section of 
the CERAD or Alzheimer's Disease Assessment Scale-cognitive subscale (ADAS-Cog) was used 
to determine inclusion, data from which was no included in the analyses of this thesis.  
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CHAPTER 6 
6. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE BCIS AND DEPRESSION: A META-
ANALYSIS 
6.1 BACKGROUND 
The Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (BCIS) literature has been covered in Chapter 3.2 
and its properties in Chapter 5.4.4. 
The rationale for this meta-analysis was that, in addition to metacognition and 
neurocognition, mood is also one of the more robust predictors of clinical insight, with lower 
mood tending to be related to improved insight, as well as a narrative review, highlighting a 
potential link (see Chapter 3; Mintz, et al., 2003; Riggs et al., 2012). As BCIS scores are known 
to be positively associated with measures of clinical insight (Riggs, 2012), and be similarly 
positively associated with positive symptoms (Engh et al., 2010; Ouzir, Azorin, Adida, 
Boussaoud, & Battas, 2012; Warman et al., 2007; Riggs, 2012) it is predicted that cognitive 
insight may also be positively associated with depression scores. Further, as covered in 
chapter 3.2, Granholm et al. (2005) have suggested that better cognitive insight may be the 
result of low mood, due to changes in self-perception. 
 Existing literature therefore indicates that further review of this relatively new 
insight measure should be carried out to investigate the mood/cognitive insight relationship. 
The aim of this chapter was to collate data from all available papers that reported both 
cognitive insight and depression scores in patients with schizophrenia, from 2004-2013, and 
perform a meta-analysis to examine the relationship between mood and cognitive insight. 
The hypothesis tested stated that ‘the relationship between mood and cognitive insight will 
demonstrate an overall positive association between self-reflection and depression’. 
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6.2 METHOD 
6.2.1 DESIGN 
This study identification strategy had two phases. PubMed and Web of Science 
databases were searched for relevant papers using the search terms COGNITIVE INSIGHT or 
BCIS or “BECK COGNITIVE INSIGHT SCALE” combined with PSYCHOSIS or SCHIZOPHRENIA 
combined with DEPRESSION or MOOD or AFFECT. This generated 135 results from PubMed 
and 344 results from Web of Science. The returned papers were then screened using the 
following inclusion criteria: (1) Correlations between BCIS and Depression (Hamilton 
Depression Scale [HDRS], Beck Depression Inventory [BDI], Calgary Depression Scale [CDS], 
Positive and Negative Symptom Scale (depression item) [PANSS]) were reported in the study 
or sufficient information was reported to enable us to compute effect sizes; (2) the sample 
comprised patient groups with a psychotic disorder (first-episode psychosis, schizophrenia, 
schizoaffective disorder), (3) the article had been published in a peer-reviewed English-
language journal; 4) the article had been published before October 2013. 
Of the papers returned in the literature search, 19 met the inclusion criteria, (see 
Table 6.1-1) 14 of which were included in the analysis. Some of the studies identified in this 
literature search could not, unfortunately, be included (Lepage et al., 2008; Penn et al. 2009; 
Bucy et al., 2010; Ekinci, Albayrak, and Ekinci, 2012; Ekinci & Ekinci, 2013). This was due to a 
lack of reporting of specific mood/cognitive insight relationships. Despite our best efforts to 
obtain the information via email or phone not all sets of data were acquired. We also 
acknowledge that some relevant studies may, unfortunately, have been missed in the 
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Depression Measure Mean Age 
(years) 
*Beck et al. (2004) 75 SR, SC, CI BDI 38.92 
*Pedrelli et al. (2004) 164 SR, SC, CI HDRS 53.3 
*Granholm et al. (2005) 39 SR, SC, CI HDRS 54 
*Colis et al. (2006) 150 SR, SC, CI BDI 36.2 
*Warman et al. (2007) 50 SR, SC, CI BDI 40 
Lepage et al. (2008) 55 SR, SC, CI CDS 23.2 
Penn et al. (2009) 65 SR, SC, CI BDI 40 
*Uchida et al. (2009) 30 CI BDI 26.7 
Buchy et al., (2010) 61 SR, SC, CI CDS 23.4 
*Greenberger and Serper 
(2010) 
50 SR, SC, CI CDS 47.3 
*Gilleen, Greenwood, and 
David (2011) 
29 SR, SC, CI BDI 38.3 
*Kao, Wang, Lu, and Liu 
(2011a) 
118 SR, CI BDI 39.3 
Buchy et al., (2012) 44 SR, SC, CI CDS 23.3 
Ekinci, Albayrak, and Ekinci 
(2012) 
121 SR, SC, CI CDS 37.8 
*Ekinci, Ugurlu, Albayrak, 
Arslan, and Caykoylu (2012) 
100 SR, SC, CI CDS 36.8 
*Mass et al. (2012) 88 SR, SC, CI CDS 34.8 
*Tastet, Verdoux, Bergua, 
Destaillats, and Prouteau 
(2012) 
53 SR, SC, CI BDI 33.8 
Ekinci and Ekinci (2013) 133 SR, SC, CI CDS 36.4 
*Raffard et al. (2013) 60 SR, SC BDI 36.8 
*Wiffen (2011) 90 SR, SC, CI PANSS 29.3 
Table 6.1-1 Table of all identified studies using BCIS and Depression measures, including their sample size, sub-
scales included, depression measure used and mean participant age. Studies included in this analysis are 
indicated with an * next to the authors. 
Data from each paper were separated into the three sub categories of BCIS: self-
reflection (SR), self-certainty (SC) and composite index (CI). A database was created in which 
all relevant characteristics of each included study were stored: authors, publication year, 
sample size, mean sample age, sub-scales of BCIS used, measure of depression used (to 
potentially differentiate between effects of different scales), type of analysis run, p value, r 
value, group means and effect direction. If the effect size could not be determined by the 
information in the study then attempts were made to locate the primary author of the study 
and request the information. 
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6.2.2 DATA ANALYSIS 
All analyses were completed in Comprehensive Meta-analysis package version 2.  
We used correlation (r) or mean group data combined with sample size and effect direction 
to calculate the effect size for each study. After inputting relevant data for each study a 
combined effect weighted for sample size was calculated for the three BCIS measures (SR, SC 
and CI) separately. Z and p values provide an indication as to the statistical significance of 
the association. In order to account for the heterogeneity of measures, a random-effects 
model was used (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2010). 
Publication bias was examined by using a funnel plot of standard error and Fisher Z 
score. Using the “Duval and Tweedie’s Trim and Fill” (Rothstein, Sutton, & Borenstein, 2006) 
procedure, putatively missing studies (as inferred from an asymmetric plot revealing bias 
due to small studies with positive correlations) were imputed and added to the funnel plot 
by an iterative procedure. 
6.3 RESULTS 
14 studies were included in the current meta-analysis, while the number of patients 
included depended on the studies included in each analysis. The mean age across studies 
was 40.1 years (accounting for varying sample sizes), with an age range from 26.7-54.5 
years, resulting in a range of 27.8 years. The smallest sample size was 29 (mean age 38.3), 
the largest was 164 (mean age 53.3). 
6.3.1 COMPOSITE INDEX 
929 patients were included in this analysis from 12 studies. There was a small but 
significant positive correlation between the CI subscale of the BCIS and depression scores 
(r=.134, p<.04, z=2.059; see figure 6.3-1a). This suggests those patients with higher 
depression scores also possess higher overall cognitive insight. However, this effect appears 
to be strongly driven by the effect of depression on SR (see below). 




Figure 6.3-1 Random effects forest plot of all included studies reporting a) CI values. b) SR values. c) SC values 
6.3.2 SELF-REFLECTION 
1012 patients were included in this analysis from 13 studies, which indicated that 
there is a small but significant positive correlation between SR and depression scores 
(r=.138, p<.02; z=4.287). Patients with higher depression scores show increased self-
reflectiveness (see figure 6.3-1b). 
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6.3.3 SELF-CERTAINTY 
1043 patients were included in this analysis from 12 studies. There was no 
significant relationship between SC and depression scores (r= -.025, p=.683, z=-.409; see 
figure 6.3-1c) 
6.3.4 EFFECT OF DEPRESSION SCALE 
We investigated whether the type of scale used to measure depression had a 
significant effect on the size of the depression-SR relationship (see figure 6.3-2). The Beck 
Depression Inventory-II (BDI) questionnaire was the most commonly used measure: 8 of the 
13 studies included in the SR analysis. The Calgary Depression Scale (CDS) and Hamilton 
Depression Rating Scale (HDRS) scales were used in only 2 studies, and the Positive and 
Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) depression measure was only used once. The highest 
overall correlation and most significant effect was seen between SR and the CDS (r=.239, 
p<.004), followed by the BDI (r=.229, p<.001). Neither the HDRS (r=-.040, p=.574) nor the 
PANSS depression item (r=.18, p=.09) had a significant relationship with SR.  
The impact of statistical heterogeneity of the different depression rating scales was 
assessed using the I2 calculation, which describes the percentage of variation across studies 
that is due to heterogeneity rather than chance (Higgins, Thompson, Deeks, & Altman, 
2003). As the number of studies included in our analysis was low this statistic I2 was deemed 
to be more suitable than Cochrane’s Q, which is known to be poor at identifying true 
heterogeneity among studies as significant (Higgins et al., 2003). Overall I2 = 31.77, which 
indicates that there is approximately a 32% chance that there was a significant impact of 
heterogeneity on the results of the meta-analysis. This level is not deemed to be significant 
in meta-analysis research (Higgins et al., 2003; see table 6.3-1). 
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Study name Correlation Scale 
Granholm et al., (2005) -0.04 HDRS 
(Pedrelli et al., (2004) -0.04 HDRS 
Gilleen, Greenwood, & David, (2011) 0 BDI 
Tastet et al., (2012) 0.155 BDI 
Beck et al., (2004) 0.17 BDI 
Greenberger & Serper, (2010) 0.18 CDS 
Wiffen, (2011) 0.18 PANSS 
Colis et al., (2006) 0.192 BDI 
Warman et al., (2007) 0.194 BDI 
Mass et al., (2012) 0.23 BDI 
Ekinci, Ugurlu, et al., (2012) 0.267 CDS 
Raffard et al., (2013) 0.274 BDI 
Kao et al., (2011a) 0.378 BDI 
Table 6.3-1 Pearson’s correlation coefficient for relationship between depression and BCIS SR from smallest to 
largest, and depression scale. 
6.3.5 PUBLICATION BIAS 
Publication bias can be detected by observing whether the bottom of the funnel plot 
(see figure 6.3-3) contains a higher concentration of studies on one side of the mean than on 
the other. This is not apparent in Figure 6.3-3, therefore it is unlikely that publication bias 
present in this study. However, due to the low number of studies included this should be 
interpreted with caution. 
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Figure 6.3-3 Funnel plot of standard error by Fisher’s Z, included studies in grey, and imputed studies in black. 
6.3.6 TRIM AND FILL 
Duval and Tweedie’s Trim and Fill analysis was run to impute missing studies - 
another aspect of publication bias. The plot (see figure 6.3-3; actual in grey, imputed in 
black) demonstrates that only one study is estimated to be missing from this analysis (black 
circle), and there is minimal change in the diamond average Z score that would arise if 
imputed studies were included in the analysis. 
6.4 DISCUSSION 
This meta-analysis sought to provide a preliminary overview and summary of 
research, published between 2004-2013, on the relationship between cognitive insight and 
mood in psychotic disorders. The main aim was to investigate if the well-established 
relationship with mood and clinical insight is also evident with cognitive insight, more 
specifically was mood related to SR scores. 
Our analysis of results from 14 studies supported the hypothesis that there would be 
an “overall positive association between self-reflection and depression”, and demonstrated 
that there was a small but highly significant effect of mood on the BCIS composite index in 
schizophrenia, which was driven by the self-reflectiveness sub-scale.  There was no 
significant effect of mood on SC scores. Hence, greater capacity to self-reflect is associated 
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with worse mood, however whether this is cause or effect is still to be determined. This 
finding echoes one of the more robust findings in the insight literature, which is the frequent 
observation of a link between greater clinical insight and worse mood (Mintz et al., 2003), 
and therefore implies that while the two forms of insight are conceptually separate they are, 
at least in part, related by the SR subscale and its relationship with affect. The effect sizes 
found in both the Mintz et al. (2003) analysis of clinical insight and the current paper are also 
very similar, indicating that both forms of insight are affected by mood in a relatively similar 
way (both correlations r=0.18) indicating that both forms of insight are affected by mood to 
a similar extent. Limited publication bias was identified. 
This analysis included papers utilising various depression scales (BDI; PANSS; CDS; 
HDRS). Although these scales all measure depression, there is the possibility that differences 
in the focus and structure of depression scales contributes variation to this relationship, for 
example self-rated measures are qualitatively different in content and structure to 
researcher/clinician-rated measures. In line with this, a recent review by Mass and Wolf 
(2012) stated that the strongest correlations with BCIS were obtained with the self-report 
BDI scale, whereas interview-based assessments of depression such as the HDRS or PANSS 
scales resulted in weaker associations with the BCIS. This pattern was also seen in our results 
(table 6.3-1), which may be because self-rated depression scales with explicit responses (BDI 
and CDS) demonstrate a stronger relationship with the self-rated BCIS scale than 
clinician/researcher rated scales (HDRS, PANSS), whilst it may also be partly due to the BDI 
and the BCIS being designed by the same person and therefore sharing a common 
conceptual basis. While post-hoc analysis indicated that the difference between scales in 
this study was not significant, future research with a greater numbers of studies is required 
before firm conclusions can be drawn. 
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 Self-certainty appears to be more independent, at least in relation to mood, but is 
associated with cognitive abilities (Nair et al., 2014). It has been demonstrated that poor 
general cognition is related to poor decision-making (Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff, 
2007), more specifically the tendency to avoid rational thinking biases (Stanovich & West, 
2008). It is therefore suggested that it takes greater cognitive capacity to reconsider one’s 
potentially erroneous beliefs than it does to make a quick decision and stand by it (such as 
jumping to conclusion bias; Garety et al., 2013). Self-reflection appears to be the more 
changeable of the two sub-scales as it varies with mood. It is still unclear in which direction 
these effects work (i.e. does cognition affect SC, or vice versa; does mood affect SR or vice 
versa), but such a model (see figure 6.4-1) may be useful in furthering the understanding of 
underlying cognitive mechanisms of both clinical and cognitive insight. The model 
demonstrates that cognitive insight is associated negatively with both mood and cognitive 
abilities, but through the different sub-scales, and that it is positively correlated with clinical 
insight. 
 
Figure 6.4-1 Theoretical and empirical model of cognitive insight in relation to mood. Lines between cognitive 
insight and the sub-scales are not arrows because the model is demonstrating how it splits into the two sub-
scales.  
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There have been suggestions that insight can be improved with cognitive-
behavioural therapy (as discussed in chapter 3). The model above highlights therapeutic 
targets by which this could be and are achieved. The relationship between cognitive insight 
and mood is relevant both clinically and ethically when related to treatment. Whilst 
clinicians want to improve their patients’ understanding of their illness primarily in order to 
improve compliance with treatment, improving insight may in fact induce depressive 
symptoms in patients if one subscribes to the defensive denial explanation for this 
relationship. However if the correct pathways are addressed problems with mood may be 
bypassed (Misdrahi et al., 2014).  
Alternatively therapy could focus on reducing self-certainty, which may improve 
cognitive insight without inducing low mood, as one would be focussing on reducing 
cognitive rigidity rather than improving reflectiveness. In contrast, if the depressive realism 
notion (Haaga & Beck, 1995) were the driving force behind this relationship, then a simplistic 
interpretation would be that clinicians should ignore patients’ mood while attempting to 
improve insight. A more ethically viable approach to enhancing insight would be to 
emphasise the positive aspects of insight in terms of acceptance of symptoms and changing 
one’s perceptions and judgements of the world, while also being alert to unwanted changes 
in mood. Importantly, the work by Kemp and colleagues, as well as Pijnenborg et al., did not 
find that mood worsened following an intervention to improve insight and compliance, 
although clearly more research needs to be carried into this issue.  
6.4.1 LIMITATIONS 
The mood-insight relationship, on which all measures in the studies reported here 
are based, is clearly affected by the nature of self-report, not least self-report in patients 
with mental illness. Though our analysis indicated that varying depression measures within 
the literature did not significantly differ in their effect on the strength of the relationship 
between BCIS and depressive symptoms, it is clear that self-report measures require a 
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certain degree of self-awareness and illness appraisal for patients to accurately rate their 
depression level and beliefs about themselves and others covered in the BCIS.  Additionally, 
clinical insight measures are usually clinician or researcher rated, albeit scored from patient 
discourse. The lack of a stronger relationship between the two measures of insight may be 
explained by the different methods of administering the assessment. 
Results of a meta-analysis are dependent on the studies included. Some identified 
studies were not included due to lack of reporting of specific mood/cognitive insight 
relationships. It is also acknowledged that that some relevant studies may, unfortunately, 
have been missed in the literature search.  Publication bias analyses were not significant, but 
cannot be excluded entirely. One problem faced in this particular meta-analysis was that 
some studies only report data on the sub-scales, or conversely only report the composite 
index data of the BCIS (see Appendix 1), and as such the total subjects in each analysis was 
not equal. In general the number and size of studies available for meta-analysis was small so 
the results must be regarded as awaiting confirmation. 
6.4.2 CONCLUSIONS 
This is the first meta-analysis to investigate the relationship between cognitive 
insight and mood in patients suffering from psychosis and schizophrenia. The results indicate 
that there is a small yet significant positive relationship between mood and the BCIS 
composite index, which is driven by the SR subscale. In contrast, research has shown that 
self-certainty, but not self-reflectivity, is related to neurocognitive functioning. Nevertheless 
it appears that both cognitive and clinical insight are influenced to a similar effect size by 
depression. Such findings provide new avenues to be explored in relation to cognitive-
behavioural treatment of psychotic disorders. They also highlight ethical aspects of treating 
insight, namely that encouraging improved self-reflectiveness may result in patients 
experiencing lower mood. Studies that examine this longitudinally would be most valuable. 
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CHAPTER 7 
7. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN METACOGNITIVE EFFICIENCY AND 
AGE, MOOD, NEUROCOGNITION AND SELF-AWARENESS IN 
HEALTHY ADULTS 
 
RESULTS FOR HEALTHY ADULTS 
This study aimed firstly to investigate metacognitive efficiency and self-awareness in 
healthy adults over the age of 18 and discover the neurocognitive and demographic 
correlates of these awareness profiles. This chapter covers the healthy adults’ 1) 
demographic and neurocognitive profile, 2) self-awareness, as measured by the BCIS and 
DEX, 3) metacognitive efficiency, and 4) whether self-reported self-awareness measures are 
related to metacognitive efficiency. Each set of measures will be reported as well as their 
inter-correlation and correlation with age and mood. Basic gender differences will also be 
reported. 
7.1 DEMOGRAPHIC MEASURES  
See Table 7.1-1 for overview (means and standard deviations) 
A total of 73 healthy adults were recruited into this study, aged 18-88 years (mean 
44.5; ± (SD) 21.0), of which there were 42 women (57.8%) with no significant age difference 
between genders (women 46.97, men 40.9; t=1.38, p=.19).  
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  Total Sample Men Women 
 n 73 31 42 
 Age (years) 44.5 (21.0) 40.9 (18.2) 47.2 (22.6) 
Mood Mood – VAS  6.79 (1.46) 6.59 (1.52) 6.93 (1.42) 
 BDI total (n=73) 5.83 (4.84) 4.45 (3.73) 6.88 (5.34) 
 BDI Somatic 3.79 (3.30) 3.00 (2.90) 4.38 (3.49) 
 BDI Cognitive 1.67 (1.96) 1.19 (1.22) 2.02 (2.31) 
Awareness BCIS CI (n=71) 6.90 (5.36) 7.10 (5.58) 6.73 (5.24) 
 BCIS SR (n=71) 19.9 (4.22) 2.47 (3.24) 19.5 (4.80) 
 BCIS SC (n=71) 13.0 (3.45) 13.4 (3.45) 12.8 (3.47) 
 DEX-sr (n=71) 16.0 (8.01) 16.8 (9.13) 15.4 (7.31) 
 DEX-ir (n=41) 10.6 (7.49) 10.4 (6.49) 10.7 (7.78) 
 DEX disc (n=41) -6.95 (8.01) -9.00 (8.30) -5.77 (7.72) 
Table 7.1-1. Healthy adult mean (standard deviation), age and clinical scores for total sample and by gender. 
Ethnicity  
61 people (83.6%) in the sample identified as White 
(British/Irish/European/American); 6 people (8.2%) in the sample identified as Black 
African/Caribbean; 3 people (4.1%) in the sample identified as Asian; 3 people (4.1%) classed 
their ethnicity as “Other”. 
7.2 IQ AND NEUROCOGNITIVE MEASURES 
See table 7.2-1 for overview (means and standard deviations). 
 Total Sample Mean 
Years in Education 14.2 (2.77) 
Total WAIS IQ (n=44) 113.4 (15.9) 
Trails B-A (n=52) 30.3 (19.3) 
Brixton Error (n=30) 12.9 (5.82) 
°Memory Recall Total (Time 1) (n=44) 11.3 (3.46) 
°Memory Recall Total (Time 2, n=46) 15.1 (8.10) 
°Memory Recognition Total (n=46) 25.3 (6.59) 
FAS Letters 60s (n=47) 53.7 (15.8) 
FAS Letters Error 60s (n=47) .09 (.282) 
FAS Categories 60s (n=47) 70.7 (21.0) 
FAS Categories Error 60s (n=47) .150 (.416) 
Table 7.2-1 Healthy adult neurocognitive scores; mean (standard deviation) for total sample (n stated in 
brackets when ≠ 73; °denotes reporting raw scores, rather than scaled). 
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Education and IQ 
There was a significant negative correlation between age and years in education (r=-
.478, p<.001).   
There was no significant correlation between Total WAIS IQ and number of years in 
education (r=.24, p=.11, n=44) and no significant gender difference in total IQ (t=1.91, 
p=.062). There was no significant correlation between total IQ and average mood (r=-.11, 
p=.51), BDI scores, BCIS scores (SC, r=.23, p=.14; SR, r=.03, p=.87; CI, r=.12, p=.40) or DEX-sr 
(r=.13, p=.42). 
There was a significant negative correlation between age and total IQ (-.30, p<.05).  
Neurocognition 
There was no significant correlation between age and any measure of 
neurocognition (apart from IQ). 
7.3 MOOD 
See table 7.1-1 for overview (means and standard deviations), see table 7.3-1 for 
correlations. 
71 participants completed the BDI questionnaire, 73 completed the mood rating 
visual analogue scale (VAS). The average mood of the sample was 6.7 (±1.46) out of a 
possible 10 (where 0 = very sad, 10 = very happy). There was no significant gender difference 
in average mood (t=-.93, p=.36). The mean sample BDI score was 6.5 out of a possible 63, 
indicating that on average the sample was psychologically healthy, with only 5 (12% of the 
total sample) scoring over the cut-off point of 13. Of the participants scoring in the clinical 
range, 4 were “mild”, 3 were “moderate”. There was a significant gender difference in BDI 
total score (t=-2.16, p<.05) and BDI cognitive sub scale (t= -1.98, p<.05), with women scoring 
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significantly higher than men for both (see Table 7.3-1), however this effect was not 
significant for the BDI somatic sub-scale.  
There was a near significant correlation in the expected negative direction between 
average mood and BDI total (r=-.217, p=.08) and BDI cognitive sub-scale (r=-.31, p<.01), but 
not the BDI somatic sub-scale (r=-.12, p=.35). 
  





Demographics     
 Age (years, n=72) -.085 -.066 -.108 
 Mood- VAS (n=68) -.217 -.122 -.309** 
 Years Education (n=73) -.093 -.131 .025 
Neuro-cognition     
 WAIS IQ Total (n=44) -.018 -.041 .038 
 Brixton Error (n=30) .495** .439* .441* 
 Trails B-A (n=50) .220 .321* -.033 
 Memory Recall (Time 1; n=46) -.179 -.252 -.015 
 Memory Recall (Time 2; n=46) -.220 -.181 -.154 
 Memory Recognition (n=46) .127 .098 .132 
 FAS Letter 60s (n=47) .066 .033 .098 
 FAS Letter Error 60s (n=47) .260 .176 .308* 
 FAS Category 60s (n=48) -.029 -.085 .077 
 FAS Category Error 60s (n=48) .096 .075 .095 
Table 7.3-1. Correlation coefficients of age, mood and neurocognitive variables (r= Pearson's correlation; p= 
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7.4 AWARENESS 
See Table 7.1-1 for means see Table 7.4-1 for correlations. 
7.4.1 COGNITIVE INSIGHT (BCIS) 
 
 
BCIS CI BCIS SR BCIS SC 
Demographics Age (years)  -.060 -.203 -.155 
 Mood – VAS (n=68) -.123 -.106 .061 
 BDI Total  .235* .366*** .082 
 BDI Somatic .139 .282* .128 
 BDI Cognitive .324** .388*** -.029 
Neuro-cognition WAIS IQ Total (n=43) .132 .227 .026 
 Years Education .195 .283** .044 
 Brixton Error (n=29) .109 .213 .045 
 Trails B-A  (n=49) -.022 -.024 -.069 
 Memory Recall (Time 1; n=43) .065 -.012 -.135 
 Memory Recall(Time 2; n=45) .101 .084 -.083 
 Memory Recognition (n=45) .086 -.080 -.061 
Table 7.4-1 Correlation coefficients for demographic, mood, clinical and neurocognitive measures with 
measures of cognitive insight (r=Pearson’s correlation; p=significance, 2-tailed*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.005; n 
stated in brackets when ≠73). 
Composite Index 
The mean CI score was 6.89 (±5.36). There was no significant gender difference in CI 
scores (t= .28, p=.78). There was no significant relationship between CI and age (r= -.06, 
p=.62).  
There was a positive significant correlation between CI and BDI total score (r=.235, 
p=.048), however this appeared to be mostly driven by the BDI cognitive subscale (r=.32, 
p<.01), as the relationship between CI and BDI somatic sub scale was not significant (r=.139, 
p=.46).  
Self-reflectiveness 
The mean SR score for this sample was 19.90 (±4.19). There was no significant 
gender difference in SR score (t=.97, p=.34). There was no significant relationship between 
SR and age (r=-.20, p=.09). SR scores were significantly related to depression, with a positive 
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correlation between SR and BDI total (r=.37, p<.01); there was also a significant relationship 
between both BDI subscales and SR (cognitive, r=.39, p=<.001; somatic), r=.28, p=.02). This 
relationship further supports the results of Chapter 6, in which we demonstrated an overall 
relationship between SR and depression in patients with schizophrenia. 
There was a significant relationship between years in education and SR (r=.28, 
p<.02) but not WAIS IQ (r=.23, p=.14). There was no significant correlation between SR and 
any neurocognitive measures (see Table 7.4-1) 
Self-certainty 
The mean SC score for this sample was 13.01 (±3.45). There was no significant 
gender difference in SR score. There was no significant relationship between SC and age (r= -
.155, p=.197). SC was not significantly correlated with depression or current mood. There 
was no significant relationship between SC and years in education or WAIS IQ. There was no 
significant correlation between SC and any measure of neurocognition (see Table 7.4-1). 
7.4.2 DEX 





DEX-ir DEX disc. 
Demographics Age (years) -.161 -.411** -.094 
 Mood – VAS (n=68) -.234   
 BDI Total .437***   
 BDI Somatic .370*   
 BDI Cognitive .404***   
Neuro-cognition WAIS IQ Total (n=43) .127 .121 .172 
 Years Education .026 .203 .064 
 Brixton Error (n=29) .115 -.058 -.400 
 Trails B-A (n=51) -.141 -.058 .109 
 Memory Recall (Time 1; n=43) -.058 -.212 .159 
 Memory Recall (Time 2; n=43) .077 -.372
a -.228 
 Memory Recognition (n=43) .214 .131 -.270 
Table 7.4-2. Correlation coefficients for DEX sub-scales, age, mood and neurocognition. Correlations for DEX 
discrepancy scores and mood have not been reported as the -ir scores were not made on the same day as 
mood questionnaires. (r=Pearson’s correlation; p=significance, 2-tailed; *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.005, ap<.08; n 
stated in brackets when ≠ 73). 
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DEX: Self-rated  
71 people completed the self-rated DEX (DEX-sr) questionnaire. The mean DEX-sr 
score was 16 (±8.01). There was no significant gender difference in DEX-sr scores (t=.71, 
p=.48) and no significant correlation between DEX-sr and age.  DEX-sr scores were 
significantly related to depression, with a positive correlation with BDI total (r=.44, p<.001), 
BDI somatic sub-scale (r=.37, p<.01) and BDI cognitive scale (r=.40, p<.001), that is, lower 
mood was related to lower self-rated executive ability. There was also a near significant 
negative relationship between current mood (VAS) and DEX-sr (r=-.234, p=.055). 
There was no significant relationship between years in education and DEX-sr (r=.03, 
p=.83) or WAIS IQ (r=.23, p=.14). There was no significant correlation between DEX-sr and 
any measure neurocognition (see Table 7.4-2). 
DEX: Independent-rater 
41 relatives or significant others completed the independent-rater DEX 
questionnaire. The mean DEX-sr score was 10.6 (±7.49). DEX-sr and DEX-ir scores were 
highly correlated (r-.440, p<.005) indicating that this group of participants had good self-
awareness.  
DEX-ir demonstrated a significant negative correlation with age (r=-.41, p<.01). 
There was no significant gender difference in DEX-ir ratings (t=-.12, p=.90). There was no 
significant correlation between DEX-ir scores and any measure of neurocognition, however 
there was a negative trend relationship with memory delayed recall (r=-.37, p=.07). 
DEX: Discrepancy score  
Mean DEX discrepancy score was -6.95 (±8.01). The presence of a negative score 
indicates that, on average, participants were rating themselves as having worse executive 
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function than their independent-raters (opposite to the pattern seen most commonly in 
patient groups). Though it appears that men had greater discrepancy scores (men -9.00, 
8.30), women -5.77 (7.72) there was no significant gender difference in discrepancy scores 
(t=-1.25, p=2.18). 
 There was no significant correlation between age and the DEX discrepancy score 
(r=-.09, p=.56). There was no significant correlation between DEX-discrepancy score and any 
measure of neurocognition (see Table 7.4-2). 
7.4.3 AWARENESS MEASURE CORRELATIONS 
 
CI SR SC 
DEX-sr .435** .497** -.067 
DEX-ir .370* .462** -.155 
DEX-discrepancy -.263a -.221 .233 
Table 7.4-3 Correlation coefficients for relationship between awareness measures (BCIS and DEX) (r=Pearson’s 
correlation; p=significance, 2 tailed; *p<.05, **p<.005, ap<.10) 
There was a significant correlation between BCIS CI and DEX sr scores (r=.44, 
p<.001), which was driven by the DEX-sr relationship with BCIS SR (r=.50, p=<.001; see figure 
7.4-1). There was a significant, positive correlation between DEX-ir and BCIS CI (r=.37, p<.05) 
that was driven by the BCIS SR (r=.46, p<.005) scores. There was no correlation between 
BCIS SC score and DEX-sr or DEX-ir scores.  There was no significant relationship between 
DEX-discrepancy score and any cognitive insight score (see Table 7.4-3). 
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a. b.  
Figure 7.4-1 Positive relationship between BCIS SR and a) DEX self-report (r=-.50 p<.001) b) DEX independent-
rater (r=.46, p<.005) 
7.4.4 METACOGNITION 
As stated in Chapter 2, metacognitive efficiency (meta d’/d’) was measured in 
relation to d’, which is primary task performance, and meta d’ refers to metacognition (i.e. 
ability to rate oneself as confident when correct and not confident when incorrect), and 
provides a prediction for the expected value of meta d’ given a particular level of task 
performance. Under the ideal observer model, we would expect meta d’ = d’, whereby a 
participant’s performance matches their expected performance and therefore meta d’/d’ 
would be expected to = 1. 
In this section, the effects of metacognitive efficiency, primary performance and 
mean confidence will be analysed separately (see Table 7.4-4 for means,7.4-5 for meta d’/d’ 
correlations, and 7.4-6 for d’, meta d’ and mean confidence). 
 Total Sample Men Women 
n 53 24 29 
Perception meta d’/d’ 1.07(.34) 1.11 (.36) 1.05 (.33) 
Perception mean confidence 3.79 (.85) 3.87 (.96) 3.72 (.76) 
Perception d’ .89 (.16) .89 (.13) .90 (.17) 
n 37 18 20 
Memory meta d’/d’ 0.73 (0.81) 0.81 (0.64) 0.65 (0.94) 
Memory mean confidence 2.51 (0.56) 2.70 (0.48) 2.34 (0.58) 
Memory d’ 1.30 (0.56) 1.40 (0.47) 1.21 (0.62) 
Table 7.4-4 Mean (SD) metacognitive measures for both perceptual and memory tasks. 
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Perception meta d’/d’ Memory meta d’/d’ 
 Age (years) -.380** -.199 
Mood Avg. Mood .084 .128 
 BDI Total -.091 -.303 
 BDI Somatic -.077 -.171 
 BDI Cognitive -.263a -.415* 
Neurocognition WAIS IQ Total (n=43) .120 .143 
 Years Education .161 .117 
 Brixton Error (n=28) -.233 -.213 
 Trails B-A (n=49) .087 -.183 
 Memory Recall (Time 1; n=34) .113 .365
 a 
 Memory Recall (Time 2; n=33) -.083 .586** 
 Memory Recognition (n=33) -.150 .367 a 
Table 7.4-5 Correlation coefficients for relationship between metacognitive efficiency (perception and 
memory) and clinical, awareness and neurocognitive variables (r= Pearson’s correlation; p=significance, 2 
tailed; *p<.05, **p<.005, ap<.06, cp<.08; n stated in brackets when ≠73). 
 
 
Age       
Perception Memory  
d’ -.380* .016 
meta d’ -.171 -.199 
Mean confidence .117 -.275 
Table 7.4-6 correlation coefficients for relationship between age and performance (d’) and metacognition 
(meta d’; r= Pearson’s correlation; p=significance, 2 tailed; *p<.005) for perception and memory tasks. 
Perceptual metacognition  
53 participants successfully completed the perceptual metacognition task, after 5 
data sets were removed before analysis due to participants scoring lower than 65% correct 
on the task, which indicated that the staircase procedure (detailed in Chapter 5) had not 
successfully maintained approximately 70% correct trials in these cases. The mean 
perceptual metacognitive efficiency (meta d’/d’) score was 1.07 (±.34). There was no 
significant gender difference in perceptual metacognitive efficiency (p=.57), d’ (p=.83) or 
confidence ratings (p=.53; see table 7.4-5). 
There was a significant negative correlation between age and perceptual 
metacognitive efficiency (r=-.38, p<.01; see figure 7.4-2a). There was a significant correlation 
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with age and perception performance (d’; r=.465) but not meta d’ (r=-.17, p=.22). There was 
no significant correlation between either memory task d’ (r=.02) or meta d’ (r=-.06) and age 
(see table 7.4-6 and figure 7.4-3). 
a             b  
 Figure 7.4-2. Negative relationship between a. age and perceptual metacognitive efficiency (r=-.38, p<.01) b. 
BDI cognitive sub-scale and Perceptual metacognitive efficiency (r=-.27, p=.057) 
The negative relationship between perceptual metacognitive efficiency and BDI 
cognitive sub-scale approached significance (r=-.26, p=.057; see figure 7.4-2b). No other 
measures of mood or awareness were significantly associated with perceptual 
metacognitive efficiency, d’ or mean confidence rating (see table 7.4-5). 
No measures of neurocognition were significantly correlated with perceptual 
metacognitive efficiency (see table 7.4-5). 
a. b.  
Figure 7.4-3 Shows the relationship between d' and meta d’ with age in both a) perceptual and b) memory 
metacognitive tasks. 
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Memory Metacognition 
38 participants successfully completed the memory metacognition task. Mean 
memory metacognitive efficiency score (meta d’/d’) was 0.72  (0.80). There was a significant 
gender difference in mean confidence ratings for the memory task (t=2.13, p<.05) with men 
rating themselves as more confident (See figure 7.4-4), however there was no gender 
difference for either metacognitive efficiency (p=.99) or task performance (d’; p =.43). 
 
Figure 7.4-4 Shows gender difference in mean confidence on the memory metacognition task 
The relationship between age and memory metacognitive efficiency (meta d’/d’) 
was negative but was non-significant (r = -.199, p = .24). We cannot however draw 
conclusions regarding a differential effect of age on perceptual compared to memory 
metacognition as the difference between the domain-specific metacognitive efficiency-age 
correlations in the subset of subjects who completed both perceptual and memory tasks 
was itself not significant (Hotelling’s t = 0.66, p = 0.51). 
There was a significant negative correlation between memory metacognitive 
efficiency and BDI cognitive sub-scale (r=-.42, p<.01); see figure 7.4-5). No other measures of 
mood or awareness were significantly associated with perceptual metacognitive efficiency, 
d’ or mean confidence rating (see Table 7.4-4).  
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Figure 7.4-5 Shows the negative relationship between BDI Cognitive sub-scale and memory metacognitive 
efficiency. 
There was a number of significant (or near significant) neurocognitive correlates 
with memory metacognitive efficiency (see table 7.4-5); memory recall from the Wechsler 
Memory Scale (time 1, r=.37; time 2, r=.59), memory recognition (r=.36). 





Perception meta d’/d’ - .397* 
Memory meta d’/d’ .397* - 
BCIS CI -.017 -.242 
BCIS SR .034 -.226 
BCIS SC .068 .173 
DEX-sr .215 .137 
DEX-ir -.051 .228 
DEX-discrepancy -.068 .480* 
Table 7.4-7 Correlation coefficients of relationship between measures of metacognition and measures of 
insight (r= Pearson’s correlation; p=significance, 2 tailed; *p<.05). 
Metacognitive dimensions 
There was a positive correlation between the two dimensions of metacognitive 
efficiency (r=.397, p<.05), however, when three memory metacognition outliers were 
removed (greater than 2 standard deviations beyond the group mean) this relationship no 
longer reached significance (r=.275, p=.150; n=29; see figure 7.4-6). 
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Figure 7.4-6 Shows the positive correlation between perceptual and memory metacognitive efficiency (r=.397; 
solid trend line), and with outliers (highlighted in gray) are removed (r=.275; dotted trend line). 
Cognitive insight 
There was no significant direct relationship between either measure of 
metacognition or any measure of cognitive insight (see Table 7.4-7). Controlling for age had 
no effect on the relationship with any variable and perceptual metacognitive efficiency, 
however it did bring the relationship between memory metacognitive efficiency and all BCIS 
sub-scales to (or approaching) significance (see figure 7.4-7); CI (r=-.518, p=.011) SR (r=-.498, 
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a. b.  
c.   
Figure 7.4-7 Partial correlations between memory metacognitive efficiency and a) BCIS composite index b) BCIS 
SR when controlling for age. 
A linear regression was performed predicting perceptual metacognitive efficiency 
from BCIS subscales, which identified a main effect of gender (t=-3.14, p<.01), and an 
interaction with SR and SC. (see figure 7.4-8). 
The interaction demonstrated that females had a negative relationship between 
perceptual metacognitive efficiency and SR, whilst males had a positive relationship (t=-2.45, 
p<.05). Additionally, females demonstrated a positive relationship with SC and perceptual 
metacognitive efficiency, whereas males demonstrated a negative relationship (t=-2.94, 
p<.01). This may be explained in terms of men tending to be more overconfident than 
women, and thus increased SC led to poorer metacognitive function in (see discussion). 
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a. b.  
Figure 7.4-8 Gender interaction with Perceptual metacognitive efficiency and cognitive insight sub-scales a. SR 
b. SC  
The same regression analysis was performed with memory metacognitive efficiency 
from BCIS sub-scales; there was no main effect of gender (p=.51), SR (p=.26) or SC (p=.74) or 
interaction between gender and SR (p=.50) or SC (p=.71). 
DEX 
There was no significant relationship between DEX-sr and either measure of 
metacognitive efficiency (see Table 7.4-5). However controlling for age brought the 
relationship between memory metacognitive efficiency and DEX-sr to trend levels (r= -.401, 
p=.058). There was a significant correlation between memory metacognitive efficiency and 
DEX-discrepancy (r=.48, p<.02; see figure 7.4-9), which remained significant after controlling 
for age (r=.47, p=.025; see figure 7.4-10).  
 
Figure 7.4-9 Correlation between DEX-discrepancy scores and memory metacognitive efficiency. 
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a  b  
Figure 7.4-10 Partial correlation between memory metacognitive efficiency and a) DEX self-report b) DEX 
discrepancy, when controlling for age. 
There was no significant relationship between memory metacognitive efficiency and 
DEX-independent, even when controlling for the effect of age. 
7.5 DISCUSSION 
This study aimed to investigate a group of healthy adults’ perceptual and memory 
metacognitive efficiency as measured on two experimentally controlled computerised 
assessments and calculated using signal detection theory methods. It also aimed to 
investigate their self-awareness, as measured on clinical scales suitable for use in the 
general population. In addition, it aimed to investigate whether experimentally controlled 
measures of metacognitive efficiency are related to scores on clinical awareness scales, and 























 + / / / / / / −ve / −ve 
Memory 
m-d’/d’ 
  / / / / / + / / −ve 
BCIS - CI      + + / + / + 
         - SR      + + / + + + 
         - SC      / / / / / / 
DEX - sr         + + + 
Table 7.5-1 Overview of relationship between main variables of interest; + denotes a positive relationship, -ve 
denotes a negative relationship, / denotes a non-significant relationship. 
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EFFECTS OF AGE 
The sample had a large age range with no gender differences in this domain. Though 
the sample was predominantly made up of white participants there was some diversity, with 
20% being made up of Black, Asian or “Other” ethnic minority groups. The sample was 
generally psychologically healthy in that they had low BDI scores, and at the time of 
assessment were generally happy, with a mean mood of 6.7 out of a possible 10. These two 
measures of mood were also correlated, indicating that enduring mood (over a two week 
period, as measured by the BDI) was related to their current mood, and therefore a good 
representation of general psychological wellbeing.  Though there was a decline in IQ as 
participants’ age increased there was no correlation with age on any measure of memory or 
executive function.  
Results supported the hypothesis that “there will be a negative association between 
metacognitive efficiency and age”, however this was only true for perceptual metacognition, 
meaning that older adults were less efficient about judging their task performance 
compared to younger adults. A small positive age effect on performance on the perception 
task was identified. However this was likely due to the adjustment of the task to help older 
adults with worse visual perception than younger adults, where the contrast between pop-
out and non-pop-out Gabor patches was increased. The narrow range of performance levels 
(between 65-73% correct) in the perceptual task precludes making strong interpretation of 
changes in d’, however, the relative values of d’ and meta d’ can be used to further analyse 
the data. Results show (figure 7.4-3) that in younger adults, meta d’ is similar to or slightly 
above d’ (meta d’/d’ ~ 1), whereas in older adults, meta d’ drops below d’, leading to 
metacognitive efficiency scores less than expected on an ideal observer model. These results 
support previous work indicating a weaker association between beliefs and abilities in older 
adults (Hultsch, MacDonald, Hunter, Levy-Bencheton, & Strauss, 2000; Ross et al., 2012) and 
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age-related differences in the accuracy of confidence judgments (Bender & Raz, 2012; 
Dodson et al., 2007; Huff et al., 2011; Kelley & Sahakyan, 2003; Pansky et al., 2009; Perrotin 
et al., 2007; Soderstrom et al., 2012; Souchay et al., 2000, 2007; Toth et al., 2011; Wong et 
al., 2012). The current results, however, are novel, as previous work did not control 
effectively for task performance when measuring metacognitive abilities. Controlling for task 
performance was important in this sample, as it allowed for more accurate assessment of 
metacognitive performance independent of notable cognitive deficiencies associated with 
advancing age. Further, these results support suggestions that poor FOK scores may have 
occurred as a result of poor awareness task performance manifesting as poor task ability 
(Souchay et al., 2007). Results further the work of Weil et al. (2013), who found that there 
was an age related improvement in metacognitive efficiency between the ages of 11 and 18, 
and a non-significant decline between the ages of 20 and 41. Together with results from the 
current study, there is a suggestion that development of metacognitive efficiency follows a 
U-shaped curve, where it improves during adolescence, plateaus in early adulthood, and 
declines as we enter older age.  
There was no age effect on memory performance (d’) or metacognition (meta d’); 
similarly there was a negative but non-significant relationship between metacognitive 
efficiency and age, which initially suggests that different metacognitive domains are related 
in a different way to age. However, when post-hoc analyses were carried out to investigate 
the difference between the two domains of metacognitive efficiency’s relationship with age 
there was no significant difference between the two. It could therefore be suggested that 
the lack of significant effect of age on memory metacognition is, in part, related to the 
smaller sample size in this group compared to that for perceptual metacognition efficiency. 
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NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL FUNCTIONING 
Results do not support the hypothesis that “there will be a positive correlation 
between executive function and metacognitive efficiency” as there was no significant 
relationship evident between perceptual metacognitive efficiency and measures of 
cognition, executive function or memory. This study is the first to investigate the association 
between experimentally controlled, psychophysical measures of metacognition and 
executive function, and does not support previous work that awareness, as measured by 
FOK, is associated with executive function in healthy adults (Souchay et al., 2002). However 
it does support previous work demonstrating no significant association between IQ and 
metacognitive efficiency (Weil et al., 2013). 
 There was a significant positive relationship between memory metacognitive 
efficiency and all measures of memory. Despite controlling for d’ in the calculations of 
metacognitive efficiency (meta d’/d’), it was not possible to control for memory task 
performance in the same manner as was possible with the perceptual task, therefore some 
degree of memory ability is still reflected in the metacognitive efficiency scores. This 
relationship may also be due to the requirement of memory function for participants to 
complete the metacognitive task, by recalling current and past memory performance to 
make accurate ratings.  
Results supported the hypothesis that “there will be a positive correlation between 
the two domains of metacognitive efficiency” as there was an initial significant relationship 
between the two domains, however when 3 memory metacognition outliers were removed 
this relationship was no longer significant.  It is suggested that this is due to a small sample 
size who managed to complete both tasks successfully, and that perhaps the full spectrum of 
metacognitive ability was not represented in this sample. Indeed, if the sample size had 
been larger it may have become apparent that these points were not truly outliers, but at 
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the lower end of the group scores. Further, other studies investigating the relationship 
between different metacognitive tasks and domains, found a significant relationship with 
larger sample sizes (McCurdy et al., 2013; Song et al., 2011).  
MOOD AND SELF-REPORTED METACOGNITION 
In relation to mood, results did not support the hypothesis that “there will be a 
positive association between metacognitive efficiency and low mood as measured on …BDI, 
in both the perceptual and memory domain.” In the memory domain, the results in fact 
identified a significant negative relationship between participants’ metacognitive efficiency 
and BDI cognitive sub-scale scores, indicating that as cognitive symptoms of depression 
increased, the efficiency of participants’ metacognitive judgements decreased. This 
relationship almost reached significance with perceptual metacognitive ability (p=.057). In 
addition, a significant negative relationship between memory metacognitive efficiency and 
total BDI score was identified. As metacognitive efficiency was associated with cognitive 
depression symptoms, as opposed to somatic, it could be suggested that in healthy adults, 
any sub-clinical cognitive aspects of low mood, such as low-self-esteem, negatively impact 
on metacognitive judgements. In other words, these results do not support theories 
suggested in clinical literature that low mood leads to a more “realistic” views of the self. 
These results are at odds with recent findings suggesting that worry induces more accurate 
metacognitive judgements in the healthy population (Massoni, 2014), as worry is often a 
cognitive symptom observed in depression. Indeed, low self-esteem has also previously 
been associated with better insight into illness (Cooke et al., 2007; Bouvet, Ettaher & Diot, 
2010). 
Participants’ BCIS-SR and DEX-sr scores were correlated, indicating that at least in 
part the measures assess similar forms of self-awareness. However, results did not initially 
support the hypothesis that “there will be a significant relationship between metacognitive 
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efficiency and measures of awareness”, as there was no direct correlation between 
participants BCIS scores and either memory or perceptual metacognitive efficiency. 
However, when controlling for age a significant negative relationship was identified between 
memory metacognitive efficiency and the BCIS CI and SR scores, and a positive relationship 
between SC and memory metacognitive efficiency almost reached significance (p=.055). 
Relationships in this direction were unexpected, as one would assume more self-reflection 
and less self-certainty would be associated with better metacognitive efficiency. It is 
therefore suggested that, perhaps in healthy adults, SC scores are not associated with the 
over-confidence attributed to patients, and thus a greater sense of self-certainty is related 
to more efficient metacognitive processes and accurate confidence in ones judgements.   
The same effect was not evident with perceptual metacognitive efficiency when 
controlling for age, however a gender interaction was identified between perceptual 
metacognitive efficiency and both SR and SC sub-scales, where female participants had a 
positive relationship between perceptual metacognition and both subscales, whereas males 
demonstrated negative relationship with both sub-scales. This could be explained by the 
finding that men tend to be more over confident that women, and has been demonstrated 
in a number of domains, such as exam behaviour (Bessington, Persson, & Willenhag, 2005; 
Lundeberg, Fox, & Punćcohaŕ, 1994), and business decisions such as stock investment 
(Barber & Odean, 2001). In the current study results could be interpreted as reflecting an 
over confidence in men, to the detriment of their metacognitive judgements, but better self-
reflection results in better metacognitive efficiency. Women tend to be less over-confident 
than men (Lundeberg, Fox, & Punćcohaŕ, 1994) and in the healthy population this more 
accurate self-confidence may be reflected in the positive association between female’s BCIS 
self-certainty and metacognitive efficiency scores. This pattern of results is similar to that 
seen between BCIS subscales and executive function (as measured by WCST errors) in 
schizophrenia patients (Kao, Wang, Lu, & Liu, 2011), where it was suggested that this 
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interaction may be due to sex differences in brain structures in healthy adults, over the 
course of normal development of the frontal lobes, where men have a greater age-related 
decline in frontal lobe volume compared to women (Cowell et al., 1994; Ingalhalikar et al., 
2014). With this in mind it could be suggested that there is a gender interaction relating to 
frontal lobe function and BCIS scores, as frontal lobe function has been shown to positively 
correlate significantly with both BCIS (Buchy et al., 2012; Pu et al., 2013) and experimentally 
controlled metacognitive judgements (Fleming et al., 2010).  
There was no significant relationship evident between participants’ DEX self-
reported scores and metacognitive efficiency in either memory or perceptual domain, 
suggesting that reported self-awareness of daily functioning is not related to metacognitive 
efficiency. However, there was a significant positive relationship between the DEX 
discrepancy score and memory metacognitive efficiency, where a negative DEX discrepancy 
score (a more objective index, indicative of participants rating their functioning as worse 
than their independent-rater), was related to poorer memory metacognitive efficiency. This 
relationship held its significance when controlling for the effect of age. These results were 
expected, as discrepancy scores have commonly been used as a simple measure of 
awareness of everyday functioning and memory in clinical studies of anosognosia (Clare et 
al., 2005). This finding supports work by Harty et al. (2013), who found that error awareness 
on a computerised task was related to discrepancy scores relating to a number of cognitive 
domains in a healthy adults sample. 
7.5.1 CONCLUSION 
Together, these results suggest that there is a relationship between healthy ageing 
and a reduction in metacognitive efficiency, which is akin to the reduction in frontal lobe 
structure and function associated with advanced age. In addition, there is a relationship 
between efficiency in both domains of metacognition.  Further, results demonstrate that low 
mood, specifically cognitive symptoms of depression, is associated with poor metacognitive 
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efficiency. They also demonstrate that there is a relationship between cognitive insight and 
memory metacognition, when controlling for age, in healthy adults, however this 
relationship is not evident with cognitive insight and perceptual metacognition. However, 
with perceptual metacognition there is a significant association with BCIS sub-scales that is 
mediated by gender. Finally, there is a relationship between participant-informant 
discrepancy measures of everyday functioning and memory metacognitive efficiency. 
These results contribute to a better understanding of metacognitive efficiency in the 
healthy population, indicating that different measures placed together under the larger term 
“metacognition” are, at least in part, related and imply that though the self-report measures 
of cognitive style and experimentally derived indices were designed to measure different 
aspects of metacognition, they are associated. Indeed, discrepancy scores may be more 
strongly associated with objective measures of metacognitive efficiency. It also appears that 
the two types of metacognitive measure are affected by mood in different ways, indicating 
that the two types of measure are dissociable in terms of their correlates. 
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CHAPTER 8 
8. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN METACOGNITIVE EFFICIENCY AND 
MOOD, NEUROCOGNITION AND SELF-AWARENESS IN FIRST 
EPISODE PSYCHOSIS 
 
RESULTS FOR FIRST EPISODE PSYCHOSIS PATIENTS 
This study aimed to investigate metacognitive efficiency and insight in patients 
experiencing their first episode of psychosis, who were over the age of 18, and discover the 
neurocognitive and demographic correlates of these awareness profiles. This chapter covers 
the FEP patients’: 1) demographic and neurocognitive profile, 2) self-awareness, as 
measured by the BCIS, SAI-E and DEX, 3) metacognitive efficiency, and 4) whether self-report 
self-awareness measures are related to metacognitive efficiency. 
8.1 DEMOGRAPHICS AND CLINICAL RATINGS 
See table 8.1-1 for means and standard deviations. 
A total of 20 FEP patients were recruited into this study, aged 20-58 years (mean 
29.7; ±10.4), of which there were 8 women (40%) with no significant age difference between 
genders (t=-1.31, p=.207; women 33.7, men 27.5 years). Data were not split by gender due 
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 (n) Mean scores 
 Age (years) 29.7 (10.4) 
Mood Average Mood – VAS score (13) 6.06 (2.40) 
 BDI total  18.8 (10.6) 
 BDI Somatic 12.8 (6.62) 
 BDI Cognitive 6.05 (4.56) 
Awareness BCIS CI 10.1 (6.36) 
 BCIS SR  24.6 (5.34) 
 BCIS SC  14.5 (4.92) 
 SAI sub-total 15.2 (5.43) 
 SAI total 18.1 (5.56) 
 DEX-SR 33.3 (13.1) 
Table 8.1-1 FEP mean (standard deviation) age and clinical scores for total sample, n stated when ≠ 20. 
Ethnicity  
13 people (65%) in the sample identified as Black African/British/Caribbean/South-
African and 7 people (35%) identified as White British/European. 
8.2 IQ AND NEUROCOGNITIVE MEASURES 
 Total Sample Mean Correlation with Age, r 
Years in Education (n=19) 12.9 (2.10) -.435a 
Total WAIS IQ 82.6 (19.4) -.056 
Trails B-A (n=19) 59.6 (39.3) .240 
Brixton Error (n=19) 18.2 (7.20) -.058 
°Memory Recall Total (Time 1; n=19) 17.8 (7.50) -.185 
°Memory Recall Total (Time 2, (n=19) 17.3 (8.85) .050 
°Memory Recognition (n=19) 24.1 (3.68) -.101 
FAS Letters 60s (n=18) 34.1 (13.9) .037 
FAS Categories 60s (n=18) 46.1 (11.9) -.212 
Table 8.2-1 FEP adult neurocognitive scores; mean (standard deviation) for total sample and by gender and 
correlation coefficients with age (r=Pearson’s correlation; p=significance, 2-tailed) where ap<.07 (°denotes 
reporting raw scores, rather than scaled). 
Education and IQ 
There was a trend correlation between age and years in education (r=-.435, p=.062). 
There was no significant correlation between Total WAIS IQ and number of years in 
education (r=.066, p=.789, n=19). There was no significant correlation between age and total 
IQ or years in education.  
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Neurocognition 
There were no correlations between age and any measure of neurocognition. 
8.3 MOOD AND COGNITIVE FUNCTION 
See table 8.1-1 for means and standard deviations, see table 8.3-1 for correlations. 
  
 BDI Total BDI Somatic BDI Cognitive 
Demographics     
 Age (years) .245 .244 .214 
 Average Mood- VAS (n=13) -.491 -.447 -.470 
 Years Education (n=19) .219 .252 .138 
Neurocognition     
 WAIS IQ Total -.305 -.258 -.333 
 Brixton Error (n=19) .162 .147 .163 
 Trails B-A (n=19) .619
** .516* .684** 
 Memory Recall (Time 1; n=19) -.116 -.154 -.046 
 Memory Recall (Time 2; n=19) .140 .107 .169 
 Memory Recognition (n=19) -.307 -.284 -.299 
 FAS Letter 60s (n=19) -.217 -.124 -.313 
 FAS Category 60s (n=18) -.152 -.075 -.236 
Table 8.3-1 Correlations of age, mood and neurocognitive variables (r= Pearson's correlation; p= Significance, 2 
tailed) where *p<.05, **p<.01 and ‘n’ is stated when ≠ 20. 
13 FEP patients completed the mood rating VAS and 20 participants completed the 
BDI questionnaire. The mean average mood of the sample was 6.06 (±2.40) out of a possible 
10.  The mean sample BDI score was 18.8 out of a possible 63, indicating that on average this 
group was mildly depressed. There were modest non-significant inverse correlations 
between average mood VAS score and BDI total (r=-.491, p=.08), BDI somatic sub-scale (r=-
.447, p=.13) and BDI cognitive sub-scale (r=-.470, p=.105). All measures of the BDI were 
positively correlated with the Trails B-A score (total, r=.619, p<.01; somatic, r=.516, p<.05; 
cognitive, r=.684, p<.01), indicating that worse executive function/processing speed was 
related to lower mood. There was no relationship between mood and any other measure of 
neurocognition. 
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8.4 AWARENESS 
See table 8.1-1 for means and standard deviations see table 8.4-1 for correlations. 
8.4.1 COGNITIVE INSIGHT (BCIS) 
 
BCIS CI BCIS SR BCIS SC 
Age (years) .462* .265 -.309 
Avg. Mood (n=13) .094 .092 .003 
BDI Total .132 .106 -.056 
BDI Somatic .068 .107 .028 
BDI Cognitive .207 .089 -.170 
WAIS IQ Total .255 .015 -.313 
Years Education (n=19) -.006 .017 .027 
Brixton Error (n=19) -.343 -.075 .367 
Trails B-A (n=19) .141 .295 .138 
Memory Recall (Time 1; n=19) .451 .268 -.299 
Memory Recall (Time 2; n=19) .451
a .073 -.512* 
Memory Recognition (n=19) .233 -.090 -.404* 
Table 8.4-1 Correlation coefficients for demographic, mood, clinical and neurocognitive measures with 
measures of cognitive insight (r=Pearson’s correlation; p=significance, 2-tailed) where *p<.05, ap<.06. 
Composite Index 
The average CI score was 10.1 (±6.36). There was a significant relationship between 
CI and age (r= .462, p<.05). There was no significant relationship between CI and any BDI 
sub-scale. 
There was no significant correlation between CI and years in education or WAIS IQ.  
There was a relationship of trend significance between CI and memory recall (r=.451, 
p=.052), however there were no other significant correlations between CI and measures of 
neurocognition (see table 8.4-1). 
Self-reflectiveness 
The average SR score for this sample was 24.6 (±5.34). There was no significant 
relationship between SR and age (r=-.20, p=.09). There was no significant relationship 
between SR and any BDI sub-scale. This finding is not in keeping with results from Chapter 5, 
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in which an overall small but significant relationship between SR and depression in patients 
with schizophrenia was demonstrated (r=.018), however this may be related to a smaller 
sample size in this study and a narrower range of mood scores. 
There was no significant correlation between SR and any neurocognitive measures 
(see table 8.4-1) 
Self-certainty 
The average SC score for this sample was 14.5 (±4.92). There was no significant 
relationship between SC and age (r= -.309, p=184). SC was not significantly correlated with 
and any BDI sub-scale. There was no significant relationship between SC and years in 
education or WAIS IQ. There were no other significant correlations between SC and 




Age (years) -.012 
Avg. Mood (n=13) -.124 
BDI Total -.060 
BDI Somatic -.119 
BDI Cognitive .035 
WAIS IQ Total .412 
Years Education .013 
Brixton Error (n=19) -.499
* 
Trails B-A  (n=19) -.174 
Memory Recall (Time 1; n=19) .687
** 
Memory Recall (Time 2; n=19) .529
* 
Memory Recognition (n=19) .537
* 
Table 8.4-2 Correlation coefficients for SAI sub-total, age, mood and neurocognition. (r=Pearson’s correlation; 
p=significance, 2-tailed) where *p<.05, ** p<.001; n stated in brackets when ≠20. 
SAI-E sub-total 
The average SAI sub-total score (not including the medication compliance item) was 
15.2 (±5.43). There was no significant relationship between SAI-E sub-total and age, or any 
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measure of mood. There was a significant relationship between SAI-E sub-total and a 
number of neurocognitive measures, where better function or less errors were related to 
improved insight; number of errors made on the Brixton test (r=-.499, p<.05); immediate 
memory recall (r=.689, p<.001), delayed memory recall  (r=.529, p<.05); memory recognition 
(r=.537, p<.05). There was also a trend relationship between SAI sub-total and WAIS total IQ 
(r=.412, p=.071) 
8.4.3 DEX 
See table 8.1-1 for overview and table 8.4-3 for correlations. Unfortunately, only 4 




Age (years) -.025 
Avg. Mood -.268 
BDI Total .550* 
BDI Somatic .479* 
BDI Cognitive .580** 
WAIS IQ Total -.244 
Years Education .343 
Brixton Error .145 
Trails B-A .324 
Memory Recall (Time 1) .040 
Memory Recall (Time 2) .031 
Memory Recognition -.158 
Table 8.4-3 Correlation coefficients for DEX-sr and DEX discrepancy, age, mood and neurocognition. 
Correlations for DEX discrepancy scores and mood have not been reported as the IR scores were not made on 
the same day as mood questionnaires (r=Pearson’s correlation; p=significance, 2-tailed) *p<.05, **p<.01. 
Self-rated DEX score was significantly correlated with all measures mood, whereby 
lower mood, as identified by cognitive and somatic symptoms, was associated with higher 
self-reported dysexecutive symptoms (Total, r=.550, p<.05; Somatic, r=.479, p<.05; 
Cognitive, r=.580, p<.01). 
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8.4.4 AWARENESS MEASURE CORRELATIONS 
 CI SR SC SAI-E sub-total 
BCIS- CI    .46* 
        - SR    .41 b 
         -SC    -.15 
DEX-sr .03 .14 .12 0.08 
Table 8.4-4 Correlation coefficients for relationship between awareness measures (BCIS and DEX) (r=Pearson's 





There was a significant positive correlation between BCIS CI and SAI-E sub-total 
scores (r=.46, p<.05, see figure 8.4-1), and a trend relationship between total SAI-E score and 
BCIS CI score (r=.38, p=.0.95) and BCIS SR (r=.41, p=.07). There was no significant 
relationship between the DEX-sr and any other awareness measures (see table 8.4-4).  
 
Figure 8.4-1 Scatterplot shows the relationship between two measures of insight, BCIS composite index and 
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8.5 METACOGNITION 
See table 8.5-1 for overview (means and standard deviations) and 8.5-2 for 
correlations. 
 Total Sample Sample 
(cases removed) 
n 12 6 
Perception meta d’/d’ 0.89(0.89) 0.87 (0.31) 
Perception mean confidence 4.68 (1.09) 4.22 (1.08) 
Perception d’ 0.63 (0.29) 0.83 (0.11) 
n 18 13 
Memory meta d’/d’ 0.41 (1.22) 0.09 (1.10) 
Memory mean confidence 2.19 (1.11) 2.02 (1.11) 
Memory d’ 0.79 (0.65) 1.06(0.56) 
Table 8.5.1 FEP mean (standard deviation) metacognitive measures for both perceptual and memory tasks, 





Memory meta d’/d’, 
n=13 
Age (years) -.243 -.417 
Avg. Mood (n=5)        .182 (n=7) .551 
BDI Total -.192 -.151 
BDI Somatic -.292 -.055 
BDI Cognitive -.021 -.308 
WAIS IQ Total -.079 .404 
Years Education .249 .435 
Brixton Error -.295 -.449 
Trails B-A -.289 -.750** 
Memory Recall (Time 1) .161 .589 * 
Memory Recall (Time 2) .307 .691 ** 
Memory Recognition .172 .756** 
 Table 8.5-2 Correlation coefficients for relationship between metacognitive efficiency (perception and 
memory) and clinical, awareness and neurocognitive variables (r= Pearson’s correlation; p= significance, 2 
tailed) *p<.05, **p<.01, n stated when ≠ 20. 
Perceptual metacognition 
Out of 12 participants, 7 successfully completed the perceptual metacognition task. 
5 data sets were removed before analysis due to participants scoring lower than 65% correct 
on the task, which indicated that the staircase procedure detailed in Chapter 5 had not 
successfully maintained approximately 70% correct trials in these cases. The mean 
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perceptual metacognitive efficiency score (meta d’/d’) score was therefore 0.87 (±.31). 
There was no significant relationship between age and perceptual meta d’/d’.  Due to the 
low number of participants successfully completing this task, no firm conclusions can be 
drawn from this data regarding non-relationships with mood and neurocognitive measures 
(see Table 8.5-2). 
A post-hoc analysis was carried out to determine whether there was a difference 
between patients who completed the perceptual task successfully and those who did not 
complete it or scored below 65% responses correct. A significant difference was found 
between patients who did and did not successfully complete the perceptual metacognition 
task in measures of executive function; Brixton Error (t=3.21, p<.01) and Trails B-A score 
(t=2.51, p<.05), where those who did complete the task scored significantly lower, and thus 
had better executive function . 
It was also found that those patients who achieved 65% or above in the perceptual 
task were less confident than the remainder, overall in their performance on the task across 
trials, to a trend level, and were thus less biased than patients who scored below 65% 
correct (t=1.93, p=.082). 
Memory Metacognition 
Out of 18 participants, 13 successfully completed the memory metacognition task. 5 
data sets were removed as their d’ was less than 0.25, indicating that they were unable to 
perform the memory task correctly. The mean memory metacognitive efficiency score (meta 
d’/d’) was therefore was 0.09 (1.10).  
There was no significant correlation between age and memory meta d’/d’. There 
was no significant relationship between memory metacognitive efficiency and mood or 
neurocognitive measures (see table 8.5-1). There was a significant association between all 
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measures of memory, as well as executive function as measured by trails B-A score, and 
memory metacognitive efficiency in this clinical group (see figure 8.5-1).  
a    b  
  c d  
Figure 8.5-1 Scatterplot shows the significant relationship between memory metacognitive ability and a) Trails 
B-A time (r=-.75, p<.01), b) short term memory recall (r=.59 p<.05) c) Long term memory recall (.69, p<.01) and 
d) Memory recognition (r=.76, p<.01). 
Post-hoc calculations were carried out to investigate whether the unexpected 
positive association between low mood and poor executive function confounded the lack of 
any significant association between BDI scores and memory metacognition. However, a 
partial correlation analysis demonstrated that, even when Trails B-A score was controlled 
for, there was no significant association between memory metacognitive efficiency and BDI 
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8.5.1 METACOGNITION AND ILLNESS AWARENESS 








Perception meta-d’/d’ - -.052 
Memory meta-d’/d’ -.052 - 
BCIS CI .486 -.242 
BCIS SR .475 -.387 
BCIS SC .049 -.144 
DEX-sr -.122 -.023 
SAI-E sub-total .467 .017 
Table 8.5-3 Correlation coefficients of measures of metacognition and measures of insight (r=Pearson’s 
correlation; p= significance, 2 tailed, *p<.05, **p<.01).  
Metacognitive dimensions 
There was no significant correlation between the two dimensions of metacognitive 
efficiency (p=.891) however this may be due to the small number of participants included 
(n=6). There were no significant correlations between metacognitive efficiency and any 
measure of insight. 
8.6 DISCUSSION 
This study aimed to investigate a group of patients with FEP regarding their 
metacognitive efficiency as measured on two experimentally controlled computerised 
assessments and calculated using signal detection theory methods. It also aimed to 
investigate their self-awareness, as measured on clinical scales. Finally, it aimed to 
investigate whether measures of metacognitive efficiency are related to scores on clinical 
awareness scales, and their neurocognitive correlates.  Due to the small number of patients 
who were able to complete the perceptual metacognitive task successfully (n=6), few 
conclusions can be drawn using these data. 
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The sample had a mean age of approximately 30 years and about two thirds of the 
group was from Black ethnic backgrounds, and one third from white ethnic backgrounds, 
which is in keeping with a higher prevalence of psychotic disorders in ethnic minorities in 
this catchment area (Fearon et al., 2006). Though mean average mood rating at the time of 
assessment was 6 out of 10, the mean BDI total score was 18 out of 63, indicating that this 
patient group was mildly depressed. There was no significant age effect for any measure of 
neurocognition, possibly due to the small age range of the group. 
Though a negative relationship was evident between memory metacognitive 
efficiency and age, nether measure reached significance; therefore results did not support 
the hypothesis that “there will be a negative association between metacognitive efficiency 
and age”. However, this may be due to the smaller range in ages in this patient group 
compared to the healthy controls described in Chapter 7, resulting in an age range too small 
to produce a significant effect. 
NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL FUNCTIONING 
Results support the hypothesis that “there will be a positive correlation between 
executive function and metacognitive efficiency” as there was a strong negative correlation 
between memory metacognitive efficiency and score on the Trails B-A score, thus better 
executive function was associated with better metacognitive efficiency. This result supports 
previous work in this patient population that highlighted an association between self-
reported measures of metacognition and executive function (Lysaker et al., 2005; Morgan & 
David, 2010). This also indicates that other domains of metacognition have similar correlates 
and, though distinct concepts, are possibly associated or mediated by similar cognitive 
processes. The same relationship was not evident between perceptual metacognitive 
efficiency and executive function. However, a number of patients were unable to complete 
the task successfully (i.e. the staircase paradigm was not able to maintain approximately 
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70% correct responses and FEP participants either failed completely before the full task was 
complete, or results from a full task were removed). A post-hoc comparison was conducted 
between those patients who completed the task successfully (i.e. achieved % trials correct 
greater than or equal to 65%) and those patients who did not. It was found that those who 
completed the task successfully had significantly better executive function as measured by 
both number of errors made on the Brixton task, where successful patients had less, and the 
Trails B-A score, where successful patients had a smaller completion time increase between 
the two versions of the task. It was also found that patients who were unable to complete 
the task successfully were more confident in their responses than patients who did complete 
the task correctly, indicating that they had a stronger “overconfidence” bias. Therefore, 
despite a lack of significant association between perceptual metacognitive efficiency and 
executive function, there is some evidence to suggest executive function is related to the 
amount of bias patients attribute to their metacognitive ratings. As patients with FEP are 
known to have poor executive function it is therefore suggested that a task with less 
executive demands is employed to further explore this hypothesis. One such suitable task 
may be that detailed in Song et al. (2011), where stimuli to be judged on the perceptual task 
are placed adjacent to one another on a single screen, as opposed to the method used in the 
current study, where they are presented one after another adding a working memory 
component. 
Results presented here also identified a significant relationship between all three 
measures of memory performance and memory metacognitive efficiency. Though the meta 
d’/d’ calculation controls for performance, it is clear that some degree of memory ability is 
required to adequately perform the memory metacognitive task. Indeed, this result supports 
the suggestion by Dimaggio & Lysaker, (2010) that poor memory function can result in 
patients lacking the ability to up-date self-knowledge, and this leads to poor self-awareness. 
Further, this finding is in keeping with previous work in AD patients by Souchay et al., (2002), 
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which demonstrated that memory metacognitive abilities were more strongly associated 
with memory in patients, and were more likely to be associated with executive function in 
healthy adults. Such findings may indicate there is some similarity between awareness 
profiles and their correlates across neuropsychiatric diagnoses. 
Results did not support the hypothesis that “there will be a positive correlation 
between the two domains of metacognitive efficiency”, however this is likely due to the low 
number of patients who completed the perceptual metacognitive task, and thus the analysis 
lacked sufficient power. 
MOOD AND SELF-REPORTED METACOGNITION 
Results did not support the hypothesis that “there will be a positive association 
between metacognitive efficiency and low mood as measured on the… BDI, in both 
perceptual and memory domain.” Again, this could not be tested adequately for the 
perceptual task due to low numbers. Regarding memory metacognitive efficiency, results 
therefore do not support previous work indicating an association between metacognition 
and mood (Lysaker et al., 2005). However it may be that previous work found an association 
because measures of both metacognition and mood were self-report questionnaires. 
Indeed, previous work, including the meta-analysis reported in chapter 6, investigating the 
relationship between insight and mood has also identified that the strongest associations 
are between two self-report measures (i.e. shared method variance). The current study 
utilised novel experimentally controlled, computerised methods of measuring 
metacognition, whilst also using self-report measures of mood, which may have reduced the 
degree of association between the two. In the current sample, poor executive function was 
associated with worse mood, whereas good executive function was associated with better 
metacognitive efficiency; a post-hoc partial correlation was carried out to confirm whether 
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controlling for executive function would reveal a significant mood/metacognitive efficiency 
relationship, however the relationship remained non-significant.  
Participants’ BCIS and SAI-E scores were correlated, indicating that, at least in part 
the clinical measures assess similar forms of self-awareness, and this is in keeping with 
previous work regarding the BCIS association with other measures of clinical awareness 
(Riggs et al., 2012). However, there was no significant association between the DEX and 
either the BCIS or SAI-E. This may be because the DEX was designed to measure behavioural 
awareness in dementia rather than schizophrenia.   
Results supported previous research regarding mood and clinical insight, 
demonstrating a significant relationship between DEX-sr and mood, whereby a higher DEX-sr 
score was associated with lower mood. However this was not evident for either BCIS sub-
scale scores, which does not match the results reported in Chapter 6. This may be a result of 
a lack of power due to the low numbers and limited range of scores.  
There was no significant association between any measure of clinical awareness and 
measures of metacognitive efficiency, which did not support the previous work reported by 
Lysaker et al. (2005). Instead results support the findings of Morgan and David (2010), who 
qualitatively analysed verbatim responses on the SAI-E and found that poor metacognitive 
processing of cognitive experiences did not dictate the awareness patients held regarding 
their illness, no matter how superficial this awareness may be.  Further, as discussed 
previously, this lack of association may be due to the current measure of metacognition 
being an experimentally controlled, computerised task, where previous work has used self-
report measures. In addition, different measures of insight were utilised in this study (SAI-E, 
BCIS and DEX; as well as in Morgan and David, 2010) compared to previous work (SUMD; 
Lysaker et al., 2005) which used an arguably a more cognitively demanding interview 
measure.  
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8.6.2 CONCLUSIONS 
 The main findings of this study are that, in this FEP patient group, there is an 
association between memory metacognitive efficiency and both executive function and 
memory performance. The strength of association between perceptual metacognitive 
efficiency and other relevant measures could not be assessed due to poor completion rates. 
This in turn appeared to be related to the general cognitive (in particular executive) 
demands of the task. Further, findings indicated that there was no association between 
metacognitive efficiency and either mood or measures of insight. 
These results add novel findings to the field of metacognition in the FEP population 
that has, until recently, relied mainly on questionnaire-based assessments of patient 
awareness. When combined with previous findings it is clear there are neurocognitive 
correlates shared by both questionnaire and objective, computerised measures of 
metacognition, indicating they are mediated by the same processes. However, a lack of 
direct association between awareness measures in this patient group adds further support 
to the notion that “metacognition” may be too broad a term when referring to various 
domains of self-awareness assessment in a clinical setting.  
Metacognitive training is being developed to improve awareness of illness in 
patients with FEP (Aghotor, Pfueller, Moritz, Weisbrod, & Roesch-Ely, 2010; Favrod, Maire, 
Bardy, Pernier, & Bonsack, 2011; Pijnenborg, Van der Gaag, Bockting, Van der Meer, & 
Aleman, 2011). The findings reported in this chapter indicating that the two forms of 
metacognition are loosely associated has implications for further development of such 
training, namely that it must be ensured that training targets the type of self-awareness that 
requires improvement, rather than general self-awareness as this is a multifaceted concept 
and impairments vary across domains.
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CHAPTER 9 
9. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN METACOGNITIVE EFFICIENCY AND 
MOOD, NEUROCOGNITION AND SELF-AWARENESS IN EARLY-STAGE 
DEMENTIA 
 
RESULTS FOR EARLY-STAGE DEMENTIA PATIENTS 
This study aimed to investigate metacognitive efficiency and insight in patients with 
early-stage dementia (ED), and discover the neurocognitive and demographic correlates of 
these awareness profiles. This chapter covers the ED patients’: 1) demographic and 
neurocognitive profile, 2) self-awareness, as measured by the BCIS, SAI-E and DEX, 3) 
metacognitive efficiency, and 4) whether self-report self-awareness measures were related 
to metacognitive efficiency. 
9.1 DEMOGRAPHICS AND CLINICAL RATINGS 
See table 9.1-1 for overview (means and standard deviations). 
A total of 18 patients with early-stage dementia (ED) were recruited into this study, 
aged 62-93 years (mean 79.6 years; ±9.36), of whom 7 were women (38.9%). There was a 
difference in age by gender, where men were significantly older (t=2.93, p<.01; women 72.7, 
men 84.0 years).  
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  Total Sample 
 (n) (18) 
 Age (years) 79.6 (9.36) 
 MMSE 25.9 (2.83) 
Mood Mood – VAS 6.87 (1.73) 
 BDI total  10.2 (6.21) 
 BDI Somatic 7.33 (5.06) 
 BDI Cognitive 3.11 (2.29) 
Awareness BCIS CI  7.27 (4.98) 
 BCIS SR 20.1 (4.51) 
 BCIS SC  12.8 (3.24) 
 DEX-sr  18.7 (10.9) 
 DEX-ir 15.6 (13.7) 
 DEX disc (12) -4.91 (17.2) 
 SAI sub-total 8.90 (6.22) 
 SAI-E total 10.5 (7.37) 
Table 9.1-1 ED mean (standard deviation) age and clinical scores for total sample, where ‘n’ is stated for values 
not acquired for all patients. 
Ethnicity  
16 people (88.9%) in the sample identified as White 
(British/Irish/European/American); 1 person identified as Black African, 1 person identified 
as Asian. 
Diagnosis 
12 of the patients in the sample had a diagnosis of Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI) 
and 6 had a diagnosis of Mild Alzheimer’s Disease (AD). The mean MMSE score of this group 
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9.2 IQ AND NEUROCOGNITIVE MEASURES 
 
 Total Sample 
MMSE 25.9 (2.83) 
Years in Education 13.2 (3.59) 
Total WAIS IQ 98.1 (22.96) 
Trails B-A 36.0 (65.12) 
Brixton Error  25.9 (9.16) 
°Memory Recall Total (Time 1) 16.5 (6.28) 
°Memory Recall Total (Time 2) 12.3 (8.28) 
°Memory Recognition Total  20.2 (6.49) 
FAS Letters 60s 38.1 (12.1) 
FAS Categories 60s 41.2 (15.5) 
Table 9.2-1 ED neurocognitive scores; mean (standard deviation) for total sample. (°denotes reporting raw 
scores, rather than scaled). 
Education and IQ 
There was no relationship between age and years in education (r=.14, p=.57) or IQ 
(r=-.24, p=.34). There was no significant correlation between Total WAIS IQ and number of 
years in education (r=.25, p=.31).  
Neurocognition 
There were no correlations between age and any measure of neurocognition. 
9.3 MOOD 
See table 9.1-1 for means and standard deviations. 
18 participants completed the mood rating on the visual analogue scale (VAS) and 
BDI questionnaire. The mean mood of the sample was 6.87 (±1.73) out of a possible 10. The 
mean sample BDI score was 10.2 out of a possible 63, indicating that on average they were 
not depressed, however 8 of the 18 patients did score over the clinical cut off of 13. Of the 
participants scoring in the clinical range, all 8 were “mild”. There was a significant difference 
in the cognitive and Beck Depression sub-scale somatic scores of this group, where patients 
endorsed more somatic, or physical, symptoms of depression than cognitive (t=3.73, p<.01). 
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There was no significant correlation between age, years in education, MMSE or measures of 
neurocognition and any measure of mood. 
9.4 AWARENESS 
See table 9.1-1 for means and standard deviations. 
9.4.1 COGNITIVE INSIGHT (BCIS) 
Composite Index 
The average CI score was 7.27 (±4.98).  There was no significant correlation between 
CI and any measure of mood or neurocognition. 
Self-reflectiveness 
The average SR score for this sample was 20.1 (±4.51). There was no significant 
correlation between SR and any measure of mood or neurocognition. 
Self-certainty 
The average SC score for this sample was 12.8 (±3.24). There was no significant 
correlation between SC and any measure of mood. There were no significant correlations 
between SC and neurocognition. 
9.4.2 DEX 
Self-rated  
The mean self-rated DEX score was 18.72 (±10.9). DEX-sr was significantly, 
negatively correlated with current mood (r=-.742, p<.05), but not with any measure of the 
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Independent rater 
DEX-sr and DEX-ir were not correlated (r=-.053, p=.871) indicating that this group of 
participants had poor self-awareness. DEX-ir demonstrated was not correlated with age or 
any measure of neurocognition. 
Discrepancy score 
There was no significant correlation between DEX discrepancy score and age, or any 
measure of neurocognition. 
9.4.3 SAI-E 
SAI-E sub-total 
There was no significant correlation between SAI-E sub-total and age, mood or 
neurocognition.  
9.4.4 AWARENESS MEASURE CORRELATIONS 
See table 9.4-1 for correlations.  
 -SR -SC DEX-sr -ir - disc SAI-E 
sub-
total 
BCIS -CI   -.208 -.311 -.517d .343 
         -SR   -.082 -.168 -.355 .115 
         -SC   .206 .243 .303 -.376 
DEX-sr      -.021 
       -ir      -.156 
discrepancy      -.254 
Table 9.4-1 Correlation coefficients for relationship between awareness measures (BCIS and DEX) (r=Pearson's 
correlation; p= significance, 2-tailed; dp<.09) 
There was a correlation of trend significance between BCIS CI and DEX sr scores (r=-
.517, p=.08). However, there were no other significant correlations between awareness 
measures.  
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9.5 METACOGNITION 
See table 9.5-1 for overview (means and standard deviation) and table 9.5-2 for correlations. 
 Mean 
N 6 
Perception meta d’/d’ 1.07 (0.32) 
Perception mean confidence 4.39 (0.56) 
Perception d’ 0.89 (0.16) 
N 12 
Memory meta d’/d’ 0.62 (0.72) 
Memory mean confidence 2.19 (0.82) 
Memory d’ 1.14 (0.39) 
Table 9.5-1 Mean (SD) metacognitive measures for both perceptual and memory tasks. 
 
 Perception meta d’/d’ Memory meta d’/d’ 
Age (years) .716 -.347 
Avg. Mood  (n=7) .555 
BDI Total .327 -.257 
BDI Somatic .106 -.370 
BDI Cognitive .394 .112 
MMSE .834* -.054 
WAIS IQ Total .546 .015 
Years Education .211 -.360 
Brixton Error -.608 -.220 
Trails B-A -.082 -.159 
Memory Recall (Time 1) .186 .322 
Memory Recall (Time 2) .139 .514a 
Memory Recognition .396 .154 
Table 9.5-2 Correlation coefficients for perceptual and memory meta d’/d’ and age, mood and neurocognition 
(r= Pearson’s correlation; p=significance, 2-tailed; *p<.05, ap<.09). 
Perceptual metacognition 
Out of 7 participants, 6 successfully completed the perceptual metacognition task, 1 
data set was removed before analysis due to participants scoring lower than 65% correct on 
the task, which indicated that the staircase procedure detailed in Chapter 5 had not 
successfully maintained approximately 70% correct trials in these cases. The mean 
perceptual metacognitive efficiency score (meta d’/d’) score was therefore 1.07 (±.03). 
There was a significant correlation between MMSE score and perceptual metacognitive 
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efficiency (r=.83, p<.05, see figure 9.5-1). There were no other significant correlations 
between perceptual metacognitive efficiency and neurocognition, however, due to the low 
number of participants successfully completing this task, no firm conclusions can be drawn 
from this data regarding significant or non-relationships with mood and neurocognitive 
measures (see table 9.5-2).  
A post-hoc analysis was carried out to determine whether there was a difference 
between patients who completed the task successfully and those who did not complete it or 
scored below 65% responses correct. There was no significant difference between patients 
who did and did not successfully complete the perceptual metacognition task in measures of 
executive function; Brixton Error (t=-.717, p=.484) and Trails B-A score (t=.242, p=.812). 
 
Figure 9.5-1 Scatter plot demonstrates the positive relationship between perceptual metacognitive efficiency 
(meta d’/d’) and MMSE scores (r=.83, p<.05). 
Memory Metacognition 
Out of 14 participants, 12 successfully completed the memory metacognition task. 2 
data sets were removed because their performance on the memory task, represented by d’, 
was less than 0.25. Mean memory metacognitive efficiency score (meta d’/d’) was therefore 
0.62 (±0.72). 
There was no significant correlation between memory metacognitive efficiency and 
age or mood (see table 9.5-2). There were no other significant correlations between 
memory metacognitive efficiency and measures of neurocognition.  
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BCIS CI .590 .456 
BCIS SR .819* .309 
BCIS SC -.124 -.340 
DEX-sr -.401 -.178 
DEX-ir - -.678* 
DEX-discrepancy - -.377 
SAI-E sub-total -.049 .255 
Table 9.5-3 Correlation coefficients of measures of metacognition and measures of insight; correlation 
between memory and perceptual metacognitive efficiency scores could not be performed due to the low n (=5) 
(r=Pearson’s correlation; p= significance,2 tailed;*p<.05). 
There was a significant correlation between perceptual metacognitive ability and 
BCIS SR (r=.819, p<.05, see figure 9.5-3) however due to the low n (=6) caution should be 
drawn when interpreting these results. 
 
Figure 9.5-2 Scatter plot demonstrates the relationship between perceptual metacognitive efficiency (meta 
d’/d’) and BCIS sr score (r=.82, p<.05). 
There was a significant negative correlation between DEX-ir and memory 
metacognitive efficiency (r=-.678, p<.05). 
9.6 DISCUSSION 
This study aimed to investigate a group of patients with ED regarding their 
metacognitive efficiency as measured on two experimentally controlled computerised 
assessments and calculated using signal detection theory methods. It also aimed to 
investigate their self-awareness, as measured on clinical scales. Finally, it aimed to 
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investigate whether measures of metacognitive efficiency are related to scores on clinical 
awareness scales, and their neurocognitive correlates.  
Analysis of demographic measures demonstrates that the sample had a mean age of 
approximately 80 years old. The majority (16) of patients were from a white ethnic 
background, with one patient identifying as Indian and one identifying as Black African. 
Mean average mood rating at the time of assessment was 6.8 out of 10 and the 
mean BDI total score was 10 out of 63, indicating that this patient group was, on average, 
not depressed, though 8 patients rated themselves in the “mildly” depressed. There was also 
a significant effect of Age on MMSE scores, indicating that, in this sample, younger patients 
had more cognitive deficiencies.  This may be due to adults at the younger end of the elderly 
population presenting to services more often with severe memory complaints than older 
adults. 
Results did not support the hypothesis that “there will be a negative association 
between metacognitive efficiency and age”. However, this may be due to the smaller range 
in ages in this patient group compared to the healthy control group described in chapter 7. 
Indeed, a lack of age effect was also observed in the FEP group, which also had a smaller 
range of ages included in their sample.  
NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL FUNCTIONING 
Results did not directly support the hypothesis that “there will be a positive 
correlation between measures of executive function and metacognitive efficiency” as there 
was no correlation between either perceptual or memory metacognitive efficiency and 
number of errors made on the Brixton task or Trails B-A score, making them at odds with 
previous clinical findings (Lopez et al.,1994; Michon et al., 1994). Neither was there a 
significant relationship between both measures and memory scores, contrary to previous 
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findings (Souchay et al., 2002; Gilleen, Greenwood & David, 2014) that have indicated a 
more significant association exists between metacognition and memory function in patients, 
whereas healthy adults demonstrated a stronger association between metacognition and 
executive function. However, perceptual metacognitive efficiency was positively and 
significantly associated with MMSE scores, indicating that as general cognitive ability 
declined, so did metacognitive efficiency, akin to previous clinical findings (Chen et al., 2014; 
Zanetti et al., 1999). It should be noted that, due to the low numbers in this analysis, 
interpretations of these results should be made with extreme caution. Only 6 patients 
successfully completed the perceptual task, and it was identified that some patients’ visual 
perceptual abilities were too poor, even after adjusting the starting contrast between the 
two stimuli and the duration of stimuli presentation. It is suggested that an easier task is 
employed, such as that detailed in (Song et al., 2011), where stimuli to be judged on the 
perceptual task are placed adjacent to one another on a single screen, as opposed to the 
method used in the current study, where they are presented one after another. 
Results did not support the hypothesis that “there will be a positive correlation 
between the two domains on metacognitive efficiency”, however this could not be 
adequately tested due to the low number of patients who completed the perceptual 
metacognitive task. 
MOOD AND SELF-REPORTED METACOGNITION 
Results did not support the hypothesis that “there will be a positive association 
between metacognitive efficiency and low mood as measured on the …BDI, in both the 
perceptual and memory domain”, and there was no relationship between metacognitive 
efficiency and either BDI scores or current mood, as measured on the VAS. These results do 
not support previous work in this domain that has indicated there is an association between 
low mood and awareness of memory deficits (Chen et al., 2014; Aalten et al., 2005). 
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However, this may be due to the lack of cognitive symptoms observed in this participant 
group. ED patients reported significantly more somatic symptoms compared to cognitive 
symptoms of depression in this group; in chapter 7 it was suggested that there is more of an 
association between cognitive symptoms of depression and metacognitive efficiency, 
compared to somatic symptoms. This pattern of results may explain the non-significant 
results reported in this chapter.  Again, low completion rates on the perceptual 
metacognitive task precluded an adequate test of this hypothesis. 
Participants’ clinical awareness scores were not correlated with each other. This is 
likely because two assessments utilised in this study were initially designed for completion 
by or with patients with psychosis (SAI-E and BCIS) therefore some questions may not 
directly translate to experiences of patients with dementia. Additionally one questionnaire 
was designed to identify awareness of Dysexecutive syndrome (DEX). However, leaving aside 
the problems with capturing different domains of awareness using the available 
standardised scales, this result may have come about because different aspects of self-
awareness are not associated in this patient group. Finally, results indicated that mood was 
not related to any measure of insight in this group of elderly people displaying an overall low 
number of depressive symptoms, perhaps due to the higher reporting of somatic versus 
cognitive symptoms of depression in this group. 
It was not possible to adequately test the hypothesis that “there will be a significant 
relationship between metacognitive efficiency and measures of awareness”, due to the 
recruitment of a lower than intended number so participants. However, an exploration of 
the data did appear to show a significant positive relationship between perceptual 
metacognitive efficiency and BCIS SR. The relationship with self-reflection was in the 
expected positive direction, meaning that as self-reflectiveness improved, so did 
metacognitive efficiency. As with other results relating to perceptual metacognitive 
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efficiency, final analyses only involved 6 data sets and so results should be interpreted with 
caution and are for illustrative purposes only. 
Other limitations include the effect of medication; due to the small number of 
participants completing assessments this could not be included. We also only included 
patients who had relatively high MMSE scores, and thus were in the early stages of 
dementia. These findings can therefore not necessarily be applied to patients with later 
stage dementia, and would be useful research to pursue in the future.  
9.6.1 CONCLUSIONS 
 The findings of this preliminary study are that, in this ED patient group, there is an 
apparent association between perceptual metacognitive efficiency and both general 
cognitive function, as measured on the MMSE, and cognitive insight, as measured on the 
BCIS. A lack of association between clinical questionnaire measures and objective task 
measures of self-awareness indicates that these measures assess behaviourally distinct 
concepts, and thus the term “metacognition” may be too broad in a clinical setting without 
adding further information to the context in which it is being used.  
There was an issue with this group in successfully completing the perceptual 
metacognitive task. This related to either patient’s inability to see or distinguish between the 
stimuli presented, or the staircase paradigm being unable to maintain approximately 70% 
correct total responses, where the n was 6 compared to 14 in the memory task where there 
was no staircase paradigm to control for performance effects. A lack of staircase paradigm 
controlling for performance within the memory task may explain the lack of an association 
between these measures and memory metacognitive efficiency, as memory ability may be 
confounding the association. Studies with more appropriately tailored stimuli for use in 
elderly and impaired populations plus a larger number of participants would be necessary to 
confirm these suggestions, such as Song et al. (2011).  
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CHAPTER 10 
10. COMPARISON OF SELF-AWARENESS AND METACOGNITIVE 
EFFICIENCY BETWEEN HEALTHY AND CLINICAL POPULATIONS 
 
RESULTS FOR BETWEEN-GROUP COMPARISONS 
This chapter aimed to compare 1) healthy adults under the age of 60 years, first 
episode psychosis (FEP) patients and depressed patients, 2) healthy adults of 60 years and 
older and patients with early-stage dementia (ED), and 3) ED and FEP patients (whilst 
acknowledging the difference in age), on measures of awareness and metacognition. Due to 
the small number of patients who completed the perceptual metacognitive task, these data 






Depressed FEP ED 
Age (years) 32.0 (10.5) 71.7 (8.2) 26.8 (7.46) 29.7 (10.4) 79.6 (9.36) 
Gender (% fem.) 54 65.2 66.7 35 38 
Years Education 15.1 (1.99) 12.2 (3.2) 16.1 (2.92) 12.9 (2.11) 13.2 (3.59) 
BDI total 5.96 (4.46) 5.57 (5.66) 32.7 (11.1) 18.8 (10.6) 10.3 (6.22) 
BDI somatic 4.26 (3.34) 4.09 (4.08) 21.5 (7.05) 12.8 (6.62) 7.33 (5.06) 
BDI cognitive 1.78 (2.02) 1.48 (1.86) 11.2 (4.54) 6.05 (4.56) 3.11 (2.30) 
Table 10.1-1 Mean (standard deviation) demographic and mood scores for each participant group. 
10.1.1 YOUNGER ADULTS, PATIENTS WITH FEP AND DEPRESSED PATIENTS  
There was no significant difference in age between younger healthy adults, FEP 
patients and patients with depression. The FEP group had spent significantly fewer years in 
education than the other two groups, and there was no significant difference between the 
healthy and depressed group.  There was a significant difference between all three groups in 
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all BDI measures of depression (total, F=74.8, p<.001; somatic, F= 74.0, p<.001; cognitive, F= 
50.9, p<.001) where HC<FEP<depressed for all three scores.  
10.1.2 OLDER ADULTS AND ED 
There was a significant difference in age between older healthy adults and patients 
with ED (t=-2.88, p<.01); the patient group was significantly older than the healthy control 
group with a mean difference of 7.9 years, where the mean age of the healthy adult group 
was 71.7 years and the ED group was 79.6 years. There was no significant difference 
between groups in the number of years spent in education. The ED group was significantly 
more depressed than the healthy older adults in all BDI measures (total, t=2.53, p<.05; 
somatic, t=2.28, p<.05; cognitive, t=2.52, p<.05). The groups were further compared on their 
executive function and memory abilities to ensure that healthy older adults were not 
suffering from undiagnosed mild cognitive impairment; healthy older adults made 
significantly less errors on the Brixton task (t=3.90, p<.001) and performed significantly 
better on the Wechsler Memory Scale (WMS; raw score) recall items (short term, t=7.06, 
p<.001; long term, t=4.98, p<.001) than the ED group. 
10.1.3 FEP AND ED  
There was no significant difference between the FEP and ED group in the number of 
years spent in education, however the FEP group were significantly more depressed, as 














Depressed FEP ED 
n 50 23 15 20 18 
BCIS CI 7.48 (5.33) 6.39 (5.89) 13.8 (4.07) 10.1 (6.36) 7.28 (4.98) 
BCIS SR 20.5 (3.52) 19.0 (5.52) 37.7 (4.79) 24.6 (5.34) 20.1 (4.51) 
BCIS SC 13.0 (2.91) 12.7 (4.48) 23.9 (4.13) 14.5 (4.92) 12.8 (3.24) 
DEX-sr 17.7 (8.22) 14.0 (6.93) 39.5 (16.7) 33.3 (13.1) 18.7 (10.9) 
DEX-ir - 6.92 (4.05) - - 15.5 (13.7) 
DEX disc - -6.23 (5.70) - - -4.92 (17.2) 
SAI 1-8 - - - 13.0 (4.67) 8.61 (5.63) 
SAI-E sub-total - - - 15.2 (5.43) 8.84 (6.04) 
Table 10.2-1 Mean scores and standard deviations for clinical insight scales in each participant group. (- 
denotes data not used in this analysis). 
10.2.1 YOUNGER ADULTS, PATIENTS WITH FEP AND DEPRESSED PATIENTS 
For overview of means and standard deviations see table 10.2-1, for between group 
comparisons see table 10.2-2. 
Measure of insight F-value Group differences 
BCIS CI 8.24* FEP=HC<Dep 
BCIS SR 95.2* HC<FEP<Dep 
BCIS SC 51.1* FEP=HC<Dep 
DEX-sr 27.8* HC<FEP=DEP 
Table 10.2-2 One-Way ANOVA to compare FEP, Depressed and healthy control groups (F-value=ANOVA 
comparison of means; *p<.001). Group difference calculated using Scheffé’s post-hoc tests. 
Results demonstrated that there were significant group differences between all 
measures of the BCIS (CI, F=8.24,p<.001; SR, F=95.2,p<.001; SC, F=51.1, p<.001; see table 
10.2-2; see figure 10.1-1a,b,c) .There were also significant group differences on the DEX self-
rated score (DEX-sr, F=.27.8, p<.001; see figure 10.1-1d) where HC<FEP=Dep (higher scores = 
more difficulties). Only 4 independent raters returned the questionnaires from the FEP and 
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a. b.  
c. d.  
Figure 10.2-1 Bar charts illustrating the significant difference between healthy adults<60, FEP and depressed 
groups in a. BCIS composite index, b. BCIS SR, c. BCIS SC, d. DEX self-report. Error bars represent standard 
error. Healthy adults n=50; FEP n= 20, Depressed n=15.  
10.2.2  OLDER ADULTS AND ED 
For overview of means and standard deviations see table 10.2-1, for between group 
comparisons see table 10.2-3. 
Measure of 
insight 
t-value Mean difference 
BCIS CI -.511 .886 
BCIS SR -.665 1.61 
BCIS SC -.144 .181 
DEX-sr -.170 4.77 
DEX-ir -2.18a 8.66 
DEX discrepancy .-261 1.31 
Table 10.2-3 t-values for difference between means of patients with ED/dementia and older healthy controls 
(age>=60) (t= t-test for equality of means; p= Significance, 2 tailed where a p<.06, *p<.05) 
There was no significant difference between the patients and control participants in 
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discrepancy scores, however there was a difference that almost reached significance in DEX 
independent rater scores (t= -2.18, p=.056; see figure 10.2-2).  
 
Figure 10.2-2 Bar chart illustrating the difference between DEX independent rater scores for healthy older 
adults and early dementia patients (p=.056). Error bars represent standard error. Healthy adults n= 23, ED n = 
18. 
10.2.3 FEP AND ED 
For overview of means and standard deviations see table 10.2-1, for between group 
comparisons see table 10.2-4. 
Clinical awareness scores were compared across the patient groups of interest; FEP 
and ED, to investigate potential differences in their awareness profiles. Many of the ED 
patients were confused by the final question on the SAI-E “How do you feel when people do 
not believe you?” therefore a total was calculated removing this from both groups’  final 
scores (SAI 1-8). In addition, the SAI-E total was not included in this analysis as it was not 
analysed or reported in the ED group (chapter 9) due to the small number of patients taking 
or offered medication relating to memory difficulties. 
Measure of 
insight 
t-value Mean difference 
BCIS CI 1.51 2.82 
BCIS SR 2.78** 4.49 
BCIS SC 1.22 1.67 
DEX-sr 3.69*** 14.5 
SAI-E 1-8 2.61* 4.37 
Table 10.2-4 t-values for difference between means of patients with FEP and early stage (t= t-test for equality 







DEX indedpendent rater score
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There were significant differences between BCIS SR scores (t=2.78, p<.01, see figure 
10.2-3a) and DEX self-rated scores (t-3.69, p<.001, see figure 10.2-3b), with the FEP group 
scoring significantly higher in SR scores. The FEP group also had higher self-report DEX 
scores, despite the ED group making significantly more errors on the Brixton task (t=-2.86, 
p<.01), and therefore having worse executive function. Post-hoc analyses indicated that this 
might be related to the higher reported levels of depression in the FEP group (BDI total, 
t=2.99, p<.005; BDI somatic, t=2.81, p<.01; BDI cognitive, t=2.456, p<.05). 
a. b.  
Figure 10.2-3 Bar charts illustrating the significant difference between FEP and ED patient groups in a. BCIS SR, 
b. DEX self-report. Error bars represent standard error. FEP n= 20, ED = 18. 
There were significant differences between FEP and ED patients in their scores on 
the SAI-E (t=2.61, p<.05; see figure 10.2-4) based on scores generated from items 1-8. 
 
Figure 10.2-4 Bar charts illustrating the difference between FEP and ED patient groups in SAI 1-8 scores, Error 

































Depressed FEP ED 
n 24 23 13 13 13 
Memory  
meta d’/d’ 
0.89 (0.43) 0.66 (0.92) 1.04 (0.57) 0.09 (1.09) 0.63 (0.72) 
Memory d’ 
 
1.30 (0.47) 1.39 (0.65) 1.10 (0.61) 1.06 (0.56) 1.14 (0.39) 
Memory 
confidence 
2.60 (0.47) 2.39 (0.68) 2.79 (0.59) 2.01 (0.59) 2.19 (0.82) 
Table 10.3-1. Mean standard deviations scores for memory metacognitive efficiency values in all participant 
groups  
10.3.1 YOUNGER ADULTS, PATIENTS WITH FEP AND DEPRESSED PATIENTS 
For overview of means and standard deviations see table 10.3-1, for between group 
comparisons see table 10.3-2. 
Measure  F-value Group difference 
Meta d’/d’ 7.53** FEP<HC=Dep 
d’ 1.52 HC=FEP=Dep 
Mean confidence 4.33* FEP<HC=Dep 
Table 10.3-2. Mean difference in memory metacognitive efficiency between healthy younger adults, FEP 
patients and depressed patients (F-value=ANOVA comparison of means; p= Significance, 2 tailed where *p<.01, 
**p<.001). Group difference calculated using Scheffé’s post-hoc tests. 
There was a significant difference between healthy younger controls, FEP patients 
and patients with depression in memory metacognitive efficiency (F=7.53, p<.001), with 
Scheffé’s post-hoc tests demonstrating that FEP<HC=Dep. There was also a significant 
difference in confidence ratings (F=4.33, p<=.01), where FEP<HC=Dep (see figure 10.3-1), 
despite no significant difference in task performance, as measured by d’. Figure 10.3-1a 
illustrates that both depression and healthy groups’ metacognitive efficiency is close to 
matching the ideal observer model (where meta d’/d’ = 1), whereas FEP patients have a 
much lower mean score of 0.09. Further, 10.3-1b illustrates that FEP patients had the least 
confidence bias, and both healthy adults and depressed patients had comparable bias 
towards over confidence. 
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a.  b.  
Figure 10.3-1 Bar chart illustrating the difference between healthy controls<60, FEP and depressed groups in 
memory metacognitive efficiency (meta d’/d’). Error bars represent standard error. 
10.3.2  OLDER ADULTS AND ED 
For overview of means (standard deviations) see table 10.3-1, for between group 
comparisons see table 10.3-3. 
Measure  t-value Mean difference 
Meta d’/d’ 0.18 0.07 
d’ 1.80 0.41 
Mean confidence 0.05 0.02 
Table 10.3.3. Shows the mean difference in memory metacognitive efficiency between healthy older adults 
and those with ED (t-value= t-test for equality of means; p= Significance, 2 tailed where *p<.05, **p<.01) 
There were no significant differences between older adults and ED patients 
regarding memory metacognitive efficiency, d’ or confidence (see table 10.3-3). 
10.3.3  FEP AND ED 
Domain Measure  t-value Mean difference 
Memory Meta d’/d’ -1.44 -0.53 
 d’ -0.38 -0.07 
 Mean confidence -0.47 -0.18 
Table 10.3-4. Shows the mean difference in perceptual and memory metacognitive efficiency patients with FEP 
and those with ED (t-value= t-test for equality of means; p= Significance, 2 tailed where *p<.05, **p<.01) 
There was no significant difference between clinical groups in their memory 
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10.4 DISCUSSION 
This study aimed to investigate the difference between healthy adults and clinical 
groups regarding their insight on a number of clinical self-awareness scales, and 
metacognitive efficiency across two domains. Though there were small numbers of patients 
included in this study, the comparisons are a useful pilot investigation into the potential 
differences between groups. 
There was no significant difference in the ages of healthy younger adults, patients 
with depression and patients with FEP. FEP patients had spent fewer years in education than 
the healthy and depressed groups. In relation to mood, the healthy group had the lowest 
depression scores on all measures, with FEP scoring higher than healthy adults but lower 
than depressed patients. In contrast, the patients with ED were significantly older on 
average than the healthy older adult group but had spent a similar number of years in 
education. The ED group was significantly more depressed than the healthy older adults. 
There was a significant difference in all clinical measures of self-awareness between 
healthy younger adults (<60 years old), patients with depression and patients with FEP. 
Patients with depression scored significantly higher than the other groups on the SR sub-
scale, and thus had a higher CI score, despite having the highest SC scores. This pattern of 
results suggests that persons with depression are more likely to reflect on their self-beliefs, 
but may be more certain of their conclusions as a consequence. FEP patients scored 
significantly lower than depressed patients on both SR and SC and thus had a lower 
composite index score. This supports previous research that indicates depressed persons 
have better cognitive insight than patients with psychosis or bipolar disorder (Colis et al., 
2006). Healthy adults had the lowest composite index score, due to their significantly lower 
SR scores, as well as an SC lower than the depressed group. Whilst previous research has 
identified that healthy adult groups produce the same factor structure as patients when 
completing the BCIS (Buchy, Brodeur & Lepage, 2012), the current study indicates that 
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healthy adults do not score higher than FEP patients, unlike previously reported data (Kao et 
al., 2011), and are more in line with work indicating there is no significant difference 
between FEP and control groups (Engh et al., 2007). The FEP group in this study was 
significantly more depressed than the healthy group, which may explain the higher SR score, 
as the meta-analysis in chapter 6 indicated that better self-reflectiveness is associated with 
lower mood. Alternatively, it is suggested that FEP patients appear more self-reflective than 
healthy adults because they do indeed reflect more on their personal experiences and 
thoughts, as they are having unusual illness-related experiences (Bedford, 2010). However 
this is not to say that healthy adults have “worse” cognitive insight than FEP patients, 
perhaps instead they answer the BCIS differently to patient groups as they 1) do not have as 
much to reflect on, or 2) interpret questions differently. Further, SC scores did not differ 
between FEP and healthy adult groups. As discussed in chapter 7, high self-certainty does 
not necessarily represent a cognitive bias in healthy adults, but an assurance that one’s 
beliefs are correct, as in this study’s depressed group.  Indeed, self-certainty is only 
problematic when twinned with low self-reflection, leading to cognitive rigidity (Riggs et al., 
2012). Further, due to the potential variance in both self-reflection and self-certainty it is 
unlikely that a cut off score for cognitive insight will be identified that will enable us to 
accurately differentiate between patient and healthy groups (Martin et al., 2010). Healthy 
adults also scored lowest on the DEX self-report, however this is expected as they had less 
symptoms of dysexecutive syndrome compared to patient populations. 
There was a near-significant difference between healthy older adults (>60 years old) 
and patients with ED on DEX independent rater scores, however this was not the case on 
self-reported DEX scores, and this did not lead to a significant difference in discrepancy 
scores. This indicates that perhaps adults with a diagnosis of dementia are more likely to be 
rated highly on the DEX, whereas self-ratings do not differ across groups. There was no 
difference, however, in the two groups’ discrepancy scores, indicating that, overall perhaps 
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there is no difference in awareness of dysexecutive symptoms between the two groups. This 
may also be explained by our use of patients with relatively good MMSE scores (mean 25.9); 
Zanetti et al. (1999) described a “tri-linear” account of insight, whereby patients scoring an 
MMSE greater than 24 consistently demonstrated better insight than those scoring below 
this, as described in Chapter 3.1.3.2. Research with patients scoring a wider range of MMSE 
scores would therefore be useful in the future. 
There were a number of differences between the two clinical groups of interest 
regarding clinical scales of awareness. FEP patients sored significantly higher on BCIS self-
reflectiveness and DEX self-rated scales, and SAI (questions 1-8). This result is in keeping 
with previous work by Gilleen, Greenwood & David (2009) indicating that patients with 
dementia score lower on the SAI than patients with schizophrenia. Post-hoc analyses 
indicated that FEP patients had higher rates of self-reported depression, which is known to 
be associated with higher self-reflection (chapter 6). Results therefore suggest that, on 
clinical measures of awareness, patients with dementia show worse awareness profiles 
regarding cognitive insight self-reflection, clinical presentation and symptoms and reflection 
about their executive function and daily functioning. This group difference may also be due 
to the FEP group scoring higher on measures of depression, as low mood is associated with 
better awareness in both clinical groups (Mintz et al., 2003; Aalten et al., 2005). Patients 
with ED did not show a significant difference compared to patients with FEP in their SC 
scores, as measured on the BCIS scale, indicating they are no more or less “overconfident” 
regarding their self-beliefs. 
Now turning to memory metacognitive efficiency, results support the hypothesis 
that “patients experiencing their first episode of psychosis … will have lower metacognitive 
scores than healthy controls” as there were significant differences between healthy adults, 
depressed patients and FEP patients in both efficiency and confidence. Healthy adults and 
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depressed patients scored comparably on both memory metacognitive efficiency and 
confidence in performance, whereas FEP patients had an overall worse mean efficiency 
score, despite no significant difference in task performance across groups, which is akin to 
results from previous work using FOK judgments (Bacon et al., 2001). However, the current 
study does not support results that measured metacognition using the gamma statistic 
(Souchay et al., 2006), which may be due to the use of less reliable statistical analysis 
(Masson & Rotello, 2009). Unlike clinical insight measures, depressed patients did not 
appear to have better self-awareness for these experimentally controlled tasks compared to 
healthy adults. This may be because these computerised objective ratings allow less time for 
rumination and prolonged consideration than self-report questionnaires, which are usually 
not time limited. Indeed, perhaps in the case of time-limited self-ratings, there is not time 
for a depressed bias towards “better” self- appraisal to manifest itself. 
FEP patients also had significantly lower confidence ratings compared to healthy 
controls and depressed patients, and thus appeared to have less of a self-serving bias 
towards positive self-confidence (as indicated by mean confidence scores over 2). This was 
unexpected, as results from BCIS studies have often indicated that FEP patients are over-
confident about their self-appraisal (Engh et al., 2007; Warman et al., 2007). Thus, it may be 
that this previously observed overconfidence in FEP is limited to illness-related self-
awareness, suggesting that whilst this computerised task and BCIS both measure aspects of 
self-awareness, the two domains of metacognition are not related, further supporting 
conclusions made in chapter 8. 
In contrast, novel results did not support the hypothesis that “patients experiencing 
… early-stage dementia ... will have lower metacognitive scores than healthy controls” as 
there was no significant difference in the metacognitive efficiency performance or 
confidence ratings between older adults and ED patients. It is perhaps possible that 
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metacognitive efficiency, as measured by self-appraisal of task performance, is spared in the 
early stages of dementia, and memory metacognitive efficiency degrades at the same rate as 
observed in healthy older adults, despite the noted difference in memory and executive 
abilities between healthy and clinical groups.  It is worth noting that the ED patients in our 
sample were relatively unimpaired in measures of general cognition (MMSE). As well, while 
some patients with MCI will never progress towards dementia, some apparently healthy 
older controls may be in fact experiencing sub-clinical pathological changes that precede 
MCI and AD. This situation of diagnostic MMSE classification would tend to blur differences 
between groups. An interesting further study would be to investigate the difference 
between patients with early and later stage dementia, to identify whether metacognitive 
processes are affected at later stages in the cognitive decline observed in dementia. 
Finally, there were no significant differences observed in the memory metacognitive 
efficiency performance or confidence of FEP and ED patients. This therefore suggests that 
there is a greater degradation in memory metacognitive efficiency for FEP patients relative 
to their age compared to ED, who score comparably with their healthy age matched 
counterparts. Indeed, looking at the mean memory metacognitive efficiency scores, FEP 
patients appear to have a lower mean score than older adults; however they also have a 
larger standard deviation of scores. This therefore suggests that poor memory metacognitive 
function is more prominent and problematic for patients with FEP than those with ED. 
Previous research has indicated that awareness of executive and behavioural deficits is 
worse in dementia patients compared to those with schizophrenia (Gilleen et al., 2009). The 
current study therefore indicates that different domains of self-awareness, such as appraisal 
of one’s task performance versus appraisal of one’s behaviour or thoughts about illness 
experience, are affected to different degrees across diagnosis. Further investigations with 
larger sample sizes would be useful to confirm this hypothesis. 
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10.4.1 CONCLUSIONS 
These findings indicate that patients with FEP indeed have different self-awareness 
profiles to those with ED, with varying deficiencies evident across awareness domains 
compared to healthy adults. 
FEP patients showed no difference or indeed better awareness compared to healthy 
younger adults on self-report measures of self-awareness, which may be explained by higher 
depression scores in the FEP group. However FEPs showed significant impairment in 
metacognitive efficiency compared to their healthy counterparts, indicating that it may be 
the efficiency of their self-awareness that is more severely impaired in FEP than their ability 
to self-reflect.  Interestingly, ED patients showed comparable self-reflection and 
metacognitive efficiency to their peers, indicating that in the early stages of dementia and 
cognitive impairment, awareness of cognitive and functional abilities may be comparable, 
despite a difference in actual abilities. When comparing the two patient groups, however, it 
was clear that there were domain specific differences in their awareness profiles. Similarly to 
Gilleen et al. (2009), FEP patients demonstrated a greater ability to self-reflect on their self-
report questionnaires than ED patients. The current study has also demonstrated that there 
are no differences in metacognitive efficiency between groups; as there is a known age 
related decline in metacognitive efficiency these results indicate that there is a greater 
impairment in the FEP group relative to their age than in ED patients.  
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CHAPTER 11 
11. VOXEL BASED MORPHOMETRY STUDY OF THE ASSOCIATION 
BETWEEN METACOGNITIVE EFFICIENCY AND BRAIN STRUCTURE IN 
PATIENTS WITH EARLY STAGE DEMENTIA.  
 
METHODS AND RESULTS FOR IMAGING ANALYSIS 
The aim of the work presented in this chapter was to identify the structural neural 
correlates of metacognitive efficiency in patients with early stage dementia (ED). Due to the 
low number of patients successfully completing the perceptual metacognitive task, only 
memory metacognitive efficiency was studied in this analysis. A second aim was to identify 
neural correlates of BCIS scores in the same group of patients, and identify if these are 
similar to those associated with metacognitive efficiency. This chapter details the methods 
utilised to analyse the structural MRI data, and describes the findings. 
11.1 IMAGING METHODOLOGY 
This section will detail the Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) acquisition, pre-
processing and statistical analysis methods that were used when analysing brain MRI data. 
Whole group means and demographics are reported in chapter 9. This analysis includes 15 
patients in the ED group who had an MRI scan within 5 months of completing the 
metacognitive test. Of the 15 patients who had an MRI scan, 2 had no meta d’/d’ score (as 
they were unable to complete the task) and 2 had a d’ score <0.25, and were thus removed 
from the metacognitive efficiency analysis. Demographics for this subset of 15 patients are 
reported in section 11.2.1 
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Voxel-based morphometry (VBM) is a neuroimaging analysis technique performed 
on structural MR images to identify the effects of a given variable of interest on brain 
structure (Ashburner & Friston, 2000); enabling investigation of significant differences 
in brain anatomy, using the statistical approach of statistical parametric mapping. VBM can 
be used to analyse differences in brain structure between groups or identify a relationship in 
one group between brain structure and a given variable, such as age or score on a particular 
task. When VBM is conducted to study the relationship between brain structure and a given 
variable, the null hypothesis states that there is no correlation between tissue volume and 
the variable in question. Specifically for the present study, the null hypothesis is that there 
will be no correlation between brain tissue volume and metacognitive efficiency in ED 
patients.  
As is common in the VBM literature, in this thesis it will be assumed that region of 
interest (ROI) size is driving the differences in VBM signal. However, it is noted that there 
may be subtler anatomical shape variations creating the VBM signal differences (Ashburner 
& Friston, 2001; Whitwell, 2009).  In other words, although we assume that it is the volume 
of a particular structure that is associated with a variable, VBM cannot discount the 
possibility that differences in the shape of the ROI are contributing to the difference in VBM 
signals across patients (Bookstein, 2001).  
MR Images were collected as part of the “Plasma Based Biomarkers for Alzheimer’s 
Disease” study at the Centre for Neuroimaging Sciences, Institute of Psychiatry  (ethics 
approval number 06/Q0706/50), using a General Electric SIGNA HDx 1.5T MR scanner. The 
neuroimaging protocol was designed for compatibility with the Alzheimer's Disease 
Neuroimaging Initiative (ADNI) magnetic resonance (MR) protocol and has been presented 
in detail previously (Jack et al., 2008; Simmons et al., 2009, 2011). Briefly, the protocol was 
implemented in the local high-resolution sagittal 3D T1-weighted MP-RAGE  ‘adni14m4’ 
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pulse sequence (slice thickness 1.2mm, slice gap 1.2mm, matrix size 192x192 with 180 
spatial slices, voxel size 1.2 x 1.2 x 1.2mm, flip angle 8 degrees). Repetition Time was 8.6 
seconds, and Echo Time was 3.8 seconds.  
11.1.1 IMAGE PRE-PROCESSING 
A fundamental problem with analysing brain structure across or within groups is that 
there are substantial individual differences in large-scale brain anatomy, in terms of global 
head size, as well as the size and shape of particular brain structures across a participant 
sample, which are due to natural anatomical variability rather than the effect of interest 
(Ashburner & Friston, 2001). For instance, people with larger heads will usually have 
uniformly larger brain volumes, which can confound the analysis if not taken into 
consideration, as significant between or within group differences may actually be the 
spurious result of these factors. VBM analysis helps overcome this problem by using a 
number of processes to register the MR images of interest in the same “normalised” 
anatomical space or template. Individual scans are spatially matched (registered) to the 
template, resulting in a given location in this template corresponding approximately to the 
same anatomical location in each one of the individual normalised scans. This process allows 
brain anatomy to be more quantitatively compared irrespective of global variations in brain 
anatomy. This process is known as spatial normalisation. Fig 11.1-2 shows an example of the 
gray matter template employed in this study.  
The process of VBM begins with “Segmentation”, which essentially identifies and 
separates the scan into one of four tissue types; gray matter, white matter, cerebrospinal 
fluid (CSF) and miscellaneous residual category of other tissues (such as skull and skin of the 
scalp). The default segmentation process (in this study performed using the “new segment” 
toolbox in SPM8) warps the individual brains to a template anatomical space, so that they 
are aligned in terms of macroscopic characteristics, and therefore global differences in head 
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size and large-scale morphological differences are corrected for, allowing accurate 
comparisons of structures to be made independently of large-scale anatomical variability.  
The MR images are constituted by volumetric image elements, or voxels, which are 
the basic elements of brain anatomy measurement. In an analogy with the basic 
constituents of a 2D image or pixels, voxels can be understood as “3D pixels”.  In the present 
study, the image acquisition sequence produced voxels of size 1.2mm3, resulting in 
approximately 868000 voxels in each subject’s brain (assuming an average brain size of 1500 
cc).  The segmentation algorithms assume every voxel in the scan is constituted by different 
proportions of the four tissue types; gray matter, white matter, CSF and other tissues (such 
as skull and skin of the scalp; Ashburner & Friston, 2005) and creates separate images for 
each type of tissue (see figure 11.1-1 for the first three). In the present study only gray 
matter images for each subject were used in the second stage analysis, as the primary 
hypothesis of the locus of association between metacognitive abilities and brain structure 
concerned gray matter loss. Further, our patient population was constituted of patients with 
early stage dementia, and therefore with neurodegeneration primarily affecting gray matter. 
The segmented images for all tissue types were also added up to estimate total intracranial 
volume (TIV), which was then used as a covariate in the group analysis stage to account for 
residual differences in head size. 
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Figure 11.1-1 Illustrates one patients’ MR image from this study (coronal, sagittal and axial views) after the 
segmentation process, a. gray matter, b. white matter, c. CSF. 
After the process of Segmentation, the spatially normalised template is created by 
averaging all individual scans through DARTEL (diffeomorphic anatomic registration via an 
exponentiated lie algebra algorithm). This procedure increases the accuracy of inter-subject 
alignment (Ashburner, 2007). DARTEL is achieved by modelling the shape of each brain using 
three parameters for each voxel (resulting in over 2.5 million parameters per subject). 
DARTEL simultaneously aligns gray and white matter among all the data included in the 
analysis. This is achieved by generating average template data (see figure 11.1-2), to which 
the full data set are iteratively aligned. 
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Figure 11.1-2 Illustrates DARTEL gray matter template for this study, which will be normalised to fit the MNI 
template in the final stage of pre-processing (coronal, sagittal and axial views). 
In order to accurately compare data across patients, all images need to be in the 
same 3D space, which is achieved by the process of normalisation. Here the DARTEL 
template is “normalised” (i.e. shifted and warped) to fit the Montreal Neurological Institute 
(MNI; Evans, Janke, Collins, & Baillet, 2012) template and then the deformations are used to 
normalise the segmented images to the MNI space. Once this has been completed the 
images are smoothed (usually 8mm FWHM [full-width at half-maximum] Gaussian kernel) 
creating spatially normalised and Jacobian scaled (taking into account how each data set has 
been adjusted individually to fit the template) gray matter images in MNI space (see figure 
11.1-3). 
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Figure 11.1-3 Illustrates NMI normalisation smoothed images for one patient from this study (coronal, sagittal 
and axial views). 
In the current study VBM was used to identify any differences in brain structure (e.g. 
volume of a specific area) and if this is related to metacognitive efficiency. This procedure 
was completed by closely following the methodology described in John Ashburner’s 2010 
VBM tutorial for SPM-8. (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/~john/misc/VBMclass10.pdf; see 
appendix 11.1.1 for code used for batch processing). 
11.1.2 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
Statistical analysis was carried out using SPM version 8 
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/) on MatLab. Before analysis could be carried out, total 
intracranial volume (TIV) was estimated to use as a covariate. This was carried out using 
code obtained from the SPM mailing list (spm@jiscmail.ac.uk) archives 
(https://www.jiscmail.ac.uk/cgi-bin/webadmin?A0=spm) (see appendix 11.1.2 for script). 
This script was run for gray matter, white matter and CSF volume, with these three values 
being combined to calculate the TIV. Multiple regression analysis was carried out to 
investigate the relationship between memory meta d’/d’ scores and brain structure (gray 
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and white matter volume), co-varying for TIV and age (see appendix 11.1.3 for script).  We 
restricted our reported findings to gray matter regions, as findings in white matter where 
likely to be artefacts. 
The null hypothesis was tested at two anatomical levels: a region of interest (ROI) 
approach focusing on replication of the findings by Fleming et al. (2010) in healthy adults in 
our ED sample, followed by a whole-brain exploratory analysis. For the ROI analysis, the 
automatic anatomical labelling (AAL) atlas (http://qnl.bu.edu/obart/explore/AAL/) was 
employed to obtain a Brodmann area 10 (BA10; anterior prefrontal cortex) mask. In this 
analysis the null hypothesis was tested using strict multiple comparisons correction based on 
random field theory adjusted with an appropriate correction for the small search volume. 
This analysis was followed by an exploratory whole brain analysis, conducted at an 
uncorrected threshold of p<0.001. The locations of significant effects were approximated 
using xjview toolbox (http://www.alivelearn.net/xjview8/) on SPM-8, using the AAL atlas 
(http://qnl.bu.edu/obart/explore/AAL/) and entering peak voxel coordinates identified in 




A total of 15 patients with early-stage dementia (ED) were included in the BCIS part 
of this study, mean age 78.5 (±8.64), of whom 7 were women (46%). There was no 
significant difference in age by gender in this sample. 13 people (86.6%) in the sample 
identified as White (British/Irish/European/American); 1 person identified as Asian and 1 
identified as Black African.  10 of the patients in the sample had a diagnosis of Mild Cognitive 
Impairment (MCI) and 5 had a diagnosis of Mild Alzheimer’s Disease (AD). The mean MMSE 
score of this group was 26.5 (±2.54). 
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Metacognition 
A total of 11 patients with early-stage dementia (ED) were included in the 
metacognition portion of this study, mean age 77.6 years (±7.60), of whom 4 were women 
(36%). There was no significant difference in age by gender in this sample. 9 people (81%) in 
the sample identified as White (British/Irish/European/American); 1 person identified as 
Asian and 1 identified as Black African.  7 of the patients in the sample had a diagnosis of 
Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI) and 4 had a diagnosis of Mild Alzheimer’s Disease (AD). The 











3, -7, 40 96 Right dorsal 
anterior cingulate 
32 6.31^ + 
60, -27, 48 34 Right post-central 
gyrus 
1,2,3 6.26^ + 
-33, 87, -33 45 Left posterior 
cerebellum 
n/a 5.46^ + 
-4, -13, -30 58 Left brainstem n/a 5.40^ - 
33, -82, 12 17 Right middle 
occipital gyrus 
19 4.04^ - 
Table 11.2-1 Shows significant associations between memory metacognitive efficiency and various brain 
regions, where “+” denotes a positive association and “-“ denotes a negative association, and ^p<.001 
uncorrected. 
There was no significant association between BA10 gray matter volume and memory 
metacognitive efficiency in ED patients (corrected at p<0.05 family wise error [FWE] based 
on random field theory with small search area correction).  
An additional exploratory whole brain analysis was then conducted, as is frequent in 
neuroimaging, at the relatively lenient threshold of at the p<.001 level, resulting in a number 
of significant positive correlations (see figure 11.2-1 for 3D rendered image, figure 11.2-2 for 
axial slice images). A significant correlation between metacognitive efficiency and gray 
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matter in the right dorsal anterior cingulate (figure 11.2-3, peak voxel coordinates: [3, -7, 
40]; tmax = 6.31; p< 0.001, uncorrected); the right post central gyrus (figure 11.2-4, peak 
voxel coordinates: [60, -27, 48]; tmax = 6.26; p< 0.001, uncorrected) and the left posterior 
cerebellum (peak voxel coordinates: [-33, -87, 40]; tmax= 5.46; p< 0.001, uncorrected) 
 
Figure 11.2-1 3D rendered image, showing areas in which gray matter volume correlates positively with 





Figure 11.2-2 Axial slices (4mm spacing) showing areas in which gray matter volume correlates positively with 
memory meta d’/d’. The significant positive clusters indicated with red blobs and red circles (slices, 32, 40, 44) 
and negative clusters indicated with blue blobs and blue circles (slice 24) 
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Figure 11.2-3 Statistical (T) maps shown on a standard overlay (coronal, sagittal and axial views) showing areas 
in which gray matter volume correlates positively with memory meta d’/d’ (red blobs). The significant cluster 
was found in the right dorsal anterior cingulate. 
 
 
Figure 11.2-4 Statistical (T) maps shown on a standard overlay (coronal, sagittal and axial views) showing areas 
in which gray matter volume correlates positively with memory meta d’/d’ (red blobs). The significant cluster 
was found in the right post central gyrus. 
There were also significant negative correlations between meta d’/d’ and volume of 
the left brainstem (peak voxel coordinates: [-4, -13, -30]; tmax= 5.40; p<.001, uncorrected) 
and the middle occipital gyrus (peak voxel coordinates: [33, -82, 12]; tmax= 5.04; p<.001, 
uncorrected). However, none of the metacognitive efficiency results survived correction for 
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60, 20,-11 21 Right inferior 
frontal gyrus 
45 4.84^ + 
-22, 32, -15 44 Left middle 
frontal gyrus 
46 4.82^ + 
-40, -88,-14 18 Left inferior 
occipital gyrus 
19 4.13^ + 
-21, -79, 12 55 Left cuneus 17 6.03^ - 
15, -43, -3 104 Right 
parahippocampal 
gyrus 
34 4.70^ - 
15, -72, 12 31 Right cuneus 17 4.19^ - 
Table 11.2-2 Shows significant associations between SR and various brain regions, where “+” denotes a 
positive association and “-“ denotes a negative association, and ^p<.001 uncorrected. 
An exploratory whole brain analysis was conducted at the p<.001 level, which 
produced a number of significant correlations (see figure 11.2-5  for 3D rendered image, 
figure 11.2-6 for axial slice images). A significant positive correlation between SR scores and 
volume of the frontal lobes; the right inferior frontal gyrus (figure 11.2-7, peak voxel 
coordinates: [60, 20, -11]; tmax = 4.84; p<.001, uncorrected), the left middle frontal gyrus 
(figure 11.2-8, peak voxel coordinates: [-22, 23, -15], tmax = 4.82; p<.001, uncorrected); as 
well as the left inferior occipital gyrus (peak voxel coordinates [-40 -88 -14]; tmax =  4.13; 
p<.001, uncorrected)  
 
Figure 11.2-5 3D rendered image, showing areas in which gray matter volume correlates positively with SR. 
The significant clusters indicated with red (highest correlation) and green (smaller correlation) blobs.  





Figure 11.2-6 Axial slices (4mm spacing) showing areas in which gray matter volume correlates with SR. The 
significant positive clusters indicated with red (slices -16, -12), significant negative clusters indicated in blue 





Figure 11.2-7 Statistical (T) maps shown on a standard overlay (coronal, sagittal and axial views) showing areas 
in which gray matter volume correlates positively with SR (red blobs).  The significant cluster was found in the 
right inferior frontal gyrus. 
 
 
Figure 11.2-8 Statistical (T) maps shown on a standard overlay (coronal, sagittal and axial views) showing areas 
in which gray matter volume correlates positively with SR (red blobs). The significant cluster was found in the 
left middle frontal gyrus. 
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There were also significant negative correlations between BCIS SR and volume of the 
right parahippocampal gyrus (peak voxel coordinates: [15 -43 -3], tmax = 4.70; p<.001, 
uncorrected), the right cuneus (peak voxel coordinates: [15, -72, 12]; tmax = 4.19; p<.001, 
uncorrected) and left cuneus (peak voxel coordinates: [-21, -79, 12]; tmax=. 6.03; p<.001, 
uncorrected).  
However, none of the self-reflection results survived correction for multiple 
comparisons across the brain volume. 
11.2.3.2 SELF-CERTAINTY 






Anatomical Label Brodmann 
area 
t-value 
+ -12, 8, -15 294 Left subcallosal 
gyrus 
25 11.53* 
+ -48, -45, -5 41 Left middle 
temporal gyrus 
46 5.24^ 
+ 46, 8, 7 128 Right precentral 
gyrus 
4 5.08^ 
+ 16, 24, 37 11 Right dorsal 
anterior cingulate 
32 4.54^ 
+ -12, 27, 25 29 Left anterior 
cingulate 
32 4.38^ 
- 33, -96, -6 121 Right left middle 
occipital gyrus 
19 5.12^ 
- 46, 60, 7 53 Right middle 
frontal gyrus 
10 4.85^ 
Table 11.2-3 Shows significant associations between SC and brain regions, where “+” denotes a positive 
association and “-“ denotes a negative  association.  *p<.01 corrected for FWE, ^p<.001 uncorrected. 
An exploratory whole brain analysis was conducted at the p<.001 level, which 
produced a number of significant correlations (see figure 11.2-9  for 3D rendered image, 
figure 11.2-10 for axial slice images). A significant positive correlation between BCIS SC 
scores and volume of the frontal lobes; the left subcallosal gyrus (figure 11.2-11, peak voxel 
coordinates: [-12, 8, -15]; tmax = 11.53; p<.001, uncorrected; left middle temporal gyrus 
(peak voxel coordinates: [-48, -45, -5]; tmax = 5.24; p<.001); right precentral gyrus (figure 
11.2-12, peak voxel coordinates [46, 7, 8]; tmax = 3.64; p<.001); left anterior cingulate(figure 
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11.2-13, peak voxel coordinates:  [-12, 27, 25]; tmax = 4.38; p<.001) and the right dorsal 
anterior cingulate (figure 11.14-21, peak voxel coordinates: [16, 24, 37]; tmax = 4.54; 
p<.001).  
 
Figure 11.2-9 3D rendered image, showing areas in which gray matter volume correlates with BCIS SC. The 




Figure 11.2-10 Axial slices (4mm spacing) showing areas in which gray matter volume correlates with BCIS SC 
The significant positive clusters indicated with red and yellow (slices –20, -16, -12, -8, -4, 4, 8, 12), significant 
negative clusters indicated in blue (slices -8, -4). 
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Figure 11.2-11 Statistical (T) maps shown on a standard overlay (coronal, sagittal and axial views) showing 
areas in which gray matter volume correlates positively with BCIS SC (red and yellow blobs) . The significant 





Figure 11.2-12 Statistical (T) maps shown on a standard overlay (coronal, sagittal and axial views) showing 
areas in which gray matter volume correlates positively with BCIS SC (yellow blobs) The significant cluster was 





Figure 11.2-13 Statistical (T) maps shown on a standard overlay (coronal, sagittal and axial views) showing 
areas in which gray matter volume correlates positively with BCIS SC (yellow blobs). The significant cluster was 
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Figure 11.2-14 Statistical (T) maps shown on a standard overlay (coronal, sagittal and axial views) showing 
areas in which gray matter volume correlates positively with BCIS SC (yellow blobs). The significant cluster was 
found in the right dorsal anterior cingulate. 
There were also significant negative correlations between BCIS SC and gray matter; 
right middle occipital gyrus (peak voxel coordinates: [33, -96, -6], tmax = 6.03; p<.001), right 
middle frontal gyrus/BA10 (see figure 11.2-15 [46, 60,7] tmax = 4.85; p<.001).  
The only result that survived correction for multiple comparisons across the brain 
volume was the positive association between SC and the left subcallosal gyrus (p<.01). 
 
 
Figure 11.2-15 Statistical (T) maps shown on a standard overlay (coronal, sagittal and axial views) showing 
areas in which gray matter volume correlates positively with BCIS SC (blue blobs). The significant cluster was 
found in the right middle frontal gyrus (BA10 area). 
11.3 DISCUSSION 
The aim of this chapter was to test the null hypothesis that there will be no 
correlation between brain tissue volume and metacognitive efficiency in ED patients, and 
conduct an exploratory analysis to investigate the neural basis of cognitive insight in a group 
of patients with early stage dementia. 
There was no significant correlation between meta d’/d’ and the BA10 area of the 
frontal lobe, which was identified as being related to perceptual metacognitive efficiency by 
Fleming et al. (2010), and thus the hypothesis “There will be a significant relationship 
- 210 - 
between areas of the frontal lobe, such as the BA10” is not supported. This may be due to 
the low number of patients included in this analysis, compared to the 32 included in the 
original study, causing this study to have less power and thus produce null results. Another 
reason for this lack of association may be that the current study analysed the relationship 
with memory metacognitive efficiency and previous studies have analysed perceptual 
metacognitive efficiency. Indeed, a study by McCurdy et al., (2013) found there to be little 
overlap in the neural correlates of memory and perceptual metacognition in healthy young 
adults, where the only similar neural correlate between both domains of metacognition was 
part of the precuneus, which may explain the lack of association in our study with BA10. 
Though this thesis indicates that there is a significant association between the two domains 
of metacognitive efficiency in healthy adults (reported in chapter 7), no such association was 
identified in the early stage dementia group. This is most likely due to the low number of 
patients who successfully completed the perceptual metacognitive task, however it may be 
that perceptual metacognitive efficiency is associated with BA10 volume, but memory 
metacognitive efficiency is not.  As well, this study included patients with 
neurodegeneration, resulting in a more heterogeneous population than the sample of 
healthy young adults presented in Fleming et al (2010). A heterogeneous sample usually 
results in increased variability of the measurement and therefore less statistical power, all 
else being equal.  
The exploratory analysis, however, identified areas of positive association between 
metacognitive efficiency and gray matter volume, predominantly in frontal regions sub-
serving executive processes, known to be associated with atrophy in MCI patients (Driscoll et 
al., 2009). Analysis found there was a significant positive association between metacognitive 
efficiency and gray matter in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, which has previously been 
associated with awareness of cognitive deficits and responses to and detection of errors in 
healthy older adults and patients with dementia (Ries et al., 2012; Sultzer et al., 2013).  
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Further associations were found between metacognitive efficiency and right post central 
gyrus, which is part of the parietal lobe. Literature surrounding dementia patients has 
indicated that the right parietal lobe is associated with insight into memory difficulties 
(Cosentino & Stern, 2005). 
Results also indicated a positive correlation with the right cerebellum and significant 
negative correlation with the left brain stem. These areas are likely artefacts as neither is 
related to awareness in dementia or MCI related volumetric changes (Liu et al., 2010; see 
section 11.3.1 for further details of limitations) 
However, results reported in chapter 10 demonstrated that there was no difference 
in memory metacognitive efficiency between healthy older adults and ED. It was therefore 
suggested that, in the ED group, there was no significant difference in the deterioration of 
metacognitive efficiency or self-awareness over and above that observed in healthy ageing 
(discussed in chapter 7), and that dementia-related deterioration associated with gray 
matter atrophy occurs when and if early dementia progresses to Alzheimer’s dementia. One 
possible explanation for the lack of a clear-cut clinical-pathological correlation in the ED 
group is that the relationship between variation in the volume of frontal structures and 
metacognitive efficiency is associated with neural correlates of normal ageing and hence 
would not differentiate ED patients from elderly controls. Further research into structural 
correlates of metacognitive efficiency in both healthy ageing and later stages of dementia 
will be required to clarify if this is the case. 
There was a significant relationship between both BCIS sub-scale scores, SC and SR, 
and a number of brain regions. Of particular interest was the finding that SC was negatively 
associated with the right middle frontal gyrus (an area within the BA10 frontal region) while 
SR was positively associated with right inferior and left middle frontal gyrus (both adjacent 
to the BA10 area). These ROIs are all within the aPFC, which is associated with perceptual 
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and visual metacognitive ability (Baird et al., 2013; Fleming et al., 2012; Fleming et al., 2010; 
Rounis et al., 2010), as well as attributive metacognition (Saxe, Schulz, & Jiang, 2006) in 
healthy adults. Further, functional imaging has demonstrated that activation of the PFC is 
associated with discrepancy scores on clinical memory questionnaire in MCI and AD patients 
(Vogel et al., 2005) and the bilateral medial PFC is associated with insight into illness and 
cognitive deficits in patients with dementia (Ries et al., 2012; Sultzer et al., 2013). Of 
particular interest is the direction of these associations. One may expect self-reflection 
(where a high score is deemed “better” on the BCIS) to be associated with better 
metacognitive efficiency, and self-certainty (where a high score is deemed “worse”, as it 
denotes overconfidence) to be associated with less efficient metacognitive judgements. 
These imaging data demonstrate a positive association between self-reflection and the aPFC 
volume and a negative association with self-certainty and volume of this region, in 
agreement with these predictions. Behavioural results from this set of ED patients (reported 
in chapter 9) indicated that there was a significant positive association between perceptual 
metacognitive efficiency and BCIS SR, and a non-significant negative association with the 
BCIS SC. While there were no significant correlations between memory metacognitive 
efficiency and either SC or SR, the direction of the associations did indicate that there was a 
positive correlation with SR and a negative correlation with SC. In both measures of 
metacognitive efficiency their association with cognitive insight, whether significant or not, 
was consistent with the direction of associations with the aPFC respectively. The lack of 
significance in both behavioural and neuroimaging data indicates that perhaps the 
neuroimaging data has more statistical power than behavioural data due to less 
environmental confounds (such as fatigue), and less measurement variability (brain 
structure does not change markedly within hours or days, whilst performance can). It may 
be the case that larger sample sizes in a behavioural study, as suggested in chapter 9, would 
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provide enough data and power to draw more robust conclusions, and perhaps results that 
would survive correction for multiple comparisons. 
Further, SC scores were positively associated with the left subcallosal gyrus volume, 
a finding that survived correction for multiple comparisons, as well as the adjacent left 
anterior cingulate, and the right dorsal anterior cingulate volumes. There was also a 
significant association between SC scores and the right dorsal anterior cingulate, indicating 
that both hemispheres may be involved in self-certainty ratings. This left anterior cingulate 
finding is of interest because it and surrounding areas were also associated with memory 
metacognitive efficiency in studies of healthy participants. It is proposed that the ACC is 
involved in detection and response to errors (Ries et al., 2012), as well as strategic 
metacognition in healthy adults (Braver, Barch, Gray, Molfese, & Snyder, 2001; Wager et al., 
2005) and was also found in this study to be significantly associated with memory 
metacognitive efficiency. 
A number of unexpected associations were also found during this exploratory 
analysis. A positive association was found between SR and the left inferior occipital gyrus, as 
well as a negative association with SC and the right middle occipital gyrus, an area which is 
usually associated with reading and word recognition as part of a semantic processing 
network (Vandenberghe, Price, Wise, Josephs, & Frackowiak, 1996), but has not yet been 
associated with any measure of awareness in dementia. There was also a negative 
association identified between SR and the right parahippocampal gyrus, which is one of the 
main areas noted to atrophy in patients with MCI and AD dementia (Galton et al., 2001; Liu 
et al., 2010). This result was unexpected; behavioural studies have indicated that self-
reflection is not associated (positively or negatively) with memory in schizophrenia patients 
(Nair et al., 2014), and a lack of association with memory function was also clear in this 
patient group (reported in chapter 9). SR scores were also found to be negatively associated 
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with the left and right cuneus volumes. This region is not associated with early significant 
loss of volume or cortical thickness in MCI or AD (Liu et al., 2010) nor has it been associated 
with any measure of awareness in dementia. SC score was also positively associated with the 
left middle temporal gyrus, which is associated with volume loss in MCI and AD (Liu et al., 
2010) but not awareness of cognitive decline. Finally, SC scores were associated with the 
right pre-central gyrus, an area of the primary cortex that is not known to be associated with 
awareness in dementia, but has been observed to atrophy in AD patients (Liu et al., 2010; 
see section 11.3.1 for further details of limitations).  These unexpected results may be due 
to the increased threshold utilized in this this study to include uncorrected data, as there 
was only one significant result that survived more stringent thresholds (sub-callosal volume 
and SC). It can therefore not be excluded that these might be false positive results.  
11.3.1 LIMITATIONS 
All but one set of MRI results did not survive correction for multiple comparisons 
across the brain volume. This is to be expected due to the low number of participants 
included in the study (Whitwell, 2009). Studies with larger sample sizes should be conducted 
to confirm the results presented in this chapter. In particular structural MRI work looking at 
cognitive insight in early stage dementia would be worthwhile. Our focus on patients in the 
early stages of cognitive impairment led to the inclusion of MCI subjects. Some of these MCI 
patients may not progress on to develop dementia and do not suffer from a 
neurodegenerative condition. This could have resulted in a heterogeneous patient sample 
that could have reduced statistical power. Further, recent work by Spalletta et al. (2014) has 
indicated that there are structural differences in the early stages of dementia between 
patients diagnosed with MCI who go on to develop AD and those who do not. As our sample 
contained MCI and early-stage AD patients these structural differences in grey matter in 
areas of the CMS may also have confounded our results. Longitudinal studies as well as cross 
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sectional studies with a larger range of diagnoses would be useful to further investigate this 
issue. 
Though some results reported in this chapter are puzzling, this was a pilot 
exploratory analysis and thus it may not be possible to explain all the results reported in 
relation to previous literature. Larger experiments into cognitive insight in early stage 
dementia, with more power and a reduced significance threshold, are required to confirm 
how these unexpected associations should be interpreted.  
Templates used in VBM analysis, such as the MNI, are created using “normal” 
healthy brains (Evans et al., 2012). As this sample used brains of patients with ED, there are 
some volumetric structural differences (Liu et al., 2010). It has been suggested that 
customised templates can be used to help minimize the chance of these errors occurring, 
however this would be of little use when we are interested in replicating results found in 
healthy populations. Further, due to the small sample size it was not possible to create a 
specialised template for this study.  
11.3.2 CONCLUSIONS 
Results partially supported this chapter’s hypothesis, as significant positive 
associations were identified between memory metacognitive efficiency and the dACC region 
of the cortical midline structures (CMS). Further to previous research, evidence suggests that 
specific regions of the CMS are associated with metacognitive judgements, and this is 
evident in a clinical population. However, chapter 9 demonstrated that there was no 
difference in memory metacognitive efficiency between healthy older adults and ED 
patients, which suggests that this volumetric variation may be associated with normal ageing 
as opposed to dementia specific pathology.  Alternatively, it is possible that our findings are 
identifying a neural substrate of very early changes in memory metacognitive efficiency, 
- 216 - 
which are apparent before significant deterioration of performance, in particular with early 
stages of dementia.  
Further, there were a number of significant correlations between the frontal lobe 
volume: SR was mainly associated with the frontal gyri and SC with the ACC and surrounding 
areas.  Another area of interest was the aPFC, which was positively associated with SR and 
negatively associated with SC. Further, both BCIS sub-scales had positive neural correlates in 
common with metacognitive efficiency but these did not overlap, i.e. both self-reflection and 
memory metacognitive efficiency were associated with volume of the inferior frontal gyrus, 
and both SC and metacognitive efficiency were associated with areas adjacent to the 
anterior cingulate volume. These results suggest that neuroimaging methods employed in 
this study had more statistical power than behavioural methods, and that there may be 
similar neural regions sub-serving both cognitive insight and metacognitive efficiency in ED 
patients. 
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CHAPTER 12 
12. DISCUSSION 
“Metacognition” is a very broad term referring to thinking about ones’ own 
cognition. This term has been used in the healthy adult cognition literature to investigate 
introspection of ones’ cognitive abilities and its correlates, such as ageing. It has also been 
used in clinical literature to refer to patients’ ability, or lack thereof, to understand and be 
aware of the various cognitive deficits and symptoms associated with their disorder, also 
termed “insight into illness”. However, current tests of metacognition and assessments of 
insight are qualitatively different, and to date have not been compared. 
This thesis had a number of aims:  1) to investigate the effect of normal ageing on 
experimentally controlled, objective tasks designed to measure the efficiency of 
metacognitive judgements on both perception and memory performance, 2) to investigate 
the cognitive systems and mechanisms underlying both insight into illness and more 
objective measures of metacognition, and discover whether the two are associated, 3) to 
investigate how current mood and presence of depression affects insight and metacognitive 
efficiency, and if this link is more evident in clinical populations compared to healthy 
controls, and finally, 4) to investigate whether deficits in clinical insight and more objective 
metacognitive processes are caused by similar cognitive and neural systems across different 
diagnoses. 
12.1 HEALTHY CONTROLS 
Previous research into adult metacognitive abilities has focused purely on the ability 
of adults to think about their own thinking in a number of cognitive domains. This thesis 
aimed to further this work by additionally looking at metacognitive efficiency in terms of its 
correlates, such as mood, age and more subjective self-report measures of self-reflection.  
- 218 - 
12.1.1  EFFECTS OF AGE ON METACOGNITIVE EFFICIENCY 
Previous evidence was divided when considering the effect of age on metacognitive 
ability, with some studies suggesting that self-knowledge improves as we age (Doson et al, 
2007; Pliske & Mutter, 1996; Vukman, 2005); this was mainly related to a persons’ 
judgement of their general knowledge. A small number of studies utilising Feeling of 
Knowing (FOK) methodology found no evidence of an age effect (Eakin et al, 2014; Souchay 
et al, 2007). However much evidence has supported the notion that there is an age related 
decline associated with metacognitive ability about general memory performance (Huff et 
al, 2011; Pansky et al, 2009; Weil et al, 2013; Soderstrom et al, 2012), FOK (Cosentino et al, 
2011) and Judgements of Learning (JOL ; Tauber & Dunlosky, 2012; Toth et al, 2011). Some 
have suggested that this is related to memory performance, rather than metacognitive 
ability itself (Daniels et al., 2009). The current study utilised newly developed methods that 
control for task performance, and thus produce an objective, experimentally controlled 
measure of metacognition that is independent of this confound, which has been dubbed 
“metacognitive efficiency” (Maniscalco and Lau, 2012).  
Novel evidence from this study demonstrates that there is a negative effect of age 
on perceptual metacognitive efficiency across a large span of adulthood. This domain of 
cognition has received little attention but holds real-world relevance when we consider that 
perceptual abilities are required to carry out a number of everyday tasks. Indeed, Ross et al 
(2012) demonstrated that, despite evidence that older drivers were more likely to have 
driving accidents or violations, they rated their own driving ability as significantly better than 
objective evidence suggested. Further, evidence from “implicit awareness” research has 
indicated that adults with disabilities are likely to display adaptive behaviours to deal with 
their disability, whether it be physical or related to memory, but will not consciously 
acknowledge that they have a problem (Mograbi & Morris, 2013). These results suggest, 
therefore, that the weight given to self-ratings made by the older population about their 
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ability to carry out certain tasks, such as driving, should be re-assessed to possibly include an 
additional rating made by a significant other. Implementation of such a scheme in certain 
areas of social and health-related tasks may reduce the likelihood of older adults causing 
accidents and injury to themselves and others, and encourage timely use of services 
available. 
There was no direct correlation between age and memory metacognitive efficiency, 
which may have been due to lack of power as a result of less participants completing this 
measure. Post-hoc analyses indicated that there was no significant difference between the 
effects of age on perceptual and memory metacognitive efficiency, which therefore 
supported the suggestion of reduced power in this measure. Further investigations with a 
larger sample size are there required in order to confirm or refute the suggestion that there 
is an effect of age on memory metacognitive abilities, independent of effects on memory 
ability. Confirmation of this finding would have practical implications, as we also know there 
is a robust age related decline in memory ability itself (Stuart-Hamilton, 2012) and thus 
encouraging older adults to use memory aids in the future may be pragmatic, if individuals 
may not be aware their memory is getting worse. Implementing such a scheme may help 
older adults keep their independence and reduce care-giver burden. 
Results here also partially support previous work to indicate that different domains 
of metacognitive ability are associated in healthy adults (McCurdy et al, 2013; Song et al, 
2011), although when outliers were removed this result did not remain significant so the 
strength of the association may not be strong. This behavioural finding implicates at least 
some underlying common cognitive and perhaps neural basis for metacognitive abilities and 
self-awareness. This may also impact the understanding of more subtle issues of awareness 
that may be experienced by patients with localised brain damage (Fleming et al., 2014). 
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12.1.2  EFFECTS OF MOOD ON METACOGNITIVE EFFICIENCY 
Novel results were found when investigating the effect of mood on metacognitive 
efficiency. Memory metacognitive efficiency was negatively associated with increased 
cognitive symptoms of depression, as measured by the BDI cognitive sub-scale, and this 
relationship almost reached significance for perceptual metacognitive efficiency. Such 
results support the notion of depressive realism, where people experiencing low mood show 
less self-serving bias in relation to self-judgements, which leads to more accurate and 
“realistic” judgements of one’s behaviour. 
12.1.3  RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COGNITION AND METACOGNITIVE EFFICIENCY 
Though it was suggested there would be significant associations between executive 
function and metacognitive efficiency, due to their shared association with frontal lobe 
volume (Fleming & Dolan, 2012; Stuss & Knight, 2013) neither domain of metacognitive 
efficiency was associated with measures of executive function, unlike previous work using 
FOKs, (Souchay et al., 2002). However there was a significant relationship between the 
memory domain of metacognitive efficiency and all measures of memory. This suggests that 
there is some degree of memory ability required to perform this type of metacognitive 
judgement, despite memory performance on the task being controlled for using the meta 
d’/d’ calculation (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012).  
12.1.4   RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DOMAINS OF METACOGNITIVE EFFICIENCY AND 
AWARENESS 
Initially results supported previous findings that different domains of metacognitive 
efficiency were associated (McCurdy et al., 2013), however once 3 outliers had been 
removed (more than 2 standard deviations outside the mean score) this association was no 
longer significant. A possible explanation is that this may be due to a smaller number of 
people completing the memory metacognitive task than perceptual metacognitive task, and 
thus the relationship had less power than previous studies.  
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Initially a relationship between metacognitive efficiency and measures of awareness 
(DEX and BCIS) yielded no significant results, however when controlling for age a negative 
relationship was evident between the self-reflection sub-scale and the memory 
metacognitive domain, and a positive association with the self-certainty sub-scale and the 
memory domain approached significance. Though a relationship between metacognitive 
efficiency and the two BCIS sub-scales was expected, the direction of this association was 
not. It is therefore suggested that, in healthy adults, self-certainty is not necessarily 
associated with over-confidence, as in patients samples, but instead a correct appraisal of 
ones thoughts or behaviour. Further, a larger degree of self-reflection may result in over-
thinking and thus metacognitive evaluation of the self is less accurate than automatic 
responses in these participants.  
Further, a gender interaction was evident between the BCIS sub-scales and 
perceptual metacognitive efficiency, whereby females had a positive relationship between 
perceptual metacognition and both subscales and males demonstrated negative relationship 
with both sub-scales. This pattern of results is similar to that observed by Kao et al., (2011) 
regarding executive function and the BCIS, indicating that there may be some behavioural 
gender effect influencing the relationship between cognitive functions and cognitive insight.  
There was no association between self-rated awareness of dysexecutive symptoms 
(as measured on the DEX questionnaire) and either domain of metacognitive efficiency, 
however there was an association between the DEX discrepancy score and memory 
metacognitive efficiency, where a negative DEX discrepancy score (indicative of participants 
rating their functioning as worse than their independent-rater), was related to poorer 
memory metacognitive efficiency, akin to findings from Harty et al. (2013). 
Results therefore demonstrate that there is an age related decline in metacognitive 
efficiency, but not in self-report measures of awareness, indicating the two self-awareness 
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measurements are not directly related. However controlling for age reveals an association 
between the two. This is the first evidence to suggest that different measures of self-
awareness may be related in healthy adults, and indicates that there is a similar cognitive 
basis for the different domains of awareness in this population. 
12.2 FIRST EPISODE PSYCHOSIS 
There is a robust body of evidence describing clinical insight in FEP. There is also a 
growing body of work investigating the qualitative aspect of metacognition in patients with 
psychotic disorders, and its association with insight and neurocognition, by assessing self- 
and other-narratives. However, little work has been done to gain objective, experimentally 
controlled measures of metacognitive function in this clinical group. This thesis aimed to add 
to the clinical insight and metacognitive literature by carrying out such an investigation and 
comparing measurement tools and their correlates.   
12.2.1 EFFECTS OF MOOD ON METACOGNITIVE EFFICIENCY 
A meta-analysis was performed on data measuring depression and cognitive insight 
in patients with psychosis, which indicated that patients displaying more symptoms of 
depression had better cognitive insight, driven by the increased capacity to self-reflect. 
There was no significant relationship with depression and self-certainty. This result was not 
supported by the data from this experimental study, however non-significant results may 
have been due to the small patient sample size. There are a number of clinical and ethical 
implications for the meta-analysis results, mostly centring on interventions designed to 
improve insight in patients with schizophrenia (Misdrahi, Denard, Swendsen, Jaussent, & 
Courtet, 2014), as cognitive insight has been identified as an avenue for exploration 
regarding cognitive behavioural therapy for schizophrenia. Using CBT-like therapy to 
improve insight should theoretically have an impact on compliance with other forms of 
treatment, however attempting to improve insight may lead to an increase in symptoms of 
depression. One suggestion to bypass this potential problem is to develop therapies that 
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attempt to reduce self-certainty bias rather than improve self-reflection. This has also been 
suggested in the clinical literature to bypass the ‘demoralisation effect’ of increased 
depression with improved insight, where Cavelti et al (2012) suggest that treatment 
targeting insight should focus on helping patients change dysfunctional beliefs and the self, 
which in turn could encourage patients to take on a positive recovery attitude.  
 The association between cognitive insight and depression is akin to the association 
observed between clinical insight and depression (Mintz et al., 2003) and therefore implies 
that, while the two forms of insight are conceptually separate, they have some similar 
correlates, and thus are partially related. These findings have led to the conceptualisation of 
a model of cognitive insight (figure 6.4-1). 
12.2.2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COGNITION AND METACOGNITIVE EFFICIENCY 
There were no age effects of metacognitive efficiency in this patient group, most 
likely due to the smaller age range than that of the healthy control group. 
Results supported previous work (Lysaker et al., 2005; Morgan & David, 2010) by 
identifying a negative association between executive function and memory metacognitive 
efficiency; however this was not the case for perceptual metacognition. A number of 
patients were not able to complete the task with ~70% correct responses, despite all 
patients beginning the task. Post-hoc analysis indicated that patients who did complete the 
task successfully had better executive function on both measures utilised in this study, and 
also reported less confidence bias in their responses than did the unsuccessful group. There 
is therefore evidence to suggest executive function is related to the amount of bias patients 
attribute to their metacognitive ratings; further investigation into this is required before firm 
conclusions can be drawn. 
There was also a significant relationship between memory metacognitive efficiency 
and all three measures of memory performance (immediate and delayed recall, delayed 
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recognition). Though memory performance on the metacognitive task was controlled for 
using the Maniscalco and Lau’s meta d’/d’ calculation, results suggest that some degree of 
memory ability is required to adequately perform the metacognitive task. Indeed, it may be 
that, as suggested by Dimaggio & Lysaker (2010), patients with poor memory function may 
lack the ability to update self-knowledge, and thus will continue to rate their abilities as 
equal to their premorbid functioning. 
There was no significant association between the two domains of metacognitive 
efficiency, however this is likely due to the low number of patients who successfully 
completed the perceptual task. 
12.2.3 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DOMAINS OF METACOGNITIVE EFFICIENCY AND 
MEASURES OF AWARENESS  
Whilst the different “concepts” of insight are all referred to as metacognitive 
processes, evidence suggests that in the FEP group they are not strongly associated with 
each other, as there was no significant association between any measure of clinical 
awareness (SAI-E, BCIS or DEX) and either domain of metacognitive efficiency. This finding 
supports the suggestion that different domains of metacognition are associated but distinct 
concepts, disrupted in different ways in the FEP population. It further supports the notion 
that definitions of specific deficits in both insight into illness and awareness should be clearly 
defined (Marková, 2005), as using such a broad term as “metacognition” in clinical settings 
may inadvertently imply direct association between two concepts which, in a clinical 
population, may not necessarily be the case.  
12.3 EARLY-STAGE DEMENTIA 
There is ample evidence to suggest that awareness of memory ability in patients 
with MCI and AD is poor (Chen et al., 2014; Lopez et al., 1994; Orfei et al., 2010; Roberts et 
al., 2009; Zanetti et al., 1999), as is awareness of poor executive function (Michon et al., 
1994). However, it has been suggested that more objective tests of metacognitive ability are 
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required in order to research metamemory deficits in MCI and AD populations (Cosentino et 
al., 2007). This study was the first to use methods measuring efficiency (controlling for task 
performance) as opposed to ability, which has a number of confounds. In addition this was 
the first study to the author’s knowledge to test domains of metacognition other than 
memory in this clinical population.  
12.3.1 EFFECTS OF MOOD ON METACOGNITIVE EFFICIENCY 
Though previous research has indicated a relationship between mood and memory 
awareness in MCI and AD, there was no significant association between measures of 
metacognitive efficiency and either current or clinical mood scores in this ED population. 
12.3.2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COGNITION AND METACOGNITIVE EFFICIENCY 
There was no evidence of an age related effect of metacognitive efficiency in this 
population. This may be related to the observation that MMSE score was negatively 
associated with age and positively associated with perceptual metacognitive efficiency 
score, indicating that as general cognitive ability declined, so did metacognitive efficiency.  
So in our cross sectional sample selected for presence of cognitive impairment, it was the 
degree of this impairment, and not age, which drove changes in metacognitive abilities.  
Further, though the average age in the ED population was ~7 years older than the healthy 
older adult population, there was no apparent age related cognitive decline in this sample. 
Longitudinal studies would be useful to indicate whether there is a decline in metacognitive 
efficiency of ED patients and that it occurs over and above any effects of ageing, perhaps 
correlating with MMSE score decline. 
12.3.3 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DOMAINS OF METACOGNITIVE EFFICIENCY AND 
MEASURES OF AWARENESS  
Due to the low number of patients successfully completing both experimental 
metacognitive tasks, no conclusions could be drawn regarding the hypothesised association 
between the two. However exploration of the data suggested there was a positive 
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relationship between perceptual metacognitive efficiency and BCIS self-reflection, 
supporting the notion that the two forms of self-awareness are related despite measuring 
different things. Indeed, as stated in section 12.2.3, using the broad term “metacognition” to 
describe the two processes should be avoided in clinical settings (Marková, 2005). This 
finding was not replicated in the FEP group, further supporting the notion that the two 
conditions have different awareness profiles. 
12.4 GROUP COMPARISONS 
12.4.1 HEALTHY ADULTS AND PATIENTS WITH FEP AND DEPRESSION 
The first group comparison was made between healthy adults under the age of 60, 
depressed patients and FEP patients. FEP patients scored lower than depressed patients in 
BCIS self-reflection and self-certainty scores, leading to an overall lower cognitive insight 
score, supporting previous work indicating that depressed individuals have better insight 
than FEP patients (Colis et al., 2006). However, healthy adults had lower BCIS self-reflection 
scores than the FEP group, which led to a lower overcall cognitive insight score. There was 
also a significant difference between groups on the DEX measure, with depressed patients 
scoring higher than FEP. The healthy adults scored lowest on both measures of self-
awareness, possibly an artefact due to a lack of dysexecutive symptoms and thus no need to 
acknowledge them and other unusual behaviour, and no need to reflect on their cognitions, 
as they are “normal”. There were significant differences between the three groups on 
memory metacognitive efficiency, with healthy adults and depressed individuals scoring 
similarly and close to the “ideal observer” score, whereas the FEP patients performed 
significantly worse overall despite no difference in task performance between the groups, 
indicating this group suffers from deficits in metacognition.  
12.4.2 HEALTHY ADULTS AND PATIENTS WITH ED 
There was no significant difference between healthy older adults over the age of 60 
and ED patient groups on awareness measures or metacognitive efficiency. This may suggest 
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that self-awareness and metacognition are spared in earlier stages of dementia and 
deteriorate at a similar rate to healthy ageing. Similarly it may suggest that some of the 
healthy older adult group were experiencing a degree of cognitive impairment that has yet 
to be diagnosed and thus the group spans older age and MCI abilities, and the large range of 
inclusion in the ED group (MCI and some early stage AD) may have resulted in the two 
groups’ cognitive abilities overlapping and thus no difference coming out. However a 
comparison of memory and executive function scores between groups indicated there was a 
significant difference, so the former explanation (sparing of metacognition in ED)  is more 
likely. 
12.4.3 PATIENTS WITH FEP AND ED 
Finally, the two patient groups were compared. The two groups differed in their 
awareness ratings, with FEP patients scoring higher on BCIS self-reflectiveness, DEX self-
report and SAI-E scales. These results therefore suggest that ED patients have a worse self-
report awareness profiles than FEP patients, which supports previous evidence (Gilleen, et 
al., 2009). However there was no difference between groups on their self-certainty ratings, 
indicating that neither group is more “overconfident” regarding their self-beliefs. There were 
no differences between the groups in their metacognitive efficiency, despite a significant 
difference in age. This therefore suggests that there is a greater degradation in 
metacognitive efficiency for FEP patients relative to their age compared to ED, who score 
comparably with their healthy age matched counterparts. One may therefore conclude that,  
though ED patients appear to be less accurate with their self-reported awareness using 
questionnaires, FEP patients are worse at judging performance on objective task 
performance. This finding leads to the conclusion that though both patient groups suffer 
from problems with their self-awareness, the degree to which domains are affected differs 
across diagnoses. This suggests that there are a number of processes mediating 
metacognition and self-awareness in the healthy population, and the different profiles of 
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reduced awareness noted in these patient populations are related to deficits in different 
mediating processes.  
12.5 NEURAL CORRELATES 
In addition to extensive analysis of behavioural measures, this study carried out a 
pilot imaging study to investigate the neural correlates of metacognitive efficiency and 
cognitive insight in patients with ED.  
The present results indicated that the ACC, which has previously been associated 
with self-evaluation and monitoring mental activities in healthy adults and awareness of 
cognitive deficits in patients with dementia (Cosentino, 2014; Ries et al., 2012; Saxe & Offen, 
2010), was associated with memory metacognitive efficiency. However, because of the small 
sample size, results from uncorrected image analyses reported can only be considered 
exploratory. This region of gray matter has previously been associated with accelerated 
volumetric reduction in patients with MCI compared to normal ageing (Driscoll et al., 2009), 
and thus its atrophy may be the substrate of poor awareness in ED patients. However, 
behaviourally there was no difference between older adults and ED patients, suggesting that 
imaging studies may hold more power to detect initial and subtle neurodegenerative 
changes than cognitive testing.  Results also indicated that the volume of the right post-
central gyrus, part of the parietal lobe, was also associated with memory metacognitive 
efficiency, which mirrors previous findings from dementia, stroke and lesion studies 
(Cosentino & Stern, 2005). 
A number of frontal areas adjacent to the BA10 area of the aPFC were associated 
with cognitive insight, where BCIS self-reflection was positively associated with volume of 
the inferior frontal gyrus, and self-certainty was negatively associated with the middle 
frontal gyrus. These areas have previously been linked to mediation of metacognitive ability 
in healthy adults (Fleming et al., 2014; McCurdy et al., 2013), and lesions in this area lead to 
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inferior performance on computerised metacognitive tasks (Fleming et al., 2014), and 
reduced illness- and self-awareness as associated with reduced gray matter in this region 
(Cosentino, 2014; Ries et al., 2012). Results therefore further support the suggestion that 
the aPFC is the main region supporting human self-reflection and introspection (Baird et al., 
2013). 
A significant correlate of both self-certainty and metacognitive efficiency was 
volume of areas in the cortical midline structures (CMS), specifically areas adjacent to the 
anterior cingulate, which has also been consistently associated with metacognitive processes 
in healthy and patient populations (Ries et al., 2012) and confidence judgements and error 
detection in healthy adults (Yeung & Summerfield, 2014) and self-reflection (Northoff et al., 
2006). As there are a number of frontal and cortical midline structures associated with both 
metacognitive efficiency and cognitive insight, larger sample sizes may therefore reveal an 
association between the behavioural measures. 
 Further, activation in vlPFC and CMS has been associated with self-reflection in 
patients with schizophrenia (Orfei, 2013; Pu, 2013; Buchy, 2014), indicating that the two 
patient groups may suffer from problems that arise from deficits in similar neural regions, 
despite having different awareness profiles. 
Analysis of structural correlates in ED patients has therefore indicated that cognitive 
insight and memory metacognitive efficiency have structural overlaps in the midline and 
prefrontal regions. This overlap indicates that the concepts have a similar neural basis, but 
may be behaviourally distinct due to different methods of measurement. 
12.6 CONCLUSIONS 
These studies provide novel evidence about metacognitive processes in healthy and 
clinical populations. In healthy adults there was an association between low mood and 
metacognitive efficiency in both the memory and perceptual domains, implicating the effect 
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of cognitive symptoms of depression in better self-appraisal. This also indicates that self-
awareness is not uniquely mediated by mood in clinical syndromes. Results have also 
provided additional evidence to implicate the negative impact of ageing on metacognitive 
efficiency, and the positive association between different domains of metacognitive 
efficiency, implicating the need for ‘other’ ratings when older adults are making self-
appraisals about their functioning in certain situations. A negative association was found 
between BCIS self-reflection and memory metacognitive efficiency, as well as an association 
with discrepancy scores on the DEX. A gender effect was found to mediate the association 
between scores of cognitive insight and perceptual metacognitive efficiency, which requires 
further study. These results suggest that, in healthy adults, there is an association between 
different domains and methods of measuring self-awareness.  
Though the conclusions drawn from clinical data are not as firm as those drawn from 
the healthy population, this study has provided novel evidence in the field of experimentally 
controlled self-awareness measures in both FEP and ED groups. FEP patients demonstrated 
an association between memory metacognitive efficiency and both executive function and 
memory scores, however this was not the case in ED. Neither group demonstrated a 
significant effect of mood on either domain of metacognitive efficiency. Preliminary findings 
from ED patients suggest that there is a positive relationship between perceptual 
metacognitive efficiency and BCIS self-reflection, indicating that different methods of self-
reporting awareness of cognition are, at least in part, related in clinical populations. There 
was also an association between memory metacognitive efficiency and scores on the 
dysexecutive questionnaire as reported by a significant other, indicating that when assessing 
objective functioning and behaviour, perhaps a reliable ‘other’ is a more appropriate source 
of information in clinical groups. However the results do indicate that a brief computerised 
test would not necessarily be suitable as an objective substitute for clinician or ‘other’ rated 
measures of awareness in a clinical setting. 
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The comparison of healthy and clinical groups revealed interesting results on 
awareness profiles. In the younger groups, there was a clear difference between FEP 
patients and both depressed and non-depressed adult controls in their memory 
metacognitive efficiency, where the FEP group were significantly worse at rating their own 
performance, despite no difference in actual memory task performance. Healthy adults 
appeared to have a similar level of overall cognitive insight to FEP patients, however the FEP 
group scored higher on the BCIS self-reflection scale, which was potentially mediated by 
their higher levels of reported depression, indicating that it may not be possible to 
differentiate between patients and healthy adults using this scale. 
 There was no difference between the older adults and ED groups in their memory 
metacognitive efficiency, implicating a preservation of metacognitive efficiency for task 
performance in the earlier stages of dementia. Further, there was no difference between the 
two patient groups on this task, despite a large age difference, indicating that metacognitive 
efficiency for task performance is relatively more affected in patients with FEP than ED. 
Conversely, patients with ED were worse at rating their cognitive and behavioural deficits 
compared to those with FEP, indicating different deficits in self-awareness across diagnoses.  
Finally, a pilot MRI study in the ED group indicated that volume of the anterior 
cingulate and right parietal lobe were positively associated with memory metacognitive 
efficiency. There were some volumetric correlations with cognitive insight that overlapped 
with areas associated with metacognitive efficiency, where self-certainty was also associated 
with anterior cingulate volume. This finding implicates a neural basis for confidence in ones 
cognitions.  Further, prefrontal cortex volume was associated with the BCIS sub-scales; 
positively with self-reflection and negatively with self-certainty, implying that, though the 
two measures are associated, it is in a negative direction. This region of the brain has 
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consistently been associated with metacognitive efficiency in domains other than memory; 
further implicating the two types of self-awareness are associated, at least on a neural level.  
In summary, this thesis has demonstrated that metacognition is a multifaceted 
concept that modulates our self-appraisal at a number of levels. Structural imaging findings 
support previous work, suggesting that areas of the pre-frontal cortex govern this basic 
process and are associated with various forms of metacognition identified in the healthy and 
clinical literature. However, behavioural evidence suggests the relationship is not so clear-
cut at a higher cognitive processing level, where the different methods of measuring 
metacognitive processes become more distinct. This is clear from the observation that 
different neurocognitive processes, such as memory and executive function, have variable 
effects on these behaviourally distinct concepts of metacognition. Persistent negative mood 
states, on the other hand, appear to have a more consistent effect on both clinical and 
cognitive aspects of metacognition, where lower mood tends to lead to significantly 
improved self-awareness in healthy adults, and at trend levels in patients. The differential 
behavioural association between clinical awareness and more objective measures of 
metacognitive efficiency across populations in this thesis indicates that the umbrella term 
“metacognition” refers to a number of associated cognitive concepts, but this term should 
be used with caution in a clinical setting unless stating the context in which it is being used. 
Further, this suggests that metacognitive training needs to be tailored to the specific type of 
metacognition that requires improvement to see meaningful changes in awareness.  
12.7 LIMITATIONS 
The main limitation of this study was the low number of patients included in the 
analyses. Initially it was estimated that a suitable sample size for each group would be 30 
participants. That said, those patients that were recruited showed a good range of 
performance on most of the tasks and scale allowing some cautious conclusions to be 
drawn. Sample size was a limitation for both behavioural and MRI studies.   
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There were 3 different insight measures used in the behavioural studies (BCIS, SAI-E 
and DEX), two of which were originally designed for use with patients with schizophrenia 
(BCIS and SAI-E), and one was originally designed for use with MCI and AD patients (DEX). 
Though all measures have been used in more than one clinical population, and the DEX and 
BCIS are suitable for use in the healthy population (Buchy, Brodeur, & Lepage, 2012), it 
should be acknowledged that there may be some limitations to the conclusions drawn 
regarding their associations in different groups. Regarding the BCIS, both healthy controls 
and ED patients may have found some questions harder to understand, such as those 
referring to “unusual experiences” (3. Other people can understand the cause of my unusual 
experience better than I can; 5. Some of my experiences that have seemed very real may 
have been down to my imagination; 15. My unusual experiences may be due to my being 
extremely upset or stressed.) Though not all participants queried these items, there were a 
few for whom these questions required further explanation before they could answer them 
appropriately. This should be taken into account when interpreting results comparing results 
across groups.  
The use of the WMS raw scores instead of the age adjusted scaled scores may have 
inflated the difference between groups on their memory ability, as mentioned in Chapter 5. 
However, the only between groups difference on memory ability identified was that 
between ED and healthy older adults, which was to be expected as both MCI and AD 
patients are diagnosed using the MMSE, which is partially dependent on memory ability. 
Patients in the ED group were all recruited from the same community patient 
sample, and all met the same inclusion criteria, however of the 18 included there was a mix 
of diagnoses, where most had a diagnosis of MCI (12) and a smaller number had a diagnosis 
of early stage AD (6). The current sample was chosen to ensure that there was a 
heterogeneity regarding cognitive function, and that the sample was not too impaired when 
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compared to the older adult sample. MCI, in many cases, is seen as a prodromal phase of 
AD, and a diagnosis is considered a risk factor making patients up to four times more likely 
to later transition into AD (de Bruijn et al., 2014).  
 
 
12.8 FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
This thesis included a number of studies testing new hypotheses, which were 
partially confirmed. Larger sample sizes would be useful to test whether results that 
approached significance reached the threshold in a sample that had more power. 
Other interesting avenues of investigation would be to assess metacognitive 
efficiency before and after metacognitive and insight interventions in patients, to see if 
efficiency can benefit from CBT-like therapy, and whether interventions are targeting the 
type of metacognitive process indented. 
Further, a longitudinal study to measure the decline of metacognitive efficiency over 
time after diagnosis in an ED population would indicate at which point metacognitive 
efficiency is compromised during the course of dementia-related cognitive decline. As 
mentioned in chapter 8, the inclusion of patients with later stage dementia would also be of 
interest to investigate the relationship between MMSE and cognitive profile is associated 
with dementia on a broader diagnostic spectrum.  
Evidence from the pilot imaging study suggests that there may be similar neural 
correlates and deficiencies of self-reflection and metacognitive efficiency in both ED and FEP 
patients. A study comparing the two populations and their neural correlates relating to both 
experimental and clinical measures of metacognition would be a useful addition to the 
literature. Functional imaging could also be utilised to investigate if there is also atypical 
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activations in the regions of interest, such as the aPFC, associated with self-reflection and 
metacognitive efficiency. 
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APPENDIX 
5.1 MEMORY METACOGNITION WORD LISTS 
Words used in the memory metacognition task come from a randomly chosen list of 
50 words (listed below). Three are chosen at random by the program for the ‘learning’ phase 
of the task. In each of the three test phases, one “learned/old” word is presented alongside 
a “new” word, taken from a new, randomly selected, list of words. 
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SWEAT ANIMAL BUTTON SUGAR THIEF SHRUB 
CHAIR BREAST SLOPE TUNE YAWN DAYLIGHT 
ROCK TULIP ESSAY LENS TABLE CORD 
SOAP WEAPON STAR SNAP BANANA PAINT 
HEAD TUCK SKIRT TREE MINE BATH 
POLLEN GLASS FROG SUNBURN ALERT GARLIC 
BATTLE HERB TRASH SNOW TALK UNIFORM 
ARMOUR FLOOD HARP SUITE FEAST FIGHT 
HORN SALARY COLD TENNIS LIGHT SALT 
WHEEL CHAIN HOLIDAY JELLY HIND BLUSH 
HAIL RABBIT SOCK TORTURE FROST STREET 
FOOTBALL CHEEK MOUNTAIN CELL SLIP STEAM 
HEEL BACK CRAWL SMOKE SNEEZE DANCER 
TEETH CLOCK COCKTAIL ROAD MONKEY SKIN 
RULER WHITE FLAG HUSBAND FRONT MOUSE 
WOUND CEMENT STUDENT ENTRANCE FIRE SKUNK 
BANKER SWEEP HUNTER SHOOT SEED DAMAGE 
FLOCK MESSAGE SHEEP ADULT SHADOW OCEAN 
PHONE SUNLIGHT LINE BEDROOM SPICE PEDAL 
JUICE FACTORY PRIZE GASP BEAN WATCH 
FAINT PANTS ACCIDENT PEACH CHIEF GOLF 
SOFT ROLL HALL DOOR ITCH FLAME 
PRINCESS EVENING MILK BLOOD AUNT NECK 
COUSIN SANDAL LIZARD OLIVE SCISSORS STOMACH 
LAUGH WIRE TENT FLOAT LIVER GUIDE 
MASH ENVELOPE PARCEL FILM MARCH COFFEE 
CONE SHORE CATTLE SWIM BUBBLE BADGE 
ROOT SNORT SPEECH CABINET MOON MUSIC 
BROTHER POCKET SNAKE WHISTLE SWARM TOUCH 
PRISONER TEXT DUMMY TOBACCO COVER FABRIC 
DESK ANCHOR TWIST BOSS CHILDREN SHOVEL 
INFANT GRAVY VEHICLE SPOON CARD WIZARD 
THORN DRILL COMFORT WINK WHISPER GRAVE 
MORNING KNEE SPOOK CHICKEN CABLE SLAVE 
BULLET MATCH STATE SOUND HAIR BURN 
HOOK ECHO BRAIN CRANK SUIT CITY 
ROOM JUDGE HERO PUPIL MARKET TRUCK 
FLUTE TANK SLICE MAGNET RUBBER ELEPHANT 
SOIL DIVE STALK GLARE GIFT WALK 
BOARD PLAIN FILE DRUG HOWL EDGE 
SISTER BOMB BASKET SKATE BRAKE FOREHEAD 
KITE POSTER HOSE WORM WOOD MIRROR 
PORCH SHIELD KISS FEVER UMPIRE DRUM 
FLUSH WORLD ACHE SCENT HOUSE INSECT 
PEST ONION BLANKET CIGAR PEOPLE PAINTER 
SPARK BLUE LETTER DRINK KNOB BEER 
SUDS ZIPPER SUNSET PREY SPRINT FISH 
PUPPY POETRY POLE BUCKLE DUCK DIAMOND 
BOOK THUNDER MEAL TEAM CUCUMBER KNIFE 
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ENEMY HONEY STOVE FOOT BIRD WHEAT 
DATE ROCKET STAIN SPIDER DEEP PORK 
PILLOW CANDLE TWIG LOBBY BROOM MOSS 
DIRT FRAME HELMET PASTURE SOUP LAMP 
BASEMENT DRAW GRAPH DINNER STRING STICK 
PEAR VASE ORANGE MOTH WORKER CITIZEN 
SHOE MOVIE STONE COUNTRY CLAW SPRAY 
CABBAGE TOAD PILL MAIL SHOWER TOMB 
FROWN APPLE ROBBER MUCUS CLOWN FIREWOOD 
DRESS OFFICE WAIST SHOUT SEAT BUMP 
SHIP BEAST LUNG ROPE NEST STABLE 
KNIGHT HAND HOTEL TRIANGLE SMELL THUMB 
CLOTHING STRAW MOLE EAGLE PUDDLE DOVE 
WING SLEEVE BRICK GATE HOCKEY JEWEL 
FLESH MOTHER WORK CROSS DEER HAZE 
OWNER DISPLAY POTATO MACHINE WITCH FAIR 
POOL COIN BUCKET RECORD RADIO POND 
RIDDLE TEACHER BRANCH NAVY SCHOOL SILVER 
BALL SCRATCH HERRING WATER STEEL REPORT 
BRIDGE SOFA DAIRY LESSON LAUGHTER TRAIN 
CURVE HORSE CROW HEART SONG BUTTER 
UMBRELLA CANAL DOLLAR NAME NEEDLE CHEST 
OBJECT TOMATO FOOTSTEP RICE CLUB NECKLACE 
CORK HAMMER GREEN SMALL SPRING GRIP 
STORY ROUGH CLOUD CAMEL TAIL PEARL 
CRAB NOODLE DOCTOR STEP PIMPLE DAWN 
FENCE FOREST GRATE GLUTTON GOWN CAVE 
CHALK VILLAGE PIANIST ROAR BEAR BOIL 
WRAP MEDICINE PENCIL FATHER LAWN SHOP 
MATTRESS COSTUME CLARINET RING MIST GIANT 
ROSE WITNESS STING BISCUIT POINT GOLD 
WALLET FUSE TUMBLE LIMB HEAT TOWER 
UNCLE THREE MAZE STORM ROUND VEIL 
DRAIN COACH TOOL CIRCLE BOWL SHEET 
TOOTH FEET LEATHER WOMB GORILLA NATURE 
GLOVE COUCH OYSTER TOWN SALAD BLOUSE 
ELBOW CORNER STAIR WHIP FRICTION LOCKER 
CAGE SHIRT DRIVER TROLLEY GALLERY RIVER 
TRAVEL GOAL SLIDE PONY PUDDING FERRY 
STEAK FLEA SEWER THREAD BIRTH FOAM 
HOOD HOOF POPE TIGER LANTERN PORTRAIT 
TUNNEL STAND SEAL ISLAND MALE MAGAZINE 
BOAT GANG BASIN GIRL LIBRARY FRIEND 
EARTH ANGLE MATERIAL BOTTLE PILE SINGER 
FLOOR LINKS PURSE LAND HOSPITAL ATOM 
BERRY POISON BONE IRON HUNGER VISITOR 
SPIKE FLOWER SPONGE CROWN FOREARM OFFICER 
BALLOON CURFEW WOOL SHOULDER ARMY FOIL 
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TOURIST SUBJECT WOMAN CLAY LEAF WHALE 
SWEET PLATE TRIP KICK CHAMPION SHIVER 
BODY LINK NAIL CONCRETE BOUNDARY PARTY 
TEAR WALRUS BREATH CARROT THROAT BENCH 
COTTAGE WRITING BOOT RENT LAMB SEASON 
COMPANY BUSH PACKAGE MATE DISEASE SLIT 
SCALE LIAR CART FARM GROUP BLISTER 
NATION HOME REBEL AVENUE JAIL TUBE 
KITTEN DIAL OUTFIT SNAIL LABOUR BLOSSOM 
LAKE PICK SHOW CASE BRAT LECTURE 
JUMP RAID TRIAL PUZZLE LETTUCE TRUNK 
NAPKIN CREAM WHIRL DIET TIRE CHOP 
SHRIEK SCAR ENGINE WALL FACE LILY 
BUNCH DRIZZLE PLANET CLOTH DENTIST ALLEY 
TURTLE CREW GRIZZLY SORE CANE PAPER 
POLO LAWYER BRASS CARPET TAPE VOLCANO 
HIDE SILK CUSTOMER COLUMN WINTER LAUNDRY 
CAMP BEAM ARTICLE MEDAL DANCE LOOP 
GROUND TASTE HAWK BEAVER LEAK BEGGAR 
SKETCH CURB SPEAR JACKET SQUIRREL BLONDE 
PASTE SEAM MISSILE VEAL MOUTH VINE 
LORD WINDOW TOILET LIQUID SWORD THROW 
CORE VOICE CHERRY BEETLE HARE PRISON 
LOOT PUNCH WIFE LEADER RACE CREATURE 
CIRCUS CROWD FOUNTAIN SHELL TICKET PIANO 
PASSAGE NOTE STUMBLE WIND VIOLIN ALCOHOL 
CHANNEL STAFF LEAD AUTHOR PRINCE WASH 
PARTNER MONEY BORDER ANKLE CANDY GLITTER 
WOLF SHARK DUSK DESIGN WASTE SUNSHINE 
NURSE COURT PEEL SIGN CEREAL QUEEN 
GRAPE TIDE TEST FLAVOUR SAUCE FALL 
SELF ROOF PLUG DART PIPE BARN 
MURDER STATUE SQUINT ENGINEER YOUTH PEPPER 
CHILD MOISTURE COTTON BANK CORN TRACK 
LEMON BELLY DISASTER ARTIST BEACH HILL 
WAVE SLEEP CAKE BAND PLANK DOLL 
SKULL JOURNAL SQUARE WELL BLIND STORE 
POST BREAD BELT POET MUSTARD GOAT 
INJURY CEILING OVEN NERVE SLAP POWDER 
COLLAR GLOBE LION LOCK KNUCKLE COAT 
TRAIL FLASH BEEF LOBSTER PARK FORK 
SLIME BRUSH KETTLE CHIN COAST SIGNAL 
GRASS CALF SPINACH BLOCK LADY PLAY 
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RIFLE ARROW MANSION NIGHT WHISKER PICTURE 
FOOD CASH DUST HOLE PHYSICS RIBBON 
SCREAM SOCCER REPTILE SWAMP FRUIT HOBBY 
NEWS LIFT YOKE HUNT PUMP TRUMPET 
SOLE METAL CHURCH WIDOW MASTER SMILE 
SOLDIER BURIAL FANG SACK COOK WEATHER 
BARK POLL BOLT WINE SHOT TONGUE 
 
5.2 VISUAL ANALOGUE SCALE 
 
Please mark on the line how happy you are feeling right now: 
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5.3 BECK DEPRESSION INVENTORY - II 
 
Instructions: This questionnaire consists of 21 groups of statements. Please read each group 
of statements carefully, and then pick out one statement in each group that best describes 
the way you have been feeling during the past two weeks, including today. Circle the 
number beside the statement that you have picked. If several statements in the group seem 
to apply equally well, circle the highest number for that group. Be sure that you do not 
choose more than one statement for any group, including item 16 (changes in sleeping 
pattern) or item 18 (changes in appetite). 
 
 
 1.  Sadness 
0 I do not feel sad.  
1  I feel sad. 
2  I am sad all the time. 
3  I am so sad and unhappy that I can't stand it.  
 
2. Pessimism 
0  I am not discouraged about my future.  
1 I feel more discouraged about my future than I used to be.  
2  I do not expect things to work out for me.  
3  I feel my future is hopeless and will only get worse.  
 
3. Past Failure 
0  I do not feel like a failure.  
1  I feel I have failed more than I should have.  
2  As I look back, I see a lot of failures.  
3  I feel I am a total failure as a person.  
 
4. Loss of Pleasure 
 
0  I get as much pleasure as I ever did from the things I enjoy. 
1  I don't enjoy things the way I used to.  
2  I don't get very little pleasure from the things I used to enjoy.  
3  I can’t get any pleasure from the things I used to enjoy. 
 
5. Guilty Feelings 
0  I don't feel particularly guilty  
1  I feel guilty over many things I have done or should have done.  
2  I feel quite guilty most of the time.  
3  I feel guilty all of the time.  
 
6. Punishment feelings  
0  I don't feel I am being punished.  
1  I feel I may be punished.  
2  I expect to be punished.  
3  I feel I am being punished.  
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7. Self-Dislike 
0  I feel the same about myself as ever.  
1  I have lost confidence in myself.  
2  I am disappointed with myself.  
3  I dislike myself.  
 
8. Self-Criticalness 
0  I don't criticise or blame myself more than usual.  
1  I am more critical of myself than I used to be.  
2  I criticise myself for all my faults.  
3  I blame myself for everything bad that happens.  
 
9. Suicidal Thoughts or Wishes 
0  I don't have any thoughts of killing myself.  
1  I have thoughts of killing myself, but I would not carry them out.  
2  I would like to kill myself.  
3  I would kill myself if I had the chance.  
 
10. Crying  
0  I don't cry any more than usual.  
1  I cry more now than I used to.  
2  I cry over every little thing.  
3  I feel like crying, but I can’t.  
 
11. Agitation 
0 I am no more restless or wound up than usual. 
1 I feel more restless or wound up than usual. 
2 I am so restless or agitated that it’s hard to stay still. 
3 I am so restless or agitated that I have to keep moving or doing something. 
 
12. Loss of Interest 
0  I have not lost interest in other people or activities. 
1  I am less interested in other people or things than before.  
2  I have lost most of my interest in other people or things. 
3  It’s hard to get interested in anything. 
  
13. Indecisiveness 
0 I make decisions about as well as I ever could.  
1 I put off making decisions more than I used to.  
2 I have greater difficulty in making decisions more than I used to.  
3 I can't make decisions at all anymore.  
 
14. Worthlessness 
0  I don't feel I am worthless.  
1  I don’t consider myself as worthwhile and useful as I used to.  
2  I feel more worthless as compared to other people. 
3  I feel utterly worthless 
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15. Loss of Energy 
0  I have as much energy as ever.  
1  I have less energy than I used to.  
2  I don’t have enough energy to do very much.  
3  I don’t have enough energy to do anything. 
 
16. Changes in sleeping pattern 
0  I have not experiences any change in my sleeping pattern. 
1a I sleep somewhat more than usual. 
1b  I sleep somewhat less than usual.  
2a I sleep a lot more than usual. 
2b  I sleep a lot less than usual. 
3a I sleep most of the day. 
3b I wake up 1-2 hours early and can’t get back to sleep.   
 
17. Irritability 
0  I am no more irritable than usual.  
1  I am more irritable than usual.  
2  I am much more irritable than usual.  
3  I am irritable all the time.  
 
18. Changes in appetite  
0 I have not experiences any change in my appetite. 
1a My appetite is somewhat less than usual. 
1b  My appetite is somewhat greater than usual. 
2a My appetite is much less than usual. 
2b  My appetite is much greater than usual. 
3a I have no appetite at all. 
3b I crave food all the time.   
 
19. Concentration Difficulty 
0  I can concentrate as well as ever. 
I can’t concentrate as well as usual. 
It’s hard to keep me mind on anything for very long. 
I find I can’t concentrate on anything.  
20. Tiredness or Fatigue 
0  I am no more tired or fatigued than usual.  
I get more tired or fatigued more easily than usual. 
I am too tired and fatigued to do a lot of the things I used to do. 
I am too tired and fatigued to do most of the things I used to do. 
 
21. Loss of interest in Sex 
0 I have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex.  
1 I am less interested in sex than I used to be.  
2 I am much less interested in sex now. 
3 I have lost interest in sex completely. 
 
Total:  
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5.4 BECK COGNITIVE INSIGHT SCALE 
Instructions: This questionnaire consists of 15 statements. Please read each statement 
carefully, and then decide if you 1 - Do not agree at all, 2 - Agree slightly, 3 - Agree a lot or 4 - 
Agree completely. Circle the number under the statement that you have picked. Be sure that 
you do not choose more than one statement for any group. 
 
 Do not 
agree at all 
Agree 
slightly 
Agree a lot Agree 
completely 
1. At times, I have 
misunderstood other people’s 
attitudes towards me. 
1 2 3 4 
2. My interpretations of my 
experiences are definitely right. 
1 2 3 4 
3. Other people can understand 
the cause of my unusual 
experiences better than I can. 
1 2 3 4 
4. I have jumped to conclusions 
too fast. 
1 2 3 4 
5. Some of my experiences that 
have seemed very real may have 
been down to my imagination. 
1 2 3 4 
6. Some of the ideas I was 
certain were true turned out to 
be false. 
1 2 3 4 
7. If something feels right, it 
means it is right. 
1 2 3 4 
8. Even though I feel strongly 
that I am right, I could be wrong. 
1 2 3 4 
9. I know better than anyone 
else what my problems are. 
1 2 3 4 
10. When people disagree with 
me, they are generally wrong. 
1 2 3 4 
11. I cannot trust other people’s 
opinion about my experiences. 
1 2 3 4 
12. If somebody points out that 
my beliefs are wrong, I am 
willing to consider it. 
1 2 3 4 
13. I can trust my own 
judgement at all times. 
1 2 3 4 
14. There is often more than one 
possible explanation for why 
people act the way they do. 
1 2 3 4 
15. My unusual experiences may 
be due to my being extremely 
upset or stressed. 
1 2 3 4 
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5.5 DYSEXECUTIVE QUESTIONNAIRE 
Subject Rater 
 
This questionnaire looks at some of the difficulties that people sometimes experience. We 
would like you to read the following statements, and rate them on a five-point scale. Please 
read each statement carefully, and then decide how often this statement applies to you. 
Circle the number under the statement that you have picked. Be sure that you do not 
choose more than one statement for any group. 
 
1. I have problems understanding what other people mean unless they keep things 
simple and straightforward. 
0  1  2  3  4 
Never  Occasionally Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
 
2. I act without thinking, doing the first thing that comes to mind.  
0  1  2  3  4 
Never  Occasionally Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
 
3. Sometimes I talk about events or details that never actually happened, but I 
believe they happened.  
0  1  2  3  4 
Never  Occasionally Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
 
4. I have difficulty thinking or planning for the future.  
0  1  2  3  4 
Never  Occasionally Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
 
5. Sometimes I get over-excited about things and can be a bit ‘over the top’ at these 
times.  
0  1  2  3  4 
Never  Occasionally Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
 
6. I get events mixed up with each other, and get confused about the correct order of 
events.  
0  1  2  3  4 
Never  Occasionally Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
 
7. I have difficulty realising the extent of my problems and am unrealistic about the 
future.  
0  1  2  3  4 
Never  Occasionally Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
 
8. I am lethargic or unenthusiastic about things.  
0  1  2  3  4 




9. I do or say embarrassing things when in the company of others. 
0  1  2  3  4 
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Never  Occasionally Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
 
10. I really want to do something one minute, but couldn’t care less about it the next.  
0  1  2  3  4 
Never  Occasionally Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
 
11. I have difficulty showing emotion.  
0  1  2  3  4 
Never  Occasionally Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
 
12. I lose my temper at the slightest thing.  
0  1  2  3  4 
Never  Occasionally Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
 
13. I am unconcerned about how I should behave in certain situations.  
0  1  2  3  4 
Never  Occasionally Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
 
14. I find it hard to stop repeating saying or doing things once started.  
0  1  2  3  4 
Never  Occasionally Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
 
15. I tend to be very restless and ‘can’t sit still’ for any length of time.  
0  1  2  3  4 
Never  Occasionally Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
 
16. I find it difficult to stop doing something even if I know I shouldn’t.  
0  1  2  3  4 
Never  Occasionally Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
 
17. I will say one thing, but do something different.  
0  1  2  3  4 
Never  Occasionally Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
 
18. I find it difficult to keep my mind on something, and am easily distracted.  
0  1  2  3  4 
Never  Occasionally Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
19. I have trouble making decisions, or deciding what to do. 
0  1  2  3  4 
Never  Occasionally Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
20. I am unaware or unconcerned about how others feel about my behaviour.  
0  1  2  3  4 
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Independent Rater 
 
This questionnaire looks at some of the difficulties that people sometimes 
experience. We would like you to read the following statements, and rate them on a five-
point scale according to your experience of…………………………………..(subject). Please read each 
statement carefully. Circle the number under the statement that you have picked. Be sure 
that you do not choose more than one statement for any group. 
 
1. Has problems understanding what other people mean unless they keep things 
simple and straightforward. 
0  1  2  3  4 
Never  Occasionally Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
 
2. Acts without thinking, doing the first thing that comes to mind.  
0  1  2  3  4 
Never  Occasionally Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
 
3. Sometimes talks about events or details that never actually happened, but he/she 
believes they happened.  
0  1  2  3  4 
Never  Occasionally Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
 
4. Has difficulty thinking or planning for the future.  
0  1  2  3  4 
Never  Occasionally Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
 
5. Sometimes gets over-excited about things and can be a bit ‘over the top’ at these 
times.  
0  1  2  3  4 
Never  Occasionally Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
 
6. Gets events mixed up with each other, and get confused about the correct order of 
events.  
0  1  2  3  4 
Never  Occasionally Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
 
7. Has difficulty realising the extent of their problems and is unrealistic about the 
future.  
0  1  2  3  4 
Never  Occasionally Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
 
8. Seems lethargic or unenthusiastic about things.  
0  1  2  3  4 
Never  Occasionally Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
 
 
9. Does or says embarrassing things when in the company of others. 
0  1  2  3  4 
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Never  Occasionally Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
 
10. Really wants to do something one minute, but couldn’t care less about it the next.  
0  1  2  3  4 
Never  Occasionally Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
 
11. Has difficulty showing emotion.  
0  1  2  3  4 
Never  Occasionally Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
 
12. Loses his/her temper at the slightest thing.  
0  1  2  3  4 
Never  Occasionally Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
 
13. Is unconcerned about how he/she should behave in certain situations.  
0  1  2  3  4 
Never  Occasionally Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
 
14. Finds it hard to stop repeating saying or doing things once started.  
0  1  2  3  4 
Never  Occasionally Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
 
15. Tends to be very restless and ‘can’t sit still’ for any length of time.  
0  1  2  3  4 
Never  Occasionally Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
 
16. Finds it difficult to stop doing something even if he/she knows they shouldn’t.  
0  1  2  3  4 
Never  Occasionally Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
 
17. Will say one thing, but do something different.  
0  1  2  3  4 
Never  Occasionally Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
 
18. Finds it difficult to keep their mind on something, and is easily distracted.  
0  1  2  3  4 
Never  Occasionally Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
 
 
19. Has trouble making decisions, or deciding what to do. 
0  1  2  3  4 
Never  Occasionally Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
 
20. Is unaware or unconcerned about how others feel about his/her behaviour.  
0  1  2  3  4 
Never  Occasionally Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
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5.6 SCHEDULE FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF INSIGHT - EXTENDED 
 
 
Schedule for the Assessment of Insight  (SAI-E)    
        1 
Kemp and David, 1995. 
1. “Do you think you have been experiencing any emotional or psychological changes or 
difficulties?” 
 
often   (thought present most of the day, most days)      = 
 2 
  
sometimes  (thought present occasionally)       
  =  1 
  
never   (ask why doctors / others think so)       
   =  0 
  
 







2. “Do you think this means there is something wrong with you?”  (For example, a nervous 
condition).   If previous answer was “never” or “no”  ask ;  “If the doctor(s) and/or others think you have 
been experiencing emotional or psychological changes or difficulties do you think there must be 
something wrong with you even though you don’t feel it yourself?” 
 
 
often   (thought present most of the day, most days)       = 
 2 
  
sometimes  (thought present occasionally)       
  =  1 
  
never   (ask why doctors / others think so)      
    =  0 
  
 







3. “Do you think your condition amounts to a mental illness or mental disorder?” 
 
often   (thought present most of the day, most days)       = 
 2 
  
sometimes  (thought present occasionally)        
  =  1 
  
never   (ask why doctors / others think so)       
   =  0 
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4. “How do you explain your condition /disorder /illness?” 
 Reasonable account given based on plausible mechanisms  
(appropriate given social, cultural and educational background, 
e.g. excess stress, chemical imbalance, family history, etc.)        = 2 
  
 
  Confused account, or overheard explanation without adequate  
understanding or “don’t know”         
     = 1 
 
  
Delusional or bizarre explanation        
     = 0   
 




If positive score on items 1,2, and 3, proceed to 5, otherwise go to item 6. 
 
5. “Has your nervous/emotional /psychological /mental /psychiatric condition (use patient’s term) 
led to adverse consequences or problems in your life?   (For example, conflict with others, neglect, 
financial or accommodation difficulties,  irrational, impulsive or dangerous behaviour). 
 
Yes (with example)          
      = 2 
  
Unsure  (cannot give example or contradicts self)     =
 1 
  
No            
          = 0 
  
 






6. “Do you think your ... condition (use patient’s term) or the problem resulting from it warrants 
(needs) treatment?” 
 
Yes (with plausible reason)         
     = 2 
  
Unsure  (cannot give example or contradicts self)     =
 1 
  
No            
          = 0 
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7. Pick the most prominent symptoms up to a maximum of 4.  Then rate awareness of  each 
symptom out of 4 as below.   (Interviewer to assess which symptoms to rate from previous interviews 
e.g. highest scoring on BPRS and/or from patient’s current presentation). 
Examples: 
“Do you think that the belief ... is not real / not really happening (could you be imagining things)?” 
“Do you think the ‘voices’ you hear are actually real people talking, or is it something arising from your own 
mind?” 
“Have you been able to think clearly, or do your thoughts seem mixed up / confused?  Is your speech jumbled?” 
“Would you say you have been more agitated / overactive / speeded up / withdrawn than usual?” 
“Are you aware of any problem with attention / concentration / memory?” 
“Have you a problem with doing what you intend / getting  going / finishing tasks / motivation?” 
 
     Symptom 1 - type:       Symptom 2 - type:     




       
 
      rating  
 
               rating                 rating                 rating 
  
 
Definitely  (full awareness)         
 = 4 
 
Probably (moderate awareness)        = 3 
 Unsure  (sometimes yes, sometimes no)     = 2   mean 
 Possibly  (slight awareness)       
  = 1 
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8. For each symptom rated above (up to a maximum of 4), ask patient ...  “How do you explain ... 
(false beliefs, hearing voices, thoughts muddled, lack of drive etc.)?” 
  Symptom 1          Symptom 2    
         Symptom  3          
Symptom 4 
         
         
 
Part of my illness            
  = 4      
Due to nervous condition         
  = 3 
  mean 
 
Reaction to stress / fatigue         
  = 2 
  
Unsure, maybe one of the above        
 = 1 
  
Can’t say, or delusional / bizarre explanation     = 0 
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9. “How do you feel when people do not believe you? (when you talk about ... delusions or 
hallucinations).” 
 
That’s when I know I’m sick          
 =  4 
  
I wonder whether something’s wrong with me   =  3   
I’m confused and I don’t know what to think    = 2   
I’m still sure despite what others say       = 1   
They’re lying           
   = 0 
  
 







Please turn to page 8 after interview and fill in grid as appropriate. 
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Compliance to treatment/therapy/medication - patient’s primary nurse to rate following 
three items (A-C). 
A.  How does patient accept treatment (includes passive acceptance)? 
Often  (may rarely question need for treatment)       =
 2 
sometimes  (may occasionally question need for treatment)   = 1   
never   (ask why)         
        = 0 
  
 












B.  Does patient ask for treatment unprompted? 
Often   (excludes inappropriate request for medication etc.)   = 2 
 
Sometimes  (rate here if forgetfulness/disorganization leads to   = 1 
occasional requests only)         
        
   
   
  
Never (ask why doctors / others think so)         
 = 0 
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  C. Summary of compliance to treatment/therapy/medication. 
Complete refusal        
          
   
= 1 
 





Reluctant acceptance (accepting only because treatment is compulsory or 









Passive acceptance = 5  
   
 Moderate participation  (some knowledge of and interest in treatment and no 
prompting needed to take the drugs) 
    
= 6 
 







   
  
 




























 Patient Primary Nurse 
ID   
Date of interview   
Time started   
Time finished   
Rater ID   
   
 
Score summary 1.     
 
 2.    
 
 3.    
 
 4.    
 
 5.    
 
 6.    
     
 7.  (mean) 
 
 8.  (mean) 
 
 9.    
 
   
     Sub 
total 
   
 
 A.    
 
 B.   NB:  Item C is not combined with other scores 
 
   
   
    Total 
     
  Item 
C. 
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5.7 WECHSLER MEMORY SCALE 
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5.8 WECHSLER ADULT INTELLIGENCE SCALE -III 
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5.9 TRAIL MAKING TASK 
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5.10 BRIXTON TASK 
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5.10 VERBAL FLUENCY TASK 
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11.1 BATCH PROCESSING SCRIPT 
The following script was run in SPM-8 to run the pre-processing portion of the 
structural imaging analysis, as detailed in Chapter 11.1.2. 
************************* 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.tools.preproc8.channel.vols = { 
                                                  
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/co20130425_152055BRCAD3s003a1001.nii,1' 
                                                  
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/co20130718_161106BRCAD3s003a1001.nii,1' 
                                                  
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/co20130801_140532BRCAD3s003a1001.nii,1' 
                                                  
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/co20130808_151029BRCAD3s003a1001.nii,1' 
                                                  
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/co20131024_142557BRCAD3s003a1001.nii,1' 
                                                  
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/co20140109_145918BRCAD3s003a1001.nii,1' 
                                                  
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/co20140120_110543BRCAD3s003a1001.nii,1' 
                                                  
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/co20140210_111320BRCAD3s003a1001.nii,1' 
                                                  
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/co20140213_141135BRCAD3s003a1001.nii,1' 
                                                  
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/co20140428_110156BRCAD3s003a1001.nii,1' 
                                                  
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/co20140508_152233BRCAD3s003a1001A.nii,1' 
                                                  }; 
%% 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.tools.preproc8.channel.biasreg = 0.0001; 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.tools.preproc8.channel.biasfwhm = 60; 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.tools.preproc8.channel.write = [0 0]; 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.tools.preproc8.tissue(1).tpm = {'/cns_zfs/system/system_s9_sparc/spm/spm-
8/toolbox/Seg/TPM.nii,1'}; 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.tools.preproc8.tissue(1).ngaus = 2; 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.tools.preproc8.tissue(1).native = [1 1]; 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.tools.preproc8.tissue(1).warped = [0 0]; 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.tools.preproc8.tissue(2).tpm = {'/cns_zfs/system/system_s9_sparc/spm/spm-
8/toolbox/Seg/TPM.nii,2'}; 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.tools.preproc8.tissue(2).ngaus = 2; 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.tools.preproc8.tissue(2).native = [1 1]; 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.tools.preproc8.tissue(2).warped = [0 0]; 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.tools.preproc8.tissue(3).tpm = {'/cns_zfs/system/system_s9_sparc/spm/spm-
8/toolbox/Seg/TPM.nii,3'}; 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.tools.preproc8.tissue(3).ngaus = 2; 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.tools.preproc8.tissue(3).native = [1 0]; 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.tools.preproc8.tissue(3).warped = [0 0]; 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.tools.preproc8.tissue(4).tpm = {'/cns_zfs/system/system_s9_sparc/spm/spm-
8/toolbox/Seg/TPM.nii,4'}; 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.tools.preproc8.tissue(4).ngaus = 3; 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.tools.preproc8.tissue(4).native = [0 0]; 
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matlabbatch{1}.spm.tools.preproc8.tissue(4).warped = [0 0]; 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.tools.preproc8.tissue(5).tpm = {'/cns_zfs/system/system_s9_sparc/spm/spm-
8/toolbox/Seg/TPM.nii,5'}; 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.tools.preproc8.tissue(5).ngaus = 4; 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.tools.preproc8.tissue(5).native = [0 0]; 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.tools.preproc8.tissue(5).warped = [0 0]; 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.tools.preproc8.tissue(6).tpm = {'/cns_zfs/system/system_s9_sparc/spm/spm-
8/toolbox/Seg/TPM.nii,6'}; 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.tools.preproc8.tissue(6).ngaus = 2; 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.tools.preproc8.tissue(6).native = [0 0]; 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.tools.preproc8.tissue(6).warped = [0 0]; 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.tools.preproc8.warp.mrf = 0; 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.tools.preproc8.warp.reg = 4; 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.tools.preproc8.warp.affreg = 'mni'; 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.tools.preproc8.warp.samp = 3; 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.tools.preproc8.warp.write = [0 0]; 
%% 
matlabbatch{2}.spm.tools.dartel.warp.images = { 
                                               { 
                                               
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/rc1co20130425_152055BRCAD3s003a1001.nii,1' 
                                               
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/rc1co20130718_161106BRCAD3s003a1001.nii,1' 
                                               
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/rc1co20130801_140532BRCAD3s003a1001.nii,1' 
                                               
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/rc1co20130808_151029BRCAD3s003a1001.nii,1' 
                                               
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/rc1co20131024_142557BRCAD3s003a1001.nii,1' 
                                               
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/rc1co20140109_145918BRCAD3s003a1001.nii,1' 
                                               
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/rc1co20140120_110543BRCAD3s003a1001.nii,1' 
                                               
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/rc1co20140210_111320BRCAD3s003a1001.nii,1' 
                                               
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/rc1co20140213_141135BRCAD3s003a1001.nii,1' 
                                               
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/rc1co20140428_110156BRCAD3s003a1001.nii,1' 
                                               
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/rc1co20140508_152233BRCAD3s003a1001A.nii,1' 
                                               } 
                                               { 
                                               
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/rc2co20130425_152055BRCAD3s003a1001.nii,1' 
                                               
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/rc2co20130718_161106BRCAD3s003a1001.nii,1' 
                                               
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/rc2co20130801_140532BRCAD3s003a1001.nii,1' 
                                               
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/rc2co20130808_151029BRCAD3s003a1001.nii,1' 
                                               
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/rc2co20131024_142557BRCAD3s003a1001.nii,1' 
                                               
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/rc2co20140109_145918BRCAD3s003a1001.nii,1' 
                                               
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/rc2co20140120_110543BRCAD3s003a1001.nii,1' 
- 292 - 
                                               
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/rc2co20140210_111320BRCAD3s003a1001.nii,1' 
                                               
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/rc2co20140213_141135BRCAD3s003a1001.nii,1' 
                                               
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/rc2co20140428_110156BRCAD3s003a1001.nii,1' 
                                               
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/rc2co20140508_152233BRCAD3s003a1001A.nii,1' 
                                               } 
                                               }'; 
%% 
matlabbatch{2}.spm.tools.dartel.warp.settings.template = 'Template'; 
matlabbatch{2}.spm.tools.dartel.warp.settings.rform = 0; 
matlabbatch{2}.spm.tools.dartel.warp.settings.param(1).its = 3; 
matlabbatch{2}.spm.tools.dartel.warp.settings.param(1).rparam = [4 2 1e-06]; 
matlabbatch{2}.spm.tools.dartel.warp.settings.param(1).K = 0; 
matlabbatch{2}.spm.tools.dartel.warp.settings.param(1).slam = 16; 
matlabbatch{2}.spm.tools.dartel.warp.settings.param(2).its = 3; 
matlabbatch{2}.spm.tools.dartel.warp.settings.param(2).rparam = [2 1 1e-06]; 
matlabbatch{2}.spm.tools.dartel.warp.settings.param(2).K = 0; 
matlabbatch{2}.spm.tools.dartel.warp.settings.param(2).slam = 8; 
matlabbatch{2}.spm.tools.dartel.warp.settings.param(3).its = 3; 
matlabbatch{2}.spm.tools.dartel.warp.settings.param(3).rparam = [1 0.5 1e-06]; 
matlabbatch{2}.spm.tools.dartel.warp.settings.param(3).K = 1; 
matlabbatch{2}.spm.tools.dartel.warp.settings.param(3).slam = 4; 
matlabbatch{2}.spm.tools.dartel.warp.settings.param(4).its = 3; 
matlabbatch{2}.spm.tools.dartel.warp.settings.param(4).rparam = [0.5 0.25 1e-06]; 
matlabbatch{2}.spm.tools.dartel.warp.settings.param(4).K = 2; 
matlabbatch{2}.spm.tools.dartel.warp.settings.param(4).slam = 2; 
matlabbatch{2}.spm.tools.dartel.warp.settings.param(5).its = 3; 
matlabbatch{2}.spm.tools.dartel.warp.settings.param(5).rparam = [0.25 0.125 1e-06]; 
matlabbatch{2}.spm.tools.dartel.warp.settings.param(5).K = 4; 
matlabbatch{2}.spm.tools.dartel.warp.settings.param(5).slam = 1; 
matlabbatch{2}.spm.tools.dartel.warp.settings.param(6).its = 3; 
matlabbatch{2}.spm.tools.dartel.warp.settings.param(6).rparam = [0.25 0.125 1e-06]; 
matlabbatch{2}.spm.tools.dartel.warp.settings.param(6).K = 6; 
matlabbatch{2}.spm.tools.dartel.warp.settings.param(6).slam = 0.5; 
matlabbatch{2}.spm.tools.dartel.warp.settings.optim.lmreg = 0.01; 
matlabbatch{2}.spm.tools.dartel.warp.settings.optim.cyc = 3; 




matlabbatch{3}.spm.tools.dartel.mni_norm.data.subjs.flowfields = { 
                                                                  
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/u_rc1co20130425_152055BRCAD3s003a1001_Template.nii' 
                                                                  
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/u_rc1co20130718_161106BRCAD3s003a1001_Template.nii' 
                                                                  
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/u_rc1co20130801_140532BRCAD3s003a1001_Template.nii' 
                                                                  
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/u_rc1co20130808_151029BRCAD3s003a1001_Template.nii' 
                                                                  
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/u_rc1co20131024_142557BRCAD3s003a1001_Template.nii' 
                                                                  
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/u_rc1co20140109_145918BRCAD3s003a1001_Template.nii' 
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'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/u_rc1co20140120_110543BRCAD3s003a1001_Template.nii' 
                                                                  
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/u_rc1co20140210_111320BRCAD3s003a1001_Template.nii' 
                                                                  
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/u_rc1co20140213_141135BRCAD3s003a1001_Template.nii' 
                                                                  
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/u_rc1co20140428_110156BRCAD3s003a1001_Template.nii' 
                                                                  
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/u_rc1co20140508_152233BRCAD3s003a1001A_Template.nii' 
                                                                  }; 
%% 
%% 
matlabbatch{3}.spm.tools.dartel.mni_norm.data.subjs.images = { 
                                                              { 
                                                              
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/c1co20130425_152055BRCAD3s003a1001.nii' 
                                                              
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/c1co20130718_161106BRCAD3s003a1001.nii' 
                                                              
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/c1co20130801_140532BRCAD3s003a1001.nii' 
                                                              
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/c1co20130808_151029BRCAD3s003a1001.nii' 
                                                              
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/c1co20131024_142557BRCAD3s003a1001.nii' 
                                                              
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/c1co20140109_145918BRCAD3s003a1001.nii' 
                                                              
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/c1co20140120_110543BRCAD3s003a1001.nii' 
                                                              
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/c1co20140210_111320BRCAD3s003a1001.nii' 
                                                              
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/c1co20140213_141135BRCAD3s003a1001.nii' 
                                                              
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/c1co20140428_110156BRCAD3s003a1001.nii' 
                                                              
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/c1co20140508_152233BRCAD3s003a1001A.nii' 
                                                              } 
                                                              }'; 
%% 
matlabbatch{3}.spm.tools.dartel.mni_norm.vox = [NaN NaN NaN]; 
matlabbatch{3}.spm.tools.dartel.mni_norm.bb = [NaN NaN NaN 
                                               NaN NaN NaN]; 
matlabbatch{3}.spm.tools.dartel.mni_norm.preserve = 1; 
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11.2 TOTAL INTRACRANIAL VOLUME CALCULATION SCRIPT 
The following script was run in SPM-8 to calculate the Total Intracranial Volume (TIV) 
of each individual MR scan, as detailed in Chapter 11.1.3. ‘Image’ denotes the scans of 
interest, in this case the scans of our 11 (metacognitive study) or 15 (BCIS study) patients. 
This code was run three times to calculate the volume of segmented gray matter, white 
matter and CSF files. The totals were then summed to produce individual TIVs. 
************************* 
V = spm_vol(spm_select(Inf,'Image')); 
Vols = zeros(numel(V),1); 
for j=1:numel(V), 
    tot = 0; 
    for i=1:V(1).dim(3), 
            img = spm_slice_vol(V(j),spm_matrix(... 
                  [0 0 i]),V(j).dim(1:2),0); 
            img = img(isfinite(img)); % <-- exclude non-finite values 
            tot = tot + sum(img(:)); 
    end; 
    voxvol = abs(det(V(j).mat))/100^3; % volume of a voxel, in litres 
    Vols(j) = tot*voxvol; 
end 
************************* 
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11.3 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
The following script was run in SPM-8 to carry out the multiple regression analysis, 
designed to investigate the relationship between brain structure and memory metacognitive 
efficiency. 
************************* 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.stats.factorial_design.dir = {'/home/k1191125/aPhD/Results/'}; 
%% 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.stats.factorial_design.des.mreg.scans = { 
                                                            
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/smwc1co20130425_152055BRCAD3s003a1001.nii,1' 
                                                            
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/smwc1co20130718_161106BRCAD3s003a1001.nii,1' 
                                                            
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/smwc1co20130801_140532BRCAD3s003a1001.nii,1' 
                                                            
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/smwc1co20130808_151029BRCAD3s003a1001.nii,1' 
                                                            
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/smwc1co20131024_142557BRCAD3s003a1001.nii,1' 
                                                            
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/smwc1co20140109_145918BRCAD3s003a1001.nii,1' 
                                                            
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/smwc1co20140120_110543BRCAD3s003a1001.nii,1' 
                                                            
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/smwc1co20140210_111320BRCAD3s003a1001.nii,1' 
                                                            
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/smwc1co20140213_141135BRCAD3s003a1001.nii,1' 
                                                            
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/smwc1co20140428_110156BRCAD3s003a1001.nii,1' 
                                                            
'/home/k1191125/aPhD/allNIfTI/smwc1co20140508_152233BRCAD3s003a1001A.nii,1' 
                                                            }; 
%% 
%% 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.stats.factorial_design.des.mreg.mcov(1).c = [-0.428847056 
                                                                -0.473994666 
                                                                0.882228955 
                                                                0.385183338 
                                                                0.84786824 
                                                                2.026132448 
                                                                -0.21836638 
                                                                1.030925043 
                                                                1.008204452 
                                                                0.568156738 
                                                                1.086397632]; 
%% 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.stats.factorial_design.des.mreg.mcov(1).cname = 'MetaD'; 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.stats.factorial_design.des.mreg.mcov(1).iCC = 5; 
%% 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.stats.factorial_design.des.mreg.mcov(2).c = [83 
                                                                78 
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                                                                62 
                                                                75 
                                                                85 
                                                                75 
                                                                89 
                                                                73 
                                                                77 
                                                                85 
                                                                72]; 
%% 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.stats.factorial_design.des.mreg.mcov(2).cname = 'Age'; 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.stats.factorial_design.des.mreg.mcov(2).iCC = 5; 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.stats.factorial_design.des.mreg.incint = 1; 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.stats.factorial_design.cov = struct('c', {}, 'cname', {}, 'iCFI', {}, 'iCC', {}); 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.stats.factorial_design.masking.tm.tma.athresh = 0.2; 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.stats.factorial_design.masking.im = 1; 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.stats.factorial_design.masking.em = {''}; 
%% 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.stats.factorial_design.globalc.g_user.global_uval = [1.55684867185684 
                                                                        1.67147945387115 
                                                                        1.27387874635969 
                                                                        1.63284839766178 
                                                                        1.64284727043351 
                                                                        1.36569485700055 
                                                                        1.6436866321893 
                                                                        1.64311831687576 
                                                                        1.61066193131368 
                                                                        1.36548152885445 
                                                                        1.53515697807603]; 
%% 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.stats.factorial_design.globalm.gmsca.gmsca_no = 1; 
matlabbatch{1}.spm.stats.factorial_design.globalm.glonorm = 2; 
matlabbatch{2}.spm.stats.fmri_est.spmmat(1) = cfg_dep; 
matlabbatch{2}.spm.stats.fmri_est.spmmat(1).tname = 'Select SPM.mat'; 
matlabbatch{2}.spm.stats.fmri_est.spmmat(1).tgt_spec{1}(1).name = 'filter'; 
matlabbatch{2}.spm.stats.fmri_est.spmmat(1).tgt_spec{1}(1).value = 'mat'; 
matlabbatch{2}.spm.stats.fmri_est.spmmat(1).tgt_spec{1}(2).name = 'strtype'; 
matlabbatch{2}.spm.stats.fmri_est.spmmat(1).tgt_spec{1}(2).value = 'e'; 
matlabbatch{2}.spm.stats.fmri_est.spmmat(1).sname = 'Factorial design specification: SPM.mat File'; 
matlabbatch{2}.spm.stats.fmri_est.spmmat(1).src_exbranch = substruct('.','val', '{}',{1}, '.','val', '{}',{1}, 
'.','val', '{}',{1}); 
matlabbatch{2}.spm.stats.fmri_est.spmmat(1).src_output = substruct('.','spmmat'); 
matlabbatch{2}.spm.stats.fmri_est.method.Classical = 1; 
matlabbatch{3}.spm.stats.con.spmmat(1) = cfg_dep; 
matlabbatch{3}.spm.stats.con.spmmat(1).tname = 'Select SPM.mat'; 
matlabbatch{3}.spm.stats.con.spmmat(1).tgt_spec{1}(1).name = 'filter'; 
matlabbatch{3}.spm.stats.con.spmmat(1).tgt_spec{1}(1).value = 'mat'; 
matlabbatch{3}.spm.stats.con.spmmat(1).tgt_spec{1}(2).name = 'strtype'; 
matlabbatch{3}.spm.stats.con.spmmat(1).tgt_spec{1}(2).value = 'e'; 
matlabbatch{3}.spm.stats.con.spmmat(1).sname = 'Model estimation: SPM.mat File'; 
matlabbatch{3}.spm.stats.con.spmmat(1).src_exbranch = substruct('.','val', '{}',{2}, '.','val', '{}',{1}, 
'.','val', '{}',{1}); 
matlabbatch{3}.spm.stats.con.spmmat(1).src_output = substruct('.','spmmat'); 
matlabbatch{3}.spm.stats.con.consess{1}.tcon.name = '+MetaD'; 
matlabbatch{3}.spm.stats.con.consess{1}.tcon.convec = 1; 
matlabbatch{3}.spm.stats.con.consess{1}.tcon.sessrep = 'none'; 
matlabbatch{3}.spm.stats.con.consess{2}.tcon.name = '-MetaD'; 
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matlabbatch{3}.spm.stats.con.consess{2}.tcon.convec = -1; 
matlabbatch{3}.spm.stats.con.consess{2}.tcon.sessrep = 'none'; 
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11.4  RAW SPM OUTPUT 
11.4.1 METACOGNITIVE EFFICIENCY 
Figure A.11.4-1 is the raw SPM output displaying the “glass brain view” of the 
positive associations between gray matter volume and metacognitive efficiency. Figure 
A.11.4-2 is the raw SPM output displaying the “glass brain view” of the negative associations 
between gray matter volume and metacognitive efficiency. Gray and black ‘blobs’ indicate 
significant areas of gray matter associated with metacognitive efficiency in the axial, sagittal 
and coronal views.  The reported statistics demonstrate the corrected and uncorrected 
significance values for clusters and peak voxels of gray matter associated with metacognitive 
efficiency. 
 
Figure A.11.4-1 Glass brain view, cluster statistics and peak voxel statistics for metacognitive efficiency 
statistical analysis (positive). 




Figure A.11.4-2 Glass brain view, cluster statistics and peak voxel statistics for metacognitive efficiency 
statistical analysis (negative). 
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11.4.2 BCIS SELF-REFLECTION 
Figure A.11.4-3 is the raw SPM output displaying the “glass brain view” of the 
positive associations between gray matter volume and BCIS self-reflection (SR). Figure 
A.11.4-4 is the raw SPM output displaying the “glass brain view” of the negative associations 
between gray matter volume and metacognitive efficiency. Gray and black ‘blobs’ indicate 
significant areas of gray matter associated with metacognitive efficiency in the axial, sagittal 
and coronal views.  The reported statistics demonstrate the corrected and uncorrected 
significance values for clusters and peak voxels of gray matter associated with metacognitive 
efficiency. 
 
 Figure A.11.4-3 Glass brain view, cluster statistics and peak voxel statistics for SR statistical analysis 
(positive). 
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11.4.3 BCIS SELF-CERTAINTY 
Figure A.11.4-5 is the raw SPM output displaying the “glass brain view” of the 
positive associations between gray matter volume and BCIS self-certainty (SC). Figure A.11.4-
6 is the raw SPM output displaying the “glass brain view” of the negative associations 
between gray matter volume and SC scores. Gray and black ‘blobs’ indicate significant areas 
of gray matter associated with SC scores in the axial, sagittal and coronal views.  The 
reported statistics demonstrate the corrected and uncorrected significance values for 
clusters and peak voxels of gray matter associated with SC scores. 
 
 Figure A.11.4-5 Glass brain view, cluster statistics and peak voxel statistics for SC statistical analysis (positive). 
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Figure A.11.4-6 Glass brain view, cluster statistics and peak voxel statistics for SC statistical analysis (negative). 
 
 
